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SUMMARY 
 
After discussing the Malawian context and summarising the remittance research, I focus 
on remittances in rural Malawi. I follow remittances from the giver’s motivations through 
to the receiver’s view of remittances and how the receiver uses them and finally to their 
impact as a means of moderating the effect of negative shocks on the receiving household. 
 
Results show that parents remit to respondents for altruistic purposes, or for insurance 
motivations (e.g. to help out the respondent if they are sick). Respondents remit to 
parents for altruistic motivations and inheritance. There is strong bi-directionality in the 
remittance flows.  Children remit to respondents as an “insurance premium”, and for 
inheritance motivations. Altruism motivates respondents to give to their children. There is 
strong evidence of co-insurance between respondents and their siblings with both 
insurance payouts and premiums being paid. Respondents and their siblings also remit to 
each other for altruistic motivations. 
 
There is strong evidence of “mental accounting” amongst both male and female headed 
households. Remittances exhibit a much lower MPC than salary and farming income. Male 
and female headed households differ in their use of income from different sources, 
however one result is consistent: remittances are used for education. 
 
Probit models indicate that households are more likely to receive remittances from local 
areas if someone in the household is sick (local remittances insure a health shock). 
Households that suffer from drought are more likely to receive remittances from more 
distant areas (other districts, a city, abroad). Drought has a major negative impact on 
consumption levels but distant remittances insure affected households who suffer from 
these. Local remittances, which make up most remittance flows, are unable to insure 
these community shocks. Only around 10 per cent of households receive remittances from 
outside their home district however. Remittances help to insure household consumption 
against health shocks, but only food consumption is insured. 
 
 viii
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1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Remittances have become an increasingly important source of income for developing 
countries and their populations making the understanding of the role that they play at  
national and household levels an ever more relevant issue. In Malawi, remittances are a 
key component of both income and expenditure at the household level. They fulfil not 
only a social role, but also have essential economic purposes such as insuring weather 
shocks – vital in an agricultural economy facing increasing climactic uncertainty.  
 
Using Malawian data, this study looks at remittances from three separate but related 
angles. Firstly, motivations to remit are studied in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the uses of 
remittances, and how they are viewed by the receiver is studied, and in Chapter 7, the 
importance of remittances as a means of insuring negative shocks is discussed. In all cases, 
existing work is extended in a timely and relevant way. Prior to analysing the data in 
chapters 5 to 7, an in-depth literature review is provided in Chapter 2, descriptive 
statistics and a general overview of the data are given in Chapter 3, and the empirical 
methodologies used are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
This present chapter fulfils the important role of giving background information on both 
remittances and the Malawian context. In doing so, it helps to situate this thesis in 
relation to other studies and to draw parallels with macro level studies. It gives important 
information regarding the Malawian economic and social context, which is relevant for 
the thesis. In particular, “health” is given its own section due to its importance in both 
social and economic terms in Malawi, as well as the links between health and several 
elements of this study. Chapter 5 includes health shocks as a potential motivation for 
remitting, and Chapter 7 focuses on the role of remittances (regardless of motivation) in 
insuring shocks (including health). 
 
For similar reasons, while discussing the economic background and environment in 
Malawi, considerable weight is given to discussing agriculture. Agriculture is the mainstay 
of the Malawian economy in terms of employment, exports and contribution to GDP. In 
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addition, the agricultural environment is particularly relevant for this thesis, since all 
empirical chapters analyse rural Malawi. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON REMITTANCES 
This thesis studies remittances on a micro (household or individual) level. In order to 
place the study within its wider context however, this section gives background 
information on remittances. Firstly the macroeconomic and international trends and 
impacts are summarised before focussing on the microeconomic level. This helps to draw 
parallels between household and international studies of remittance flows including their 
motivations and impacts, and helps view this thesis from a more global perspective.  
1.2.1 Evolution and importance of international remittance flows 
Elbadawi and Rocher (1992) in El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) calculate that by 1990 
remittance flows had increased fivefold since 1970 to US$33.8bn. Gammeltoft (2002) 
compares flows of remittances, aid, FDI and other official and financial flows from the 
official statistics of developing countries from 1991-2000. Official remittances doubled to 
US$65bn between 1991 and 1999 and including estimates of unofficial flows such as 
those made through hawala-type systems these flows could increase to over US$100bn. 
Over the same period, aid fell by 16 per cent to US$41.6bn and the value of flows of FDI 
has increased continually. In 1991, aid was the largest single component of resource flows 
comprising 32 per cent, but by 1999 FDI accounted for over half of all financial flows to 
developing countries.  
 
Ratha (2004) calculates that remittance receipts for developing countries were worth 1.3 
per cent of their GDP or around US$72.3bn in 2004. This amounts to 42 per cent of the 
value of FDI in this year. He finds that remittances to least developed countries (LDCs) are 
larger as a share of GDP than those to middle-income countries (1.9 per cent versus 0.8 
per cent). Ratha (2007) shows that 2006 remittance flows were double their 2001 levels 
at over US$200bn, and believes them to be greater than FDI when informal transfers are 
included. 
 
Several factors have contributed to this increase with increased migration being 
particularly responsible. El-Sakka and NcNabb (1999) also discuss active policy by the 
Egyptian Government to encourage remittance inflows since the 1960s. The Pakistani 
Government also operates policies to encourage remittances including offering privileges 
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such as special lounges in airports, free insurance, exemption from certain import duties 
and emergency renewal of passports for those who remit over a certain amount. The 
Mexican Government subsidises remittances used to invest in businesses (Orozco, 2002b). 
In addition, improved and expanded data collection has helped to increase apparent 
remittance flows (De Luna Martinez, 2005). 
 
All of these studies are however, limited by the lack of information on transfers. For 
example, informal and largely unrecorded transfers made through hawala/hundi1 systems 
are believed to amount to a significant proportion of international remittance flows (e.g. 
Anarfi et al., 2000). In addition, official remittance flows are significantly under-reported 
since different countries collect different information. For example, some countries 
collect data on transfers made through the Post Office as well as banks, but others collect 
data only on those made through banks. Banks will often allow a customer to posess two 
debit cards, one of which can be sent to a remittance receiver, who is able to withdraw 
money directly from cash machines. The value of these flows is estimated in some places, 
but not in others (De Luna Martinez, 2005). Adams and Page (2005) found that sub-
Saharan African countries have the highest proportion of unrecorded remittances equal 
to 73 per cent of recorded flows. If Malawi is typical, the true value of international 
remittances will be closer to two per cent of GDP rather than the one per cent currently 
estimated (WDI, 2006). 
 
Despite the data limitations, a number of characteristics and impacts of international 
remittances can be discerned. For example, they tend to be stable or counter-cyclical 
(Gammeltoft, 2002), and increased in value during the 1995 Mexican crisis, the Asian 
currency crisis during the late 1990s and during natural disasters such as hurricanes in 
central America (Clarke and Wallsten, 2003) the Asian Tsunami (Ratha, 2007) and the 
northern Pakistani earthquake in 2005 (Savage and Harvey, 2007). Ahmed (2000) also 
notes a steady increase in remittances towards Somalia during conflict years. In addition, 
El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that inflation in the home country (Egypt) has a positive 
                                                
1
 These systems allow the sender to enter a dealer’s offices (often located in their own homes) and request 
that funds be sent to a recipient. S/he then pays the dealer, who then contacts another dealer close to the 
home of the intended recipient (usually by telephone). In rural areas, the local recipient will often be able to 
identify the recipient by name and deliver the funds directly to their house. Dealers keep records of flows in 
each direction, and any flows which are not netted out are settled through the occasional transfer of funds  
between dealers (in the form of cash,  gold, jewellery or other means). These systems are widespread and 
able to function at very low cost (around 0.5 to 1% of the value of the transfer) and the low set-up costs 
means that the system is highly pervasive, even in remote areas. 
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impact on remittances concluding that senders increase flows in order to support families 
during times of rising price levels. Although these are measured on a macro level, these 
characteristics indicate that remittances are, at least in part, driven by altruism and/or 
insurance. In contrast to El-Sakka and McNabb (1999), Higgins, Hysenbegasi and Pozo 
(2004) find that inflation in a migrant’s country of origin has a negative impact on 
remittance flows in Latin America whilst increased inflation in their host country serves to 
increase remittances as migrants seek to protect their purchasing power. A nominal 
depreciation of the receiving country’s (migrant’s country of origin) exchange rate 
increases remittances suggesting that migrants take advantage of potentially higher 
returns to investments. An anticipated depreciation however causes remittances to fall 
temporarily as they are delayed. Motivations to remit on a micro level are tested for in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) look at the impact of remittance receipts on the real 
exchange rate (RER) of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries. They control for 
technical progress differentials, government spending, external terms of trade, interest 
rates and foreign aid and account for the endogeneity of remittances and potential 
endogeneity of foreign aid. They find that a doubling in the value of per capita 
remittances causes the RER of the receiving country to appreciate by 22 per cent, and 
conclude that remittances are potentially associated with the risk of “Dutch Disease”. The 
same study finds that foreign aid does not have a significant impact on the RER, perhaps 
because during the period studied (1979-1998) much aid was tied to purchases from the 
donor country. 
 
Risk of Dutch Disease and/or Balassa-Samuelson effects is strongly linked to the 
microeconomic uses of remittance income. El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that the 
income elasticity of imports from remittances is high while the price elasticity is low. This 
may indicate that remittances in kind (defined, in Egypt, to include only the value of 
imports funded directly by remittances) are predominately luxury goods. Finance may 
thus be diverted away from investment and towards conspicuous consumption. The uses 
of remittances are studied in Chapter 6.  
 
Page and Plaza (2006) note that remittances, the extent of a country’s overseas diaspora, 
and investment are strongly linked. In 2000, 45 per cent of the total US$41bn of inward 
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FDI for China came from the Chinese diaspora. Gould (1994) finds that a 10 per cent 
increase in immigrants to the US is associated with a 4.7 per cent increase in US exports 
to immigrants’ country of origin. Head and Ries (1998) use a Tobit specification of an 
augmented gravity model to find that a 10 per cent increase in the stock of immigrants 
increases exports by 1-1.3 per cent and imports by 3.1-3.9 per cent. 
 
Remittances can have an important impact on economic growth and poverty. 
Summarising previous literature, Chami et al. (2003) report that positive Keynesian 
multipliers can be identified for  remittances. Short-term multipliers between 1.24 and 
3.2 are reported (Adelman and Taylor, 1990; Davies and Davey, 2008). 
 
Modelling remittances, Chami et al. (2003) measure per capita economic growth as a 
function of workers’ remittances. Under all specifications of their theoretical model, they 
find a negative relationship. Their results are robust even when instrumenting to correct 
the problem of endogeneity; the main causes of growth might also influence remittances. 
They conclude that “[n]ot only do remittances in low-growth countries tend to be higher, 
but higher remittances within a country are associated with lower growth” (p.74). 
 
Adams and Page (2003) look at the impact of inward remittances on poverty. They find 
that a 10 per cent increase in remittances as a percentage of GDP decreases the share of 
people living in poverty by 1.6 per cent. Furthermore, the poorest tend to be the largest 
beneficiaries, with the poverty gap also decreasing in remittances. This paper has the 
weakness of assuming that remittances are exogenous. It does not consider a household’s 
income under the alternative situation that the remitting migrant had stayed and worked 
at home. 
 
Yang and Martinez (2005) use data on household level remittance receipts in the 
Philippines from before and after the 1997 Asian currency crisis and find that that “an 
increase in the migrant households’ remittances receipts equivalent to 10 per cent of pre-
crisis household income reduces the poverty rate among such households by 2.8 
percentage points”. Additionally, they find that non-migrant households benefit from 
increased gifts, reduction in poverty rates and poverty gap thanks to the “trickle-down 
effect” of remittance income. 
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Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) simulate a model to estimate the change in poverty 
rates in Lesotho – a country in which remittances (mostly from South African mines) 
made up around 40 per cent of GNP at the time studied (1986/87) – if workers were 
forced to return home. In their most advanced model which considers the labour of 
returned miners, an additional 11 to 14 per cent of households would be classified as 
poor. 
1.2.2 Microeconomic impacts 
Studies have shown that remittances can impact on consumption and savings behaviour 
(studied in Chapter 6) including investment in education (discussed in Chapter 6) and 
business, labour market behaviour, and can act as insurance for shocks (studied in 
Chapter 7). The impact of remittances can be determined by the motivation for sending 
them (studied in Chapter 5). 
1.2.2.1 Consumption behaviour 
In an analysis of 200 semi-urban Salvadorian households, Benavides et al. (2003) 
postulate that households with and without migrants will exhibit different consumption 
patterns. They split their sample accordingly and find that households with migrants 
exhibit a higher savings rate (22.5 per cent versus 3.9 per cent of income) and invest over 
three times more in health, education and other categories than non-migrant households. 
Furthermore school-age children in migrant households are more likely to be enrolled in 
education than those in other households. Looking at poverty, these same authors find 
that absolute poverty is lower for households with migrants than those without (72.5 per 
cent versus 94.4 per cent). However, income and expenditure in migrant households are 
around 50 per cent higher than in non-migrant households leaving open the question of 
causality. 
 
Taylor and Mora (2006) attempt to answer the question “Does Migration Reshape 
Expenditure in Rural Households?”. They suggest that this may occur through remittances 
but choose to separate their (Mexican) sample into households with a migrant and those 
without whilst controlling for any potential selection bias using Inverse Mill’s Ratios. They 
find that households with international migrants dedicate a larger marginal budget share 
to investments than non-migrant households (0.21 compared with 0.10). Households with 
US migrants also spend more at the margin on consumer durables than other households 
(0.22 against 0.12) and more on services than non-migrant households (0.23 versus 0.16). 
 7
However, households with internal migrants exhibit a lower marginal propensity to invest 
than non-migrant households (0.06 compared with 0.10).  
 
The 2006 Malawian Migration Baseline Survey (MBS) interviewed 9,546 respondents of 
whom 736 were migrants. It looked at the link between migration and remittances and 
found that remittances contributed an average of six per cent to total household income 
with farming produce adding an additional 31 per cent, casual labour (known as “ganyu”) 
27 per cent and wage employment 18 per cent. 27 per cent of households only sent (and 
did not receive) remittances, with the MBS report assuming this always went to a worker 
away from home. 15 per cent of households received remittances and 17 per cent both 
sent and received remittances. The findings also indicate that male migrants are more 
likely to remit than female migrants with two thirds of males remitting as opposed to one 
third of females. This is likely to be a reflection of the reasons for migrating. Men are 
more likely than females to migrate for employment and remit home.  
 
Although difficult to assess due to the fungibility of assets, the MBS asked respondents 
about how they spend the  remittances they receive. Respondents reported that  
remittances were primarily used to fund the  purchase of food, with 75 per cent of urban 
households, and 46 per cent of rural households reporting using their remittance receipts 
to purchase food. Remittances were also important to pay for water and medical bills. 
These uses show that remittances are used for necessities (perhaps following a negative 
shock), and the medical expenditure suggests insurance or altruistic motivations for 
remitting. 
 
Table 1.1: Reported Uses of Remittances by Respondents of 2006 Malawi Migration Baseline Survey 
 Rural Urban 
Food 46.0% 75.0% 
Water 25.6% 5.4% 
Medicine 20.1% 13.4% 
Source: Adapted from NSO (2006) 
1.2.2.2 Education 
Yang (2005) and Yang and Martinez (2005) find that increases in remittance flows in the 
Philippines resulting from the 1997  exchange rate shock led to improved schooling 
expenditure; a decrease in child labour; an increase in durable good ownership and 
increased investment in capital intensive entrepreneurial activity. 
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Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) focus on the use of remittances for investment in 
education in El Salvador. They examine the effects of remittances on school dropout rates 
amongst families which receive remittances and those which do not. They find that the 
hazard of dropping out decreases by 0.4 per cent as household income increases by 100 
colones, although in rural areas this impacts only after the 6th grade. The receipt of 875 
colones (the median remittance) decreases the hazard of dropping out before the 6th 
grade by 54 per cent and by 27 per cent from the 7th to 12th grade.  The impact of 
remittances at its smallest is 10 times the size of the effect of any other income source. 
The authors offer two explanations for this. Firstly they suggest that remittances are more 
stable than other sources of income and so offer a better proxy for permanent income 
than other sources of income (although, since they use cross-sectional data, they offer no 
proof of this in this instance). The second is that there is a higher propensity to spend on 
children’s schooling out of remittances than out of other sources. They explain this result 
by suggesting that such spending is a condition of continuing to receive remittance 
payments. Chapter 6 focuses on MPC out of remittances and finds that remittances are 
indeed used to fund education. However, Chapter 6 offers an alternative explanation. 
 
Kozel and Alderman (1990) in Chami et al. (2003) report that the receipt of remittances 
has a negative effect on the probability of labour market participation amongst male 
adults in Pakistani households. The full long-term impact of this is difficult to assess given 
that we do not know whether time was spent in education or leisure. Bokosi (2001) notes 
that labour is already underemployed in Malawi. 
 
Lucas (1987) found improvements in agricultural practices due to investment from 
remittance income. However, he found that the associated gains were offset by the 
effects of labour withdrawal from agriculture towards mines. More importantly, Azam 
and Gubert (2004) find that the lower crop production is not simply a result of the 
withdrawn labour, but a behavioural (moral hazard) response to the receipt of 
remittances.  
1.2.2.3 Business 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006a) analyse the links between remittances and business 
ownership. They model remittances and entrepreneurship as being simultaneously 
determined since ownership of a business may influence receipt of remittances while 
receipt of remittances may influence entrepreneurship. They find that business 
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ownership raises the probability of receiving remittances (even from extended family) by 
20 percentage points. However, receiving remittances lowers the probability of owning a 
business. They suggest that “while remittances may loosen the budget constraints faced 
by some households when it comes to business ownership, these monetary inflows also 
induce an income effect that raises the reservation wages of those household members” 
(p.950). 
 
Orozco (2003) indicates that remittances tend to be saved or invested in education, 
health or wealth generation. Citing Woodruf and Zenteno (2001), he notes that 
remittances were “responsible for 27 per cent of the capital invested in micro-enterprises 
in Mexico”. Orozco (2002) finds in a study of six developing countries plus Portugal that 
“at least 10 per cent of recipient households use their money for a savings or investment 
scheme”, and Iskanda (2002) in Orozco (2002) states that 70 per cent of Moroccans living 
abroad have invested in Morocco, compared with only 30 per cent who have invested in 
their host countries. 
 
Massey and Parrado (1998) use repeated cross-sectional data from 1982-83 and from 
1987 to 1992 to assess the link between international remittances and business 
formation in Mexico. Using a probit model, they find that receipt of remittances increases 
the likelihood that a household will form a business and increases productive investment, 
although the latter was more influenced by personal, household and community 
characteristics than remittances or migration as such. They also find that remittances 
received during a household migrant’s absence had little impact on business formation, 
but rather, following the migrants’ return, remittances increased business investment. 
Local market conditions also play a role, with some areas being more entrepreneurial 
than others. 
 
In a report based on the Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) Survey undertaken in Malawi 
in 2000, Ebony Consulting International Ltd, Kadale Consultants and the National 
Statistics Office (2000) find that the principal source of MSE start-up capital is remittance 
income in around 12 to 19 per cent of cases between 1998 and 2000. Furthermore, the 
percentage of business start-ups using this source of income as their major start-up 
capital is increasing over time. This is compared with an average of two per cent which 
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used credit institutions, seven per cent who used loans from family or friends and 61 per 
cent who used personal savings. 
 
McCormick and Wahba (2001) use a dataset of 1,526 return migrants to Egypt. They note 
that 10 per cent of returnees invest in economic projects. They find that 19 per cent 
become employers compared with 10 per cent pre-migration and one third of new 
entrepreneurs judged skills acquired abroad to be useful. Savings accumulated overseas 
were also important. Furthermore, the private sector is more favoured post migration 
with just nine per cent returning to public enterprises against 44 per cent before 
migration. The industrial pattern of employment remains similar however with a modest 
shift away from agriculture and production. Using a probit model to estimate the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur, McCormick and Wahba (2001) find that the 
savings acquired abroad are most important in setting up a business for those with lower 
education who perhaps find it more difficult to access credit in Egypt, while overseas 
experience (skills gained) matters most for the better educated. 
 
Ahmed (2000) notes that 15 per cent of remittance receivers in post-war Somaliland used 
their remittances to set up businesses or acquire land or housing. He also reported other 
main uses of remittances as being consumption, celebrations (such as marriage) and 
blood money (payable under Islamic sharia law in lieu of execution following a murder). 
 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) use a probit model to estimate the probability of an 
individual being a business owner, controlling for personal characteristics. They use the 
migration rate of the state in which the individual is living and the state in which s/he was 
born as a proxy for “access to remittances”. The results are compared with Bank of 
Mexico remittance data and results are shown to be similar. They find that both higher 
migration rates and higher remittance levels are “generally associated with higher rates 
of enterprise ownership”, with the effect being stronger for female and internal migrants 
than for males and those who migrate abroad. The paper continues to estimate the log of 
capital invested in business enterprises (but seems not to control for potential selection 
bias) to find that invested capital is higher in states with more migration to the US and “a 
one standard deviation increase in the migration rate is associated with an increase in 
invested capital of about 10 per cent”. 
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1.2.2.4 Remittance mechanisms and the impact of technology 
International remittances can be sent formally or informally. Formal remittances will tend 
to be in the form of cash sent through banks or money transfer agencies. Different 
countries count these differently. For example some include those sent through the post 
office and others do not. In addition, some banks allow account holders to have several 
cash cards. One of these can be sent abroad and the remittance receiver can withdraw a 
certain amount per month. Some countries make efforts to calculate the value of these 
‘semi-formal’ remittances, whilst others do not. In this case it is difficult to know which 
flows are remittances and which are simply the remitter visiting family in his/her home 
country. 
 
Both internal and international informal transfers are made in several ways. The remitter 
might save money and then carry it in cash to the recipient. Alternatively cash might be 
given to a friend or family member to take to the receiver. Internally, or across land 
borders, cash might be given to those who make a trip regularly such as bus drivers. In 
some areas, hindu or hawala systems are also used. Finally, the remitter might make 
purchases directly for the receiver. This might include paying school fees directly, or 
giving gifts. 
 
Over large (or even small) distances, and where technology is not easily available, the 
costs of remittances can be prohibitive. It can take a day or longer to make even short 
journeys in rural Africa, and large firms are often unable to reach the rural poor.  
 
The recent development of mobile phone networks which pervade even the remotest 
rural African areas are giving Africans access to national and international networks which 
can be used to transfer funds. Many phone companies allow remitters to text funds to 
receivers, who are then able to ‘cash in’ their balance at local stores. This is greatly 
reducing the costs of remitting to rural areas, and, although little research has been 
undertaken to date, this innovation has the potential to greatly reduce transaction costs. 
The impact of this has yet to be observed. 
 
Finally, both governments and the World Bank
2
 are making efforts to publicise the costs 
of sending international remittances in an effort to encourage competition amongst 
                                                
2
 See: http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/  
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formal money transferors and reduce costs. This has had additional impetus since 9/11 
since western governments  value the importance of formal remittance flows as opposed 
to informal finance, which can be used to finance terrorism. 
 
1.3 THE MALAWIAN CONTEXT 
1.3.1 Geography 
Malawi is a small country situated in south-east Africa measuring approximately 900km 
from north to south and 80-150km from east to west with Lake Malawi covering 
approximately a fifth of its total area. It is densely populated with a population of around 
13 million. Although Lake Malawi is the third largest freshwater lake in Africa, the country 
is landlocked and borders Tanzania to the north, Mozambique to the west, south and east 
and Zambia to the east. There have been recent moves to allow medium sized ocean 
going vessels direct access to Malawian ports through canals and rivers in Mozambique. 
Figure 1-1: Map of Malawi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Map of southern Africa 
 
    Source: oasisafrica.com 
 
Malawi is a largely rural country with around 
15 per cent of the population living in cities. 
The four main cities are Lilongwe, the capital 
in the centre of the country, Mzuzu in the 
north and Blantyre (the commercial capital) 
and Zomba (the former capital) in the south. 
 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
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1.3.2 History and society 
The Malawian population is largely descended from several waves of migration. Bantu 
tribes began to migrate into the area from central Africa from around 200AD bringing 
with them Iron Age agricultural technologies. During the sixteenth century Maravi Bantu 
tribes began to settle in Malawi and the majority of modern Malawians including the 
Chewa who are dominant in the south and central regions and the Tumbuka who are 
dominant in the north are descended from this wave of migration. 
 
During the nineteenth century Yao tribes entered the southern region from Mozambique 
partly displacing the Maravi from the area and Ngoni Zulus migrated northwards from 
South Africa, eventually settling in central and northern Malawi. 
 
Arab slave and ivory traders, who had been active along the east coast of Africa for a 
millennium began moving inland during the nineteenth century bringing with them Arabic 
culture and Islam. Arabic influence remains strong in some areas of the south. Around the 
same time British missionaries and scientists were arriving in Malawi bringing with them 
Christianity and commerce. Modern Malawian school books look favourably upon the 
“achievements of the Muslims and … the Christian missionary groups” (Standard 6: p.80). 
Today around 80 per cent of the country is Christian of various denominations; around 15 
per cent is Muslim; and 5 per cent hold traditional religious beliefs of worship of a single 
God through ancestors (Mkandawire, 1999: p.38; Phiri, 2004: p.29). There is little (but 
growing) religious tension and a majority Christian electorate elected a southern Muslim 
president, Bakili Muluzi, in 1994. 
 
Although Malawi is generally a harmonious place whose people are proud to be a 
“peaceful nation”, the country has strong regional divisions. Today these divisions 
manifest themselves in the religious make-up of the regions (Muslims are concentrated in 
the South along Arab-Swahili slave trading routes); language (Tumbuka is spoken in the 
North and Yao in some southern areas while Chichewa is used in most other regions); 
voting (political parties have strong regional biases (Mkandawire, 1999: pp.20-21)); and 
inheritance and marriage customs (the north is largely patrilineal and patrilocal whilst the 
south and centre is more matrilineal and matrilocal).  
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In addition, the colonial legacy has left vast disparities in education and industrial capacity. 
Christian missionaries tended to set up schools in the north of Malawi, while industrialists 
set up production facilities in the south. The result is that upon independence, 55 per 
cent of northern children attended school compared with around a third in the rest of the 
country (McCracken, 2002). Industry is concentrated in the south where the industrialists 
tended to settle. 
 
Today, literacy rates are 82.1 per cent of the population for men and 70.7 per cent for 
women, but both literacy and school attendance are higher in the north (NSO, 2006b: 
p.37). Furthermore, in some northern regions, female literacy rates are higher than those 
of men, while the greatest gender disparities exist in the southern tip (Sena-speaking 
area) of Malawi with the male rate of literacy being over 22 percentage points higher 
than that for females. School enrolment rates amongst 6 to 13 year olds are on average 
65.7 per cent but this increases to over 85 per cent in many northern areas, and falls to 
under 55 per cent in some southern areas. Education levels are greater on average in the 
north, with 7-9 years of education on average, while many areas in the south have less 
than 4 years of formal education. Educational achievement is higher in urban areas than 
rural ones, with less than 2.5 per cent of rural people achieving their Malawi High School 
Certificate, compared with over 10 per cent in urban areas (NSO, 1998). 
1.3.2.1 Health 
This section will show that health is an important issue in Malawi and can have a large 
impact on the both the household and the wider economy. Discussion of health is best 
done by classifying issues into those related to HIV/AIDS and other issues. This section 
provides essential information for understanding the context of the study, and also helps 
to justify studying health shocks in the context of motivations for remitting in Chapter 5 
and remittances as insurance for health shocks in Chapter 7. An overview of Malawi’s 
health situation and findings regarding specific issues such as malaria and malnutrition 
are provided. A dedicated section deals separately with HIV/AIDS.  
 
Malawi has three central hospitals and over 40 regional ones. However these are not 
spread evenly with some districts not having any medical facilities (King and King, 2000). 
Access to these hospitals remains difficult with average walks of over 12 kilometres to 
reach a hospital and between 2 and 5km to reach a health centre (Conroy et al., 2006: 
p.105). Health care spending is around £3 per patient compared with £700 per patient in 
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the UK (King and King, 2000: p.19); one surgeon per one million people compared with 
one per 30,000 in the UK and one doctor per 30,000 compared with one per 600 in the 
UK (King and King, 2000: p.30). The health service relies on medical assistants and “clinical 
officers”. Clinical officers are often confused with doctors but do not have the same level 
of training. This is partly a calculated move by the Government which ceases a doctor’s 
training before doctor status is reached, ensuring staff do not migrate to developed 
countries. 
 
Malawi lacks important medical staff with vacancy rates of between 42 and 87.8 per cent 
for positions of different grades in both government and Christian Health Association of 
Malawi (CHAM)3 clinics and hospitals (Conroy et al., 2006: p.38). This remains the case 
despite the British Department for International Development (DfID) paying to double 
medical workers’ salaries in 2006 and ensuring the funds are available to pay any new 
medical staff. “Of the 26 districts in the country, ten have no Ministry of Health doctor 
and four districts are without any doctors” (Conroy et al., 2006: pp.43-44). 
 
Using Demographic and Household survey data, Devereux et al. (2006) report that around 
48 per cent of children in Malawi are stunted. Furthermore, there is a strong association 
between child stunting and the mother’s education, with incidence of stunting falling 
significantly after 4 years of education. The problem is most severe in urban areas (NSO, 
2006b: p.12). “Malnutrition is severe in Malawi because the great majority of the 
population cannot afford to eat enough even in normal [crop yield] years” (Conroy et al., 
2006: p.41). The average Malawian consumes 1818 calories per day, and poor households 
which account for 65 percent of the population consume only 1428 calories per day 
compared to the 2000 to 2500 calories needed to sustain the average adult male (Conroy 
et al., 2006: pp.39-41). 
 
The impact of malaria is also severe for households and the national economy in Malawi. 
40 per cent of outpatient visits are due to malaria and malaria accounts for 18 per cent of 
the deaths of under-fives (NSO, 2006b: p.17; Conroy et al., 2006: p.34). Furthermore, 
malaria risk is highest during the agricultural season; the time at which households have 
the greatest need of their labour. Malaria dramatically decreases a household’s 
                                                
3
 CHAM provides around 37 per cent of Malawi’s healthcare (Conroy et al., 2006: p.146; The Nation, 
20/10/2006). 
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productivity since missing key dates for planting, harvesting or weeding has a severe 
negative impact on crop yields. Maize yields can be between almost nothing to around 
4,000kg per hectare depending upon fertiliser use and the weeding regime. The total cost 
of malaria to the average Malawian household is estimated to be around 22 per cent of 
annual household income (Conroy et al., 2006: pp.35-36 and p.90). 
1.3.2.2 A focus on HIV/AIDS 
Malawi has the tenth highest HIV prevalence in the world, with over half a million 
Malawians having died as a result of the disease and around half a million children having 
lost at least one parent to HIV/AIDS. AIDS has also had a strong impact on life expectancy 
with it having dropped to less than 39 years of age due to the disease. Without AIDS, it is 
estimated to have been around 56 years (Morah, 2007; Conroy et al., 2006: p.65). 
 
Official rates of HIV are around 14-15 per cent and have remained relatively steady since 
the turn of the 21st century. There is also some indication that official rates are actually 
over-estimates and that prevalence has fallen in recent years with the 2004 Malawi 
Demographic and Health Survey (MDHS) finding an infection rate of around 12 per cent 
(11 per cent in rural areas and 17 per cent in urban areas) (Morah, 2007).  
 
Morah (2007) analyses attitudes to the spread of HIV in Malawi following the discovery in 
a national survey conducted in 2003, that 94 per cent of the adult population agree with 
the proposition that “HIV is spread by people who know they are HIV-positive, but cannot 
or will not change their behaviour”. Morah (2007) uses a sample of 743 respondents of 
whom 327 were openly living with HIV and 416 individuals who were unaware of their 
HIV status. He finds that the HIV positive have better knowledge of the disease and are 
more much more likely to engage in safer sexual behaviour. Although they are more likely 
to practice safer sex, 56.6 per cent of HIV positive people did not report always practicing 
safer sex. 
 
Reasons for not practicing safer sex amongst those who did not know their sero-status 
varied but a full 12.6 per cent of those who did not know the sero-status of their partner 
reported not knowing where to purchase condoms or not knowing how to use them. 
Other reasons included fatalism: with 35.3 per cent of HIV positive and 30.7 per cent of 
sero-status unaware reporting that they believed that becoming infected was pre-
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destined by God/Allah. 23.2 per cent of HIV-positive and 39.4 per cent of sero-status 
unknowns believe that “condoms have holes in them that allow the HIV to go through”. 
 
King and King (2000) note that 80 per cent of the HIV patients under the age of thirty 
years were females but men predominated in the over-thirties patients with total deaths 
from each being equal. They conclude that inter-generational sex was responsible for this. 
This may be through transactional sex or through sexual cleansing rituals in which an 
older man known as a “fisi” or “hyena” has sex with young girls after they have gone 
through an initiation ceremony (Conroy et al., 2006: p.55). Such practices are being 
strongly discouraged through awareness campaigns and general promotion and 
discussion in the media (The Sunday Times, 24/10/2006; The Nation 23-29/10/2006). 
 
Conroy et al. (2006) believe that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is fuelled by the gender 
inequality “because women are unable either to refuse sex or to negotiate safe sex” 
(Conroy et al., 2006, p.29). Females are more likely to contract HIV at a younger age than 
men. Just over 10 per cent of new female infections occur between the ages of 20 and 24 
years, compared with 3 per cent of new male infections. Conroy et al. (2006: p.53-55) 
present evidence that younger women are having sex with older men. In addition, young 
women are more likely to contract HIV because their bodies are more physiologically 
vulnerable to HIV infection (Conroy et al., 2006: p.534). 
 
In her first person account of the 2002 famine in Malawi, Anne Conroy (in Conroy et al., 
2006: p.129) notes that “[y]oung women reported that many of them had multiple sexual 
partners during the food crisis in order to increase food availability for the family.” The 
number of patients presenting themselves with sexually transmitted infections (STI) 
increased by 31 per cent during the food crisis and teenage pregnancies increased by 93 
per cent and abortions by 62 per cent. In addition, levels of violence increased during the 
crisis “as people were beaten up (sometimes fatally) when they were caught stealing 
food” (p.129). Lack of insurance following climatic shocks can have important social and 
long run economic effects through health and makes the study of remittances as 
insurance, as in Chapter 7, essential. 
 
The economic and social impacts of HIV/AIDS are costly. Orphaned children represent 
around 13 per cent of the under-18 population (of which around half are AIDS orphans) 
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(Conroy et al., 2006: pp.144-145). This group are at greater risk of malnourishment and 
disease than other children, and the elderly are both deprived of their “pension” (in the 
form of help in their old age from their children) and are left to bring up young children. 
Decreased useful labour during the agricultural season decreases crop yields and 
resources are diverted to pay for health care and funerals. Experienced and 
knowledgeable people often die without having passed on their expertise. Households 
break up frequently where a member is chronically ill and husbands or wives (depending 
upon whether the tribe is matri- or patri-lineal) are expected to leave the village, often 
without their children who are cared for by distant relatives (Conroy et al., 2006: pp.76-
81).  
 
Conroy et al., (2006: pp.62-63) report that HIV is spread following migration of husbands 
who seek work outside of their native district. In order to supplement her income the 
wife will often engage in transactional sex, while husbands will pay for sex while away 
from the home. 
 
AIDS has had an impact on business with 37 per cent of firms in a sample of 22,000 
households and small businesses (with less than 50 employees) reporting being aware of 
being directly affected by the epidemic (Ebony Consulting International Ltd, Kadale 
Consultants and the National Statistics Office, 2000). Morah (2007), King and King (2000) 
and Conroy et al. (2006: p.51) report that the urban educated are at particular risk from 
HIV/AIDS. King and King (2000: p.77) note that “a woman whose husband attended more 
than eight years at school is twice as likely to be HIV-positive than a poor peasant 
woman”. This carries a high economic cost to the country as a whole and has strong 
negative consequences for businesses which already find it difficult to recruit employees 
with relevant skills. 
1.3.3 The economy 
Malawi’s economy grew steadily post independence, averaging three per cent per capita 
real growth to 1979. Like other developing countries, Malawi was hit hard by the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s. These, combined with a civil war in Mozambique which deprived 
Malawian exporters and importers of their main route to world markets and several 
droughts during the 1980s led the economy into difficulties. Structural Adjustments were 
introduced during the early 1980s but these did little to halt long term decline, with there 
being some criticism of the sequencing of reforms (Kherallah and Govindan, 1999; 
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Mkandawire, 1999: p.117). Real GDP per capita declined between 1981 and 1995 
(Mkandawire, 1999: pp.6-9). 
 
Today, Malawi is one of the least developed countries in the world. Although economic 
growth in per capita GDP has been reasonable in recent years (averaging 3.53 per cent 
over the period 2003 to 2005 (NSO, 2005)) and reaching 4.69 per cent in 2006 (WDI, 
2006), its PPP per capita GDP is US$630 (WDI, 2006). It is ranked 164th out of 177 
countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Indicator (UNDP, 2007).  
 
Malawi has a fast-growing population with annual population growth anticipated to be 
around 1.9 per cent per year until 2015. This is reflected in the age structure of the 
population with around 45 per cent being under the age of 15 years. The rapid population 
growth has caused crop land per capita to halve between 1977 and 1998, from 0.42 to 
0.23 hectares per person (Devereux et al., 2006). 
 
Over 52 per cent of the population live below the poverty line and inequality is relatively 
high with a Gini coefficient of 0.62 (0.45) in 1995 (1968) (Mkandawire, 1999: p.33). The 
country is largely rural with only around 15 per cent of the population living in urban 
areas (2001). This is expected to rise to 21 per cent by 2015 and compares with less than 
eight per cent in 1975. Malawi is thus the fastest urbanising country in the world (United 
Nations Human Settlement Programme, 2004). 
 
National debt has decreased sharply in recent years following debt relief programmes 
such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and debt cancellation by the 
British Government. Debt service declined from 7.1 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 2.2 per 
cent in 2001 (IMF, 2000). 
 
Malawi regularly runs current account deficits, importing more than it exports and has 
seen a doubling of exports and almost tripling of imports from 2002 to 2005. Malawi’s 
main export market is South Africa followed by Zimbabwe with which a trade agreement 
has recently been signed4. Agricultural goods make up around 80 per cent of Malawian 
exports with tobacco being the largest component. The tobacco industry is highly 
                                                
4
 See Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (18 July, 2006): 
http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=5089  
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concentrated with the two largest firms, Limbe Leaf and Alliance One, representing 90 per 
cent of all tobacco production. The importance of tobacco in industrial agricultural 
production is further attested to by the fact that 90 per cent of total agricultural credit is 
directed towards tobacco production (Imani Development, 2006). The Government is 
trying to alter this trade structure since tobacco is facing declining world demand and low 
prices. 
 
This export structure reflects the overall economic structure with 90 per cent of the 
labour force working in agriculture which contributes 36 per cent towards GDP. Industry 
contributes another 19 per cent towards total economic activity and services contribute 
around 45 per cent (2007 est. CIA World Factbook; Simler, 1997). The tobacco industry 
grew in importance under the Banda dictatorship which tightly regulated the industry and 
prevented smallholders from producing and handed out licences as favours. In 1970, 22 
million kilograms of tobacco was produced, rising to 130m by 1993. Tobacco exports 
contributed 39 per cent of export earnings in 1974 compared to 69 per cent by 1993 (van 
Donge, 2002). 
 
Inflation in Malawi is high by current western standards but remains under control by an 
independent central bank; it varied between 23 per cent and nine per cent between 2001 
and 2006 (WDI, 2006). The exchange rate policy has been one of a “managed float” since 
1994. There are currently (June 2008) around 140 kwacha to the dollar 
(www.chartflow.com), but the value of the kwacha is steadily declining due to the higher 
inflation in Malawi relative to that in the United States (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2000; 
Simwaka, Kisu and Mkandawire, 2006). Constant devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha (MK) 
has caused the relative price of imports to rise. This is particularly important with regards 
to agricultural fertiliser, and is especially salient given the importance of agriculture for 
the economy as a whole. 
 
Table 1.2 presents selected national indicators from Malawi and other countries in the 
region for comparison. 
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Table 1.2: Selected national indicators – Malawi and surrounding countries, 2004 
Series M
a
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GNI per capita, (current US$)  160 480 270 320 3,630 400 620 
GNI per capita, PPP (current 
international $)  631 1,130 1,168 671 10,964 890 2,041 
Aid per capita (current US$)  37.8 19.0 63.2 46.4 13.6 94.2 14.4 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP)  0.9 0.3 4.0 2.3 0.3 6.2 1.3 
Lending interest rate (%)  36.8 12.5 22.1 13.9 11.3 30.7 278.9 
Real interest rate (%)  22.7 5.2 8.4 9.5 5.1 8.7 -15.8 
Gross savings (% of GDP)  -7.7 13.6 6.2 8.5 14.4 12.5 3.1 
Exports of goods and services (% of 
GDP)  26.5 26.2 30.0 18.6 26.6 19.8 36.1 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports)  16.4 21.1 … 20.2 57.6 10.0 28.5 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)  11.4 11.1 13.3 7.4 20.0 12.1 13.6 
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people)  17.6 76.1 36.4 43.6 428.5 26.1 30.7 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)  1.6 13.2 5.8 7.4 82.2 9.8 77.3 
Price basket for Internet (US$ per 
month) 62.0 45.7 50.8 117.0 33.3 32.6 23.3 
Urban population (% of total)  16.7 40.5 36.8 36.5 57.4 36.2 35.4 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 
 
1.3.3.1 A focus on agriculture 
Since this thesis is focused on rural areas, it is appropriate to discuss the role of 
agriculture and its importance to the economy as a whole. 
 
Agriculture is a key element of the Malawian economy, contributing 35 per cent of GDP 
and earning 90 per cent of its export earnings (Simler, 1997). Smallholder farmers are the 
“breadbasket” of the economy with 84 per cent of agricultural production coming from 
around two million smallholder households cultivating one hectare of land or less (Conroy 
et al., 2006: p.24; Mkandawire, 1999: p.44). Estate farming occupies 12 per cent of arable 
land and produces 20 per cent of agricultural GDP with smallholders producing the 
remainder. Estates produce mainly tobacco, tea and sugar, the production of which earns 
95 per cent of total agricultural export earnings. Maize destined for consumption 
accounts for two thirds of smallholder agricultural output. The sector was strongly 
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regulated in post-independence Malawi, and a slow liberalisation was begun in the early 
1980s (Mkandawire, 1999: pp.46-49). 
 
Major reforms carried out between 1981 and 1999 include allowing smallholders to 
produce cash crops for export and liberalising fertiliser and output prices. The exchange 
rate was also liberalised during this period having a direct impact on estate farming 
through export earnings and on smallholder farming which requires fertiliser inputs to be 
imported (Kherallah and Govindan, 1999). Kherallah and Govindan (1999) and 
Mkandawire (1999: p.117) believe however that the sequencing of the reforms was not 
optimal. For example, input subsidies were reduced without first ensuring adequate rural 
credit systems were in operation. 
 
Agricultural policies have often changed unpredictably since the early 1980s. Pre-1987 
fertiliser was subsidised by the parastatal Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC). ADMARC was also the monopsony buyer of most agricultural 
produce. It funded the subsidies by buying below the market value for produce and 
selling at a profit with the price fixed centrally. In 1987 ADMARC’s monopsony was 
broken and private traders were allowed. Pricing controls for all crops were abandoned in 
1996 with the exception of maize which theoretically saw its price float between an upper 
and lower bound. ADMARC did not however have the financial power to enforce the 
upper and lower bounds. 
 
Attempts to help smallholders tended to be short term and either unsuccessful or lacking 
in political willpower; little attention has been paid to irrigation, for example, and 
smallholders have seen their purchasing power eroded year on year between 1968 and 
1996 as inflation increased by more than the prices they received from ADMARC for their 
produce (Mkandawire, 1999). This erosion of terms of trade coupled with a fast 
expanding population to feed increased the risk of poverty amongst smallholders. 
 
Devereux et al. (2006) note that livestock ownership is particularly low in Malawi 
compared with neighbouring countries with Malawians owning around 8.9 tropical 
livestock units per capita compared with 24.9 in Zambia and 157.5 in Botswana. Fear of 
crime is cited as one of the major reasons for not owning livestock. Although crime has 
increased since democratisation in the mid-1990s, Malawi remains a relatively safe 
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country. Regardless of the reasons, this leaves Malawian households with fewer assets to 
help them cope during the frequent years of poor harvest, and potentially increases the 
importance of remittances following shocks, as studied in Chapter 7. 
1.3.4 A comparison of Malawi and her neighbours 
Malawi’s neighbour, Zambia is the country closest to Malawi in both economic and socio-
cultural terms. The two major languages spoken in Malawi – ChiChewa and ChiTumbuka – 
are also spoken in large parts of Zambia. The two countries exhibit similar PPP per capita 
GDP, and along the borders there is a large amount of formal and informal connections 
between the peoples. 
 
Like Malawi, official international remittance receipts are a little under 1 per cent of GDP 
(World Bank, 2007a). However, internal remittances are of great importance as a survival 
mechanism. 
 
Studies show that remittances behave similarly in Zambia and Malawi. For example a 
report prepared by the consultancy firm, Finmark, indicates that remittances tend to be 
seasonal, coinciding with agricultural expenditures or helping to pay for school fees. 
Remittances might be cash, or in kind (Finmark Trust, 2008). Cliggett (2008) confirms that 
remittances in Zambia tend to be small gifts and are reciprocated. She finds that 
remittances are a means of social networking, and are important in order to maintain 
relationships with those who are able to ‘insure’ against negative shocks. 
 
The Finmark study found that remitters often have difficulty remitting, but that the single 
most popular means is bus drivers, who charge around 10 per cent of the value to 
transport the remittances. Around a quarter of senders reported using bus drivers to send 
remittances and all bus drivers interviewed reported regularly transporting remittances. 
Other neighbouring countries report differing amounts of international remittances. The 
World Bank (2007b) estimates that official remittances received by individuals in Tanzania 
amount to around 0.1 per cent of GDP. Lassen and Lilleør (2008) however find that 
internal remittances are also of importance here with remittances acting as an inter-
generational contract funding both pensions and education.  
 
Official remittances account for just over one per cent of Mozambique GDP (World Bank, 
2007c). Tschirley and Weber (1994) report that remittances are more important on a 
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household level in the south of Mozambique from where South African gold mines are in 
easier reach compared with the north.  
 
The similarities between the remittances in Malawi and her neighbours mean that the 
results found in this thesis can be abstracted to a large proportion of southern Africa,  
making this thesis relevant not only for Malawi, but also for the wider region. 
1.4 WHY STUDY REMITTANCES IN THE MALAWIAN CONTEXT? 
At the household level, remittances make up an important part of Malawian income. 
Between a quarter and a third of households receive remittances (IHS98, CPS) and 
Chipeta and Kachaka (2005) estimate that remittances account for 6.3 per cent of total 
household income in Malawi. Data used in this thesis indicate that for households that 
receive them, remittances account for around half of non-business income (IHS98). In 
addition, nearly one third of all rural households send remittances (CPS). 
 
Official international remittances are estimated to be around one per cent of Malawian 
GDP (WDI, 2006), and the survey data used in this thesis indicate that only around one 
per cent of households receive remittances from abroad (CPS). However, the average 
value of foreign remittances is around three times the average value of those that are 
received from Malawian cities (CPS). 
 
Given the share of remittances in total income, it is interesting and important to ask how 
this source of income impacts on consumption habits, as is done in Chapter 6. In addition, 
since a large proportion of remittances are local, using suitable data, it is possible to 
analyse the motivation behind remitting in the first place, as is done in Chapter 5. 
 
As well as comprising an important source of income for Malawian households, 
remittances fulfil essential economic roles. The lack of capital markets including formal 
insurance in rural areas makes remittances a key component in financing cyclical 
agricultural production (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Bokasi, 2001).  The contribution of 
agriculture to the Malawian economy as discussed in the previous section  makes 
remittances all the more important. 
 
Income is highly volatile on a microeconomic level due to the agricultural nature of the 
economy. Income is highly dependent on weather patterns, and without insurance whole 
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regions can be devastated economically (Davies and Davey, 2008). This makes access to 
both credit and insurance, often in the form of remittances, important (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006). 
 
Finally, depending upon the motivation for remitting, remittances can help to moderate 
the impact of household shocks such as sickness. Health shocks such as malaria generally 
occur during the agricultural season during which being unable to work impacts heavily 
on agricultural output (Conroy et al., 2005).  
 
The importance of remittances to rural Malawi cannot be underestimated. They are 
potentially capable of impacting on household consumption habits, and they fulfil the 
essential economic role of moderating shocks at both household and community levels. 
These characteristics combined with their importance in terms of the number of 
households that receive them and their share in household income serve to make Malawi 
an ideal context for the study of remittances from several perspectives. 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Given the importance of remittances in the context, this study seeks to contribute to the 
understanding of this income source both within rural Malawi and in general. In particular, 
what motivates remittances? How do they impact on consumption habits? And how do 
they help to moderate the impact of negative shocks? Thus, this thesis aims to contribute 
to the literature by studying remittance flows in rural Malawi from the initial 
establishment of motivations to remit, to how remittances are viewed by the receivers 
and their general impact on household consumption habits, and finally by studying a 
specific effect – insurance. Thus, in some sense, remittances are followed from the giver, 
to the receiver, and finally to understanding one of the major impacts.  
 
The main objectives of the study are of interest in themselves but are also linked. The 
motivation for remitting can have an effect on the impact of the remittances. So, for 
example, remittances sent for altruistic purposes might be more likely to have a negative 
moral hazard effect, perhaps reducing work effort, or increasing conspicuous 
consumption, while remittances sent for investment are potentially more likely to be 
invested in useful production. Similarly, how remittances are used is likely to depend on 
how they are viewed by the receiver. Are remittances seen as a right or a privilege, or 
alternatively, are they viewed as the product of someone else’s hard work, or as manna 
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from heaven? Finally, both the motivation for remitting and how remittances are used 
will have an effect on the overall impact. Altruistic and insurance motivations are more 
likely to moderate the impact of a negative shock, whilst investment motivations will not. 
Remittances used to fund education or invest in business will have a long run positive 
impact for the family and the economy as a whole, whilst remittances used to fund 
conspicuous consumption are likely to have little long run benefit for the receiving family, 
and may be harmful for the economy as a whole. 
 
This thesis aims therefore to study each of these three important aspects of remittances 
within a suitable and relevant context. Each study can be read independently as a part of 
the overall story. 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
This chapter has given relevant background information regarding the context of this 
study. This chapter has discussed health, which is an important part of two of the three 
empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 7) and the agricultural context. In addition, this 
chapter has discussed remittances in general in order to help place this study within its 
wider context and to draw parallels between this micro study and relevant micro and 
macroeconomic studies. 
 
Chapter 2 is a literature review which focuses in more detail on aspects of the literature 
relevant to the main empirical chapters. It is divided into a theoretical section, and three 
sections which review in turn the literature on (i) motivations to remit, (ii) remittances 
and mental accounting, drawing on the relevant psychological literature and (iii) 
remittances as insurance. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the data sets used for each empirical chapter. Since different data are 
used for each chapter, the context and descriptive statistics are given separately. In 
addition, each data set collected unique information which can be used to help inform 
the overall study. This thesis therefore uses the different data to focus in turn on 
individual transfer behaviour; differences between male and female headed households 
(who represent around one fifth of all households in rural Malawi); and differences 
between remittance receiving households, remittance sending households and those 
which do not engage in remittance transfers. Where possible to do so, differences 
between the data sets are noted. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the empirical methodology. Here, the thesis discusses in turn OLS 
and corrections made; probit models; consumption functions and Tobit models; and 
panel data analysis. 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 are the three main empirical chapters. Chapter 5 begins with studying 
motivations to remit and, due to data availability, focuses on intra-family (but inter-
household) remittance flows. This chapter analyses separately remittance flows between 
respondents and their parents; respondents and their children; and respondents and 
their siblings. Although it should be noted that one motivation does not necessarily 
preclude another (for example a threat of disinheritance may motivate a child to insure a 
parent’s health), there is evidence that different motivations drive each transfer 
relationship. 
 
Chapter 6 draws on psychological theory to help understand how remittances are viewed 
by receivers. In particular Chapter 6 tests whether psychological “mental accounting” 
systems are in operation in which remittance income is used differently to income from 
other sources. It goes on to estimate consumption functions to analyse how remittance 
income is used. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the impact of remittances. In particular, Chapter 7 aims to 
understand whether remittances help to moderate the impact of a shock. It focuses 
separately on idiosyncratic (household) shocks, such as death and sickness, and covariant 
(community) shocks such as droughts. The evidence shows that idiosyncratic shocks can 
be “insured” through remittances from local areas, whilst community shocks require 
remittances from further afield (for example from abroad or Malawian cities) which few 
households benefit from. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises and concludes. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature on remittances is wide ranging, and a summary of the related literature is 
provided as a background in Chapter 1. This chapter is highly focused on the literature 
which is directly linked to the empirical work in Chapters 5 to 7. 
 
Section 2.2 draws on remittance theory to help situate each empirical chapter in its 
“theoretical context”. Section 2.3 discusses microeconomic studies analysing motivations 
to remit. The focus is on key empirical results and the methods (particularly the 
discriminating hypotheses) used to obtain and interpret the results. Section 2.4 draws 
strongly on the economic psychology literature on “mental accounting” and shows how 
this can be used to study remittances. Section 2.5 reviews the theory used to study ex 
post coping strategies and consumption insurance in developing countries before going 
on to discuss the main empirical findings. Each section is therefore related to a particular 
empirical chapter. 
 
2.2 THE THEORY OF REMITTANCES 
2.2.1 Summary 
This section provides an overall look at remittances in theory. It draws on a wide-ranging 
literature review by Rapoport and Docquier (2006), but focuses on areas most relevant to 
the thesis. Relevant theories of remittances are elucidated and links between the various 
theories are shown. All theories have an important element of motivation to remit behind 
them, but they can also be used to illustrate remittances as insurance as well as 
remittances as payment for services and repayment of past funding. This thesis is 
empirical in nature and the aim here is to provide an overview of the relevant theory 
rather than a detailed exposition. 
 
Theoretical models can be split into two main branches: those modelling altruistic 
behaviour in which the utility of the sender (usually a migrant) depends partly on the 
utility of the receiver (usually his/her family at home). Poirine (2006) models altruistic 
remittances by a growing overseas diaspora to assess how altruistic remittance flows 
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should change over time. His simulations show that as the number of migrants increase, 
remittances per migrant decreases but total remittance flows increase. As the income gap 
between the host and migrant-sending countries declines, remittance flows decrease. The 
second branch models can be described as “self-interested”. Remittances are used, at 
least in part, in the interest of the remitter. These models are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive; the existence of one motivation does not necessarily exclude another. 
 
Self-interested models can be split into further sub-categories. The first category suggests 
remittances form part of a “joint optimisation” agreement where both the sender and 
receiver gain from risk-sharing. Different shared income sources permit the reduction of 
income risk from both macro and micro shocks. These models may also be called 
“insurance” models (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). The second category models 
families/friends as banks. Remittances are then seen as repayments of implicit loans used 
to fund migration or education – that is repayments from past investments. The “repaid” 
money is often then used to help others, often family members (Ilahi and Jafferey, 1999). 
Finally self-interested models might imply investment for the future rather than 
repayments for past investments. In this case the remitter chooses how to divide his 
assets amongst different geographical areas – for example the city and the countryside, 
or the country of origin and the host country. Macroeconomic variables would have a 
strong influence on remittances in this case. 
 
These different motivations to remit imply different effects. Altruistic motivations may act 
as a counter-cyclical measure helping to reduce risk of poverty during recessions or other 
negative shocks (such as changing weather conditions). Altruistic motivations combined 
with asymmetric information may have the effect of reducing labour-market participation 
which could reduce welfare (Lucas, 1987; Azam and Gubert, 2004). Altruistic and “family 
as bank” motivations to remit could increase consumption at a micro level but have 
negative “Dutch disease” effects at the macro level. Insurance motivations serve to 
reduce income risk for the family, perhaps encouraging greater risk taking (perhaps 
investment) and increasing welfare. Finally, investment motivations suggest that 
remittances can help to improve output and productivity with the caveat that investment 
in existing housing and land stock may encourage a Balassa-Samuelson effect with 
negative macro consequences. All reasons to remit can have an impact on the exchange-
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rate if remittances are from abroad, perhaps harming the receiving country’s ability to 
export (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004). 
 
The peculiarities of remittances suggest that their receipt may impact differently on a 
household’s spending habits than income from different sources. Households may 
conform to “mental accounting models” and not spend out of remittances in the same 
way as they spend out of income from other sources (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). The 
reason the remittance is made will impact on spending decisions and may influence other 
household behaviour such as labour-market participation. 
2.2.2 Modelling altruism 
Altruistic theories of remittances model the utility of the sender (usually considered to be 
a migrant family member) as a function of his or her own consumption and the 
consumption of the receiver household (usually the migrant’s home household). 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) illustrate an altruistic theory in which both the sender (s) 
and the receiver (r) exhibit altruism towards each other and in which the utility of the 
sender, ),( rss CCU  is a weighted average of his/her felicity derived from his/her own 
consumption, )( ss CV  and the utility of the receiver, ),( srr CCU . 
 
),()()1(),( srrssssrss CCUCVCCU ββ +−=     (2.1) 
 
),()()1(),( rssrrrrsrr CCUCVCCU ββ +−=     (2.2) 
 
where felicity exhibits diminishing marginal return in consumption, VXY0 and VXX<0 and 
the 
2
10 ≤≤ iβ  giving the degree of altruism. If 2/1=sβ  then the sender values the 
receiver’s happiness resulting from consumption as much as he values his own. Values 
above ½ in which the sender values the receiver’s happiness above his/her own are 
excluded
5
, and a value of 0=sβ  results in a purely selfish model in which the sender 
(usually a family migrant) does not consider the utility of his/her family at all. 
 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) incorporate transfers by re-writing consumption as equal 
to income, I, less transfers, T. In addition, they rule out the possibility of negative 
                                                
5
 Although it could be noted that this is not necessarily the case. For example, parents or grandparents 
might favour feeding their children or grandchildren above themselves during periods of severe food 
shortage. 
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transfers from the sender to the receiver, and impose a felicity function satisfying VXY0 
and VXX<0, V(.)=ln(.) and solve for the optimal level of transfers from the sender’s 
perspective. Although not shown in Rapoport and Docquier (2006), all calculations are 
provided in the appendix to this chapter, and the resulting altruistic model has several 
properties: 
(1) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s income; 
(2) Transfers are falling in the receiver’s income; 
(3) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s degree of altruism; 
(4) Transfers are falling in the degree of altruism of the receiving household. 
  
This provides several testable hypotheses, but these results could also be generated by 
other factors.  Rapoport and Docquier (2006: p.12) note that the “main testable 
implication of the altruistic model is that transfers cannot increase with the recipient’s 
income”. 
2.2.3 Modelling insurance 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) formally model a suggestion by Funkhouser (1995) that 
under altruism, remittances from any one remitter (a migrant in their model) should 
decline in the number of remitters (migrants), but this should not be the case under an 
insurance hypothesis. This provides an additional testable implication and helps to 
illustrate the theoretical links between the models on which elements of Chapter 5 
(motivations for remitting) and Chapter 7 (remittances as insurance) are based. It is to 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) that this chapter now turns. 
  
In a two period model, a remittance sender faces certain income in period 1, equal to sI . 
In period 2, s/he faces uncertainty with high income, sGI , with a probability of π−1  and 
low income, sBI  with a probabilityπ  )10( << π . S/he can choose to remit to a receiver an 
amount T in the first period and receive an actuarially fair indemnity ( πTs = ) in the 
case of a negative shock in the second period. The receiver (insurer) is assumed to face no 
uncertainty. Denoting, as before )( ss CV  and )( rr CV the sender’s, s, and receiver’s, r, 
felicity functions, the sender’s expected utility (EU) is denoted: 
 
)()()1()( sIVIVTIVEU sB
ss
G
sss ++−+−= ππ     (2.3) 
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where felicity functions are kept constant across time and state and the sender’s utility 
depends only on his/her own consumption, and not that of the receiver, unlike in the 
altruistic model. 
 
Using log utility as before, which satisfies decreasing marginal utility to consumption and 
risk aversion, the optimal level of transfers or remittances, T* is shown (see the appendix 
to this chapter) to be: 
 
*][
)1(
TII sB
s =−
+ π
π
        (2.4) 
 
This insurance model has several properties: 
(1) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s first period income (as with the previous 
altruistic model); 
(2) Transfers are decreasing in the sender’s bad state income; 
(3) Transfers are increasing in the probability of a bad state (potentially proxied 
empirically by education, unemployment or legal status if abroad). 
 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) go on to extend the altruistic model sketched above to 
include the fact that households receive remittances from several senders (migrants). The 
model provides one further testable implication: “[u]nder pure insurance (or other self-
interest) motives, the number of other migrants would not affect own-remittances. On 
the other hand, under altruism where migrants are concerned with the welfare of the 
non-migrating household, the presence of multiple remitting migrants will affect the 
average remittance level” (p.2036). Rapoport and Docquier (2006) point out that this 
assumes the exogeneity of the number of remitters a household benefits from (those 
with more volatile income or those that are more risk averse may ensure they have more 
transfer relationships). In addition, they note that if household income is affected by 
moral hazard then household income might not necessarily be assumed exogenous. 
Moral hazard and remittances are modelled by Azam and Gubert (2002).  
2.2.4 Payment for service 
Remittances as payment for services is modelled in detail by Cox (1987) and discussed in 
brief by Rapoport and Docquier (2006). Here, the methodology and the central 
conclusions are briefly discussed.  
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Services transferred might include looking after the remitter’s house, business, cattle (as 
in Lucas and Stark, 1985) or children (as in Chapter 5 of this thesis). If remittances are 
viewed as payments for looking after an asset, Rapoport and Docquier (2006) suggest that 
this is a sign of temporary migration. Alternatively, remittances can be viewed as a means 
of exchange in an environment in which, “due to market imperfections, transaction costs 
may be saved on through non-market interpersonal agreements” (p.13). The benefit from 
not using the market is then split between the sender (who pays less than the market 
price) and the receiver (who receives more than they would have by selling their labour in 
the market). 
 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) describe a reduced version of Cox (1987) in which non 
altruistic remittance receivers gain utility from their own income, the transfer they 
receive (which together form consumption) and lose utility from the service, S they 
provide. Using previous notation: 
 
),( STIV rr +  and ),( STIV ss −       (2.5) 
 
The remittance sender gains from the service provided but at an ever decreasing rate, 
whilst the receiver who offers the services suffers from providing that service at an ever 
increasing rate (increasing disutility of effort): 
 
0,0
2
2
>
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
S
V
S
V rr
 and 0,0
2
2
<
∂
∂
>
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∂
S
V
S
V ss
     (2.6) 
 
Finally, in order to provide the service to the sender, the receiver must gain at least as 
much total utility when providing the service than when not providing it. Allowing the 
remittance sender to pay the minimum amount whilst ensuring the receiver provides the 
service, yields one key but unsurprising result: the amount of remittances increases with 
the amount of service provided. 
 
Laferrère and Wolff (2006) discuss all major models noted above taking the same 
perspective taken in Chapter 5; that of intra-family transfers. The main conclusions 
remain unchanged. 
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2.2.5 Mental accounting links 
Mental accounting theory implies that income from different sources is seen and used 
differently. Thus all income is not pooled as conventional theory would imply and 
remittances may be used for different purposes to other income. 
 
The motivation for remitting might influence which “mental account” this income falls 
into. For example, remittances from an altruistic son may be used differently to 
remittances given on the implicit understanding that they are payment for a service, or as 
an insurance premium. In addition, the fact that remittances may serve to reduce risk 
may have a wider impact on household consumption behaviour. Understanding 
motivation for remitting therefore gives an insight into the likely uses of the remittances. 
 
Although the data used in Chapter 6 do not permit the study to assess effectively the 
motivation for remitting and only the uses of remittances are estimated, this link should 
be borne in mind. 
 
2.3 MOTIVATIONS FOR REMITTING 
Studies analysing motivations to remit use either Tobit models to estimate the value of 
remittances, probit models to estimate the probability of sending or receiving 
remittances or OLS to estimate net remittances received. The independent variables 
focus on the receiver’s and sender’s characteristics. Regressions thus take the form:  
 
Remittances=f(Receiver characteristics; Sender characteristics; X)    (2.7) 
 
where ‘Remittances’ is the value of remittances sent or received (Tobit), net remittances 
(OLS), or whether or not remittances were received (probit) and f(.) is the relevant 
function (Tobit, OLS, probit). The X represents any other study specific variables included. 
This section focuses on discriminating hypotheses and empirical results found in the 
literature. Chapter 4 discusses in more detail the econometric methods used in this thesis. 
 
Most authors are unable to rule out a variety of motivations and key conclusions are 
presented in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of key findings from studies on motivations to remit 
Study Key conclusions 
Lucas and Stark (1985) - 
Botswana 
Positive association between remittance receipts from children and 
per capita household income (altruism). Sons remit more the 
wealthier is the household (inheritance). 
    
Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) - 
Pakistan 
Return Pakistani migrants remit less to their immediate family, the 
more they have borrowed from extended family (repayment of past 
loans). 
    
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) - 
Guyana 
The more migrants in the household, the less a migrant will remit 
(altruism). Lower household income is associated with higher 
remittance receipts (altruism). 
    
Naufal (2008) - Nicaragua As the number of migrants increase, remittances from any one 
sender decline (altruism). As income risk of the household increases, 
remittances increase (altruism). 
    
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2006) - Mexico/United States 
Mexican migrants in the U.S. remit more home to Mexico as their 
income risk increases (insurance). Larger home households increase 
remittances (altruism). 
    
De la Brière et al. (2002) - 
Dominican Sierra 
Remittances are increasing in work day losses due to sickness for the 
home household (altruism, insurance, reverse causality?). 
Remittances are increasing in inheritable land, but decreasing in the 
number of heirs (inheritance). 
    
Van Dalen et al. (2004) - 
Morocco, Egypt and Turkey 
Higher remittances as home households perceives its financial 
situation to be 'insufficient' (altruism). 
    
VanWey (2004) - Thailand Male migrants more likely to remit to landless households (altruism) 
and both male and female migrants remit less as the number of 
migrants in the household increases (altruism). Female migrants 
remit less the more land the household owns (altruism). 
    
Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008) 
- Armenia 
High unemployment discourages remittance flows to a region 
(undefined selfish motives). 
 
Untangling motivations for remitting requires finding discriminating hypotheses. Lucas 
and Stark (1985) test motivations to remit in Botswana. They note that children’s 
aspirations to inherit will cause remittances to increase in the home household’s wealth. 
By contrast a negative relationship between wealth and remittance receipts would be 
consistent with either altruistic or co-insurance motives. Discriminating between 
insurance and altruistic motivations is difficult, but the authors used data collected during 
a period in which Botswana suffered from a severe drought. Households with drought-
sensitive assets should receive more remittances than other households. The authors 
note that although this is consistent with the co-insurance hypothesis, this might equally 
occur as a result of remitters seeking to protect inheritance.  
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Lucas and Stark (1985: p.910) find a positive association between remittances and per 
capita income of the home household. This result is consistent with inheritance 
motivations for remitting to parents. The authors caution however that in a “dynamic 
setting, one cannot rule out the possibility that past remittances sent with altruistic intent, 
have helped to raise today’s income”. They are unable to investigate this further using 
their cross-sectional data. 
 
Further investigation of the inheritance hypothesis shows that sons (who are more likely 
to inherit than other relations) remit more to families with larger cattle herds (the main 
store of wealth in Botswana). This evidence of an inheritance motive is tempered with the 
observation that often (migrated) sons keep their own cattle with those of their 
household of origin. Remittances may therefore actually be contributions towards the 
cost of keeping the cattle (payment for service). 
 
Finally, the authors find that households whose assets are more susceptible to drought 
are more likely to have higher remittances (the period of the survey included widespread 
and severe drought). They interpret this as evidence of a co-insurance motive, however, it 
should be noted that in light of the information that sons often keep their cattle with 
those of the household, this might also be a reflection of sons’ desire to safeguard their 
own assets. 
 
Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) investigate the hypothesis that remittances are, at least in part, 
repayment of implicit loans used by migrants to fund the initial costs of migration 
(transport, visa, job search, perhaps education). Using data collected from Pakistani 
return migrants, they know who funded the migrant and the value of remittances sent 
back to immediate family and savings. They use a model to simultaneously estimate 
remittances to the immediate family, retained savings and the size of the initial loan. They 
show that as the value of any loan from extended family increases, or the proportion of 
the total cost covered by such loans increases, remittances sent to the immediate family 
and retained savings falls. Thus, the greater the implicit loan, the more migrants are 
required to repay extended family, and the less money is available to save or to remit to 
the immediate family. 
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The results indicate that a 1 per cent increase in the value of the loan from the extended 
family decreases remittances sent to the immediate family by around 1 per cent. In 
addition, a 1 per cent rise in the value of a loan lowers retained savings by around 0.5 per 
cent. These results offer support to the hypothesis that remittances are, at least in part, 
repayment of implicit loans taken out by the migrant to fund the initial costs of migration, 
potentially including education. 
 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) test insurance motivations to remit against altruistic 
motivations using Guyanese data. Theirs is the first paper that develops a model in which 
the number of migrants sent by a household is key in discriminating between altruistic 
and insurance motivations. They note that flows of remittances from migrants who remit 
for insurance reasons would not be influenced by the number of migrants sending 
remittances. Risk averse migrants would individually choose to be fully insured by their 
household of origin. Under altruistic motivations however, an increased number of 
(remitting) migrants would cause remittances from any one of these to decrease. 
 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) model the decision to remit using a probit model. The 
Inverse Mills Ratio is then placed in a second stage regression à la Heckman (1976) which 
models the value of remittances. Since there is information on the number of migrants 
and the amount of remittances received in total but not which migrant remitted, the 
authors assume that each migrant remitted an equal share of total remittances.  
 
A variable indicating the presence of other migrants in the household is negative and 
significant suggesting that remitters do indeed decrease their remittances in response to 
other migrants. This is consistent with altruism motivations. Household per capita income 
is negative and significant. That is, lower household income is associated with higher 
remittance receipts. This finding is again consistent with altruistic motivations. 
 
Naufal (2008) uses Nicaraguan data to investigate the relationship between value of 
remittances received and (a) number of migrants from a household and (b) probability of 
a “bad income state” in the household. Probability of a bad income state is proxied using 
two measures: firstly whether the household head reported leaving work due to 
liquidation of the enterprise, being fired, seasonal work, lack of work, personal duties, 
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lack of safety at work, harassment in work and illness and secondly whether the head has 
been looking for work for longer than one year. 
 
Since the value of remittances is truncated at zero, Naufal (2008) uses a Tobit model to 
estimate remittances received by the household from the migrant. He includes migrants’ 
characteristics (age, gender, education, destination [developed or developing country], 
years living abroad and labour force status) and similar characteristics for the home 
household. 
 
The data give the amount of remittances received by a household and the number of 
migrants, but not which migrant remitted; he therefore excludes households with more 
than one migrant, and controls for selectivity bias. Results from Tobit models are similar 
to those of probit and OLS models and indicate that as the number of migrants increase, 
remittance receipts decline. This is consistent with altruistic motivations.  In addition, as 
income risk increases (as proxied by having been made redundant or been looking for 
work for over a year), remittance receipts increase. This result is also interpreted in 
favour of altruistic models of remittances, but is also consistent with insurance 
motivations. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) test insurance against altruistic motivations to remit 
using data from Mexican migrants returning to Mexico from the United States. They show 
that risk averse migrants will be more likely to remit if they face greater risk in the host 
country (the United States). Income risk is proxied with legal status, access to migrant 
networks and American work experience amongst other variables. By contrast, the 
authors suggest that amount of remittances sent for altruistic purposes should not vary 
with income risk in the host country. 
 
Using a Tobit model, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) find that the probability of 
remitting increases by 6 percentage points for undocumented migrants compared to 
documented migrants. Undocumented migrants also remit around 4 percentage points 
more than legal migrants. In addition, increased work experience and access to migrant 
social networks decrease both the likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted. These 
results suggest that increased risk in the host country increases the amount of 
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remittances sent back home. There is therefore considerable evidence in favour of the 
insurance hypothesis.  
 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006: p.243) note however, that an insurance motive does 
not preclude altruistic motivations and indeed interpret a positive and significant 
coefficient on household size in the home country as evidence of some degree of 
altruistic remittance flows: “Each additional family member left back home raises the 
likelihood of remitting and the fraction of earnings sent home by those remitting, 
suggesting that the needs of the family back home are important to migrants and that 
migrants behave in an altruistic manner”. 
 
De la Brière et al. (2002) compare results from four regressions (OLS, Random Effects, 
Tobit and Powell’s Censored Least Absolute Deviations) to study the role of destination, 
gender and household composition in the motivations for sending remittances in the 
Dominican Sierra. They discriminate between insurance and investment motivations 
(where investment is largely an inheritance motive) for remitting. They find evidence of 
both insurance and inheritance motivations. Remittances increase as the home 
household loses more work days to sickness suggesting that remittances insure sickness. 
It should be noted however that the causality may run the other way as in Azam and 
Gubert (2004) who find that due to moral hazard problems, remittances have a negative 
impact on the probability of participating in the labour market. Remittances are 
increasing in inheritable land but decreasing in the number of heirs indicating an 
inheritance motive.  
 
Van Dalen et al. (2005) use probit models to study the probability of receiving remittances 
based on home household and migrant characteristics in Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. 
They find that households which perceive their financial situation to be “insufficient” are 
more likely to receive remittances than other households, suggesting altruistic motives 
for remitting. Well-educated migrants are less likely to send remittances than their less-
educated counterparts. The authors suggest that this may be because the better 
educated are more likely to see their move as permanent and are therefore less likely to 
remit. This is consistent with selfish motivations for remitting; that is, remittances ensure 
a place in the household or community upon return.  
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A household wealth index is consistently insignificant in both the pooled sample and 
across countries. Under altruistic motives there should be a negative coefficient on this 
variable (migrants are more likely to remit to poorer households) whilst the inheritance 
model suggests that there should be a positive relationship between the two variables (as 
wealth increases, household bargaining power increases vis-à-vis the migrant, who is 
required to remit more in order to safeguard his/her share of inheritance). The lack of 
support for either the altruistic or inheritance model from this variable is interpreted in 
favour of the insurance hypothesis. 
 
Although Van Dalen et al. (2005: p.23) are unable to “clearly pinpoint altruistic or motives 
of self-interest as sole driving forces behind the receipt of remittances”, they do note that 
that the “characteristics of emigrants are far more important than the characteristics of 
migrant-sending households [in explaining remittances]”. Using the criterion that 
household characteristics should be important in determining altruistic motivations, but 
not selfish ones (as Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) suggest) would mitigate in favour of 
self-interested motives. 
 
VanWey (2004) uses logit models to study the likelihood of male and female migrants 
remitting to their household of origin, and the likelihood of the household remitting to 
the migrants. She contrasts altruistic and contractual remittances in Thailand and finds 
that male migrants are more likely to remit to landless households and both male and 
females are less likely to remit as the number of migrants increase. In addition 
remittances from female migrants are falling in land owned by the household. These 
findings favour the altruism hypothesis.  
 
VanWey (2004) also analyses remittance flows from the household to the migrant and 
finds that migrant education has a positive impact of such remittance flows. In addition, 
unemployed migrants are less likely to receive remittances. Since better educated, 
employed migrants are likely to earn more and therefore be better insurers, VanWey 
(2004) notes that this is evidence of a contractual motive. Given her findings, VanWay 
(2004: p.748) concludes that there is “considerable support for both the altruistic and the 
contractual approaches”. 
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Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008) use the 2004 Armenian Integrated Living Standards 
Measurement Survey to study migration and remittances in that country. They model 
decision to migrate and decision to remit simultaneously with household decision to work, 
save and spend on education. They find that high unemployment discourages remittance 
flows and interpret this as being in favour of the self-interest motivations.  
 
Despite efforts to disentangle motivations behind remittance flows, it is important to 
note that motivations are not mutually exclusive. For example, it could be that a threat to 
disinherit a child encourages an insurance payout to be made. Given this, it is not 
surprising that most studies have difficulties in concluding unambiguously in favour of a 
single motivation. Chapter 5 aims to shed further light on remittance motivations by 
comparing and contrasting evidence of different remittance motivations according to 
familial relationship between the sender and the receiver. 
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2.4 MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND HOW IT RELATES TO REMITTANCES 
Since the mental accounting hypothesis has yet to be tested quantitatively for developing 
countries, this literature review focuses on the theoretical framework, and summarises 
conclusions drawn from studies in developed countries. Where relevant, it is also pointed 
out why this is a suitable framework to study the impact of remittances on household 
consumption behaviour. 
 
Recent empirical work has shown that remittances have a unique impact on a 
household’s expenditure decisions. Adams (2002) finds that the marginal propensity to 
save out of remittances in Pakistan is higher than for other sources of income. Maitra and 
Ray (2002) study expenditure shares in South Africa and conclude that remittances 
increase the proportion of household expenditure spent on food, education and clothing. 
Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) examine the impact of remittances on household 
schooling decisions in El Salvador. They find that remittances decrease the probability 
that children will drop out of school and the impact of remittances is significantly more 
important than for other sources of income. 
 
One potential explanation for these impacts lies in how people view and use money from 
different sources. Remittances lend themselves to an analysis in such a mental accounting 
framework. In some cases they come with conditions attached (“use this money to 
educate my little brother”), in other cases they are used as a form of income pooling, 
mutually reducing risk (e.g. Dercon et al., 2005; Harrower and Hoddinott, 2005) and 
helping to smooth consumption6 thereby potentially altering consumption behaviour. 
Remittances may thus be used for or encourage investment in “useful” areas such as 
education, health, nutrition and savings, or may be seen as “manna from heaven” and 
encourage non-productive behaviour (Kozel and Alderman, 1990 in Chami et al., 2005). 
 
Mental accounting is important for government policy as well as for NGOs and banks 
trying to mobilise savings and encourage borrowing. If lack of consumption out of illiquid 
assets is a choice and not forced upon individuals, microfinance institutions not only need 
to provide liquidity, but also need to change consumption and savings behaviour. It is 
important to understand whether remittances are combined with other sources of 
income or spent in a particular way. If they are used for different purposes to money from 
                                                
6
 Alderman and Paxson (1992) summarise the literature on risk and consumption in developing countries. 
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other sources, do these purposes tend to be constructive (such as education) or 
destructive (conspicuous consumption)?  
 
Levin (1998) uses American longitudinal data to find marginal propensities to consume 
(MPC) for different categories of goods out of different assets. He finds that the MPC out 
of current income is around 0.42 whereas the MPC out of changes in housing value is zero. 
This is a common empirical result which is seen as an anomaly of the lifecycle 
consumption model. Credit market constraints are often cited as an explanation (Hayashi, 
1987; Zeldes, 1989), but Levin suggests that individuals are not credit constrained but 
rather choose not to consume out of these assets. He uses testable differences between 
the models which allow him to discriminate between lifecycle consumption models with 
liquidity constraints and behavioural models of consumption and finds evidence in favour 
of the latter. Furthermore households use different wealth categories to purchase 
different goods; for example, they are more likely to use liquid wealth such as savings 
than current income to pay for occasional purchases such as vacations.  Although Levin’s 
findings support the fact that individuals choose and are not forced to consume 
differently out of assets with different levels of “temptation”, he does not break down 
current income into different categories. Thus, he is unable to test whether equally liquid 
income is used for different purposes. 
 
Adams (2002) uses panel data from a sample of 469 rural Pakistani households to 
measure marginal propensities to save and consume out of income from different sources. 
He finds that the marginal propensity to save out of remittances is higher (at 0.711 for 
external remittances and 0.589 for internal remittances) than that for any other source of 
income. Although he notes that these results do not conform to unmodified lifecycle 
consumption models, Adams suggests that this is due to income volatility and risk 
aversion, noting that income sources with greater variability exhibit greater marginal 
propensities to save. While Adams is able to distinguish between different MPC out of 
sources of equally liquid income, he does not look at how this income might be spent. The 
IHS98 reveals similar variance in remittance and salary incomes (with standard deviations 
of 1899 and 1949 respectively). Adam’s hypothesis would suggest that salary and 
remittance income should exhibit similar MPCs (which is shown not to be the case). The 
standard deviation of farm income is lower at 562. 
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2.4.1 Theoretical background 
Traditional lifecycle consumption models have rational individuals maximising utility from 
total lifetime income subject to their budget constraint. Utility is some function of 
consumption in each period. An individual who lives for T periods will therefore maximise 
the following function at time t: 
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subject to his/her budget constraint which ensures that the total lifetime consumption 
cannot be greater than their total lifetime income: 
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where A0 is initial wealth, Yt wage income and r the constant, known interest rate
7
. 
 
With marginal utility decreasing in consumption, the maximising agent will set 
consumption in each period to be equal. That is, c1=c2=…=cT since this will ensure 
u’(c1)=u’(c2)=…=u’(cT) and total lifetime utility is maximised. Consumption in each period 
is thus an equal proportion of total expected lifetime income: 
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Perfect capital markets are assumed so that even as income fluctuates, agents are able to 
borrow and save in order to ensure constant consumption over their lifetime (equal to ct, 
or “permanent income”, yp). As agents borrow and save, the value of their assets (which 
can be positive or negative in any given period) fluctuates according to: At+1=(1+r)At+yt-ct. 
 
In this basic model, agents lump all wealth together. A $1 increase in the value of one’s 
home should be spent in the same way as a $1 increase in wage income. Agents are 
rational maximisers who exhibit no self-control difficulties. They maximise utility given 
information available and carry out their plans with the utmost dedication. Given these 
                                                
7
 I abstract from expectations for simplicity and to focus on the relevant parts of the model. 
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hypotheses it is perhaps not surprising that empirical studies find a number of anomalies 
in human behaviour for which explanations must be found. 
 
Several theories exist to explain consumption behaviour – notably the permanent income 
hypothesis (PIH). This suggests that people consume in line with their permanent lifetime 
income – that is, their expected average yearly income is equal to consumption. When 
income is lower than this (e.g. students), individuals borrow to increase their 
consumption, and when their permanent income is above the expected average, they 
save (either by repaying past loans, or by saving for pensions). 
 
This methodology means that individuals have both expected changes in income, and 
unanticipated shocks (innovations). Research has shown that individuals do not react in 
the ‘correct’ way to these, but rather, exhibit excessive smoothness to income 
innovations (that is, they do not consume as much as they should), but excessive 
sensitivity to current (anticipated) income changes – that is, consumption tends to be 
closer to current income than the theory postulates that it should. 
 
Several explanations for these anomalies have been suggested. For example, it is possible 
that individuals are unable to borrow and save as they would desire. However, mental 
accounting suggests that this is not the case, and that individuals actually choose to use 
current income in a different way to future income. Several studies have shown that this 
is the case (e.g. Levin, 1998).  
 
However, to date, no study has been made of income from different, equally liquid, 
income sources. This chapter aims to help fill this gap. It allows people to view and use 
not only income from differently liquid sources in a different way, but also permits 
equally liquid income to be used differently – something that the PIH does not allow in its 
framework. Indeed, any evidence that suggests that individuals do treat equally liquid 
income sources differently suggests that people behave in a different way to that which 
the PIH would suggest. 
2.4.2 Psychological extensions and evidence 
Empirical studies find excess sensitivity of current consumption to current income and 
excess smoothness with respect to income innovations. Capital market imperfections are 
often cited as an explanation of the former, although this explanation performs badly 
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when compared with behavioural hypotheses (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Lewis and 
Winnett, 1995; Levin, 1998). One key presupposition of the model often questioned is the 
assumption that humans do not exhibit preference reversal over time (given no additional 
information). An alternative is to abandon exponential discounting of the future in favour 
of a hyperbolic (or quasi-hyperbolic) consumption model. Psychological analysis of human 
preferences favours quasi-hyperbolic discounting which allows dynamic inconsistencies in 
preferences (Angeletos et al., 2001)8.  
 
In their behavioural lifecycle model, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose a complementary 
explanation. They suggest that there are two selves: a “planner”, who maximises utility as 
per the neo-classical utility function, and a “doer” who carries out all decisions but who is 
myopic in nature and suffers a psychological “willpower” cost to reducing consumption 
when the planner dictates this to be necessary. The two selves often have mutually 
inconsistent preferences but coexist at all times. This is complementary to quasi-
hyperbolic discounting models in which current selves seek to impose constraints on 
future selves in order to resolve the conflict between the two. 
 
The psychological cost of avoiding current consumption (inversely related to a 
“temptation level”) depends upon current consumption opportunities. Borrowing from 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988), Xt is defined as the opportunity set of current feasible choices 
of consumption. The unrestrained doer would maximise ut on Xt, maximising consumption 
and utility in period t. The planner attempts to intervene but reducing today’s 
consumption carries a psychological willpower cost, wt
9. Thus, doer utility is defined as: 
 
z t = ut  - wt           (2.11) 
 
                                                
8
 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting takes the form: ...3
3
2
2
1 ++++= +++ ttttt CCCCU βδβδβδ  where 
δ represents the normal exponential discounting. The function is essentially a normal exponentially 
discounted utility function augmented to discount all future consumption by an additional 10 ≤≤ β . 
Hyperbolically discounted utility initially falls faster as consumption is further away in time than its 
exponential counterpart, but then begins to fall slower. Hyperbolic discounting allows for preference 
reversals found in the psychology literature. 
9
 This assumes conflict between the planner and the doer. This would arise where the planner’s optimal 
solution requires reducing current consumption in order to save for, say, retirement. Note that, the doer 
and planner are not in conflict per se. A young person earning below his or her permanent income level 
would do well to dissave in order to increase current consumption according to the planner’s optimum. 
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Willpower effort is effective if the maximised values of zt and ut are not the same. In this 
case, the doer has successfully reduced consumption today so that it is nearer the 
planner’s optimal level. A willpower effort variable, θt indicates the amount of willpower 
exercised at date t. *
t t(c ,X )tθ gives the degree of willpower effort required at 
consumption level ct given the opportunity set Xt. In order to reduce consumption at any 
level, an increase in willpower is required. Any increase in willpower is painful since the 
corresponding reduction in consumption reduces zt. Furthermore, increasing willpower 
becomes increasingly painful as additional willpower is applied (this follows also from the 
assumption of concave utility). 
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Given these costs, the planner must find means to resolve the conflict. He can do this by 
imposing a series of restraints in order to both reduce the opportunity set of the doer, Xt 
and make the willpower effort less painful. Karlsson (2003) shows that consumers are 
aware of this conflict and routinely implement different strategies in order to cope. 
 
One option is to impose external restraints. For example, money can be physically placed 
in an account allowing no withdrawal (pensions for instance). This voluntary reduction of 
future opportunity sets is comparable with what Karlsson calls “desire-reducing 
strategies”. Another example might be that the individual may vote for compulsory state 
social security programmes funded through (involuntary) taxation. 
 
Karlsson’s second group of strategies aimed at resolving internal inconsistencies can be 
termed “willpower strategies”. Internal constraints are imposed and heuristic or “rule-of-
thumb” behaviour is adopted. Mental accounting rules such as “consume out of savings 
only in the event of an emergency” are an example of this behaviour. There is a 
psychological cost to breaking the rule. In order for the rule to be effective, this cost must 
be greater than the willpower costs associated with reducing consumption to the level 
required if the rule is to be successfully adhered to. 
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Psychology literature such as Ainslie (1975)10 suggests that the easiest rules to obey are 
those which become habits (saving for example, may become habitual). Exceptions must 
be rare and well-defined, and the rules must be dynamically stable: it is difficult to break 
habits11. 
 
Mental Accounting permits households to become accustomed to allocating money for 
specific purchases or categories of goods. Current earned income may be used to fund 
every-day necessities, but to make these same purchases out of money allocated to 
savings carries a high psychological cost which is greater than the willpower cost of 
forgoing the extra consumption. Thaler (1990) points out that many Americans regard 
savings in their Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) to be “off-limits” except in the most 
dire of emergencies. 
 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) divide Mental Accounts into three components: current 
spendable income (Y), current assets (A) and future income (F). Under the traditional 
lifecycle consumption model, a special example of the behavioural lifecycle model where 
the psychological cost of reducing consumption is zero, the MPC out of all three 
categories is equal. Under the BLC model the different mental accounts would exhibit 
different MPC since the psychological cost of consuming out of current income is lower 
than that of consuming out of future income. Otherwise put, current income exhibits a 
higher temptation level than future income. Given these different psychological costs, 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) suggest that we should observe a much higher MPC out of 
current income than out of future income. 
 
c= c (Y, A, F)           (2.13) 
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This offers an alternative explanation to the anomaly of excess sensitivity to current 
income posed by the traditional model and performs well in empirical studies against 
other explanations including capital market imperfections (Levin, 1998). 
                                                
10
 Brocas, Carrillo and Dewatripont (2004) review various commitment devices. 
11
 Anderson and Nevitte (2006) find that saving behaviour is largely a matter of habit. Furthermore, these 
habits are, at least in part, learnt in the home as a child. 
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Levin (1998) finds that an increase of $1 in income raises total spending by 42 cents while 
an increase of $1 in the value of all assets raises total expenditure by just 2 cents. Shefrin 
and Thaler (1988) and Lewis and Winnett (1995) use surveys12 to show that the source of 
the income and the amount of income are both important in placing income in one 
account or another. A windfall gain is likely to be placed in the asset account (perhaps 
savings) while several small gains adding up to the same value tend to be placed in the 
current income account, even when both of these income gains are anticipated. Analysing 
the claim that the large bi-annual bonuses (which are the norm in Japan) contribute to 
the comparatively high savings rate, Ishikawa and Ueda (1984) estimate MPC from 
regular and bonus income for Japanese workers. They find that for non-recession years, 
MPC is significantly higher for regular income than for bonus income (0.685 versus 0.437). 
It appears that in Japan, households habitually save around half of their bonus income 
and these authors conclude that, at least in the short run, habits govern household 
expenditure patterns. 
 
Extending this analysis, Feldman (forthcoming) analyses a change in the American tax 
laws resulting in decreased monthly tax deductions whilst reducing compensating tax 
rebates (or increasing payments) at the end of the year. There was no change in the 
marginal tax rate. Since the decreased deductions allowed households to gain only a 
comparatively small amount per month whilst the rebates tended to be large, Feldman 
(forthcoming) suggests that the lump sum would be placed in a mental savings account 
whilst the small monthly increase would go into the consumption pot. Traditional theory 
predicts that people would realise that their financial position had not changed and 
would simply save an additional amount per month to compensate. Her results suggest 
however that this seemingly innocuous change had an adverse impact on retirement 
savings. This is in line with the mental accounting hypothesis13. 
 
The fact that the source of income is important in the allocation of income to different 
accounts is key in Chapter 6. Income might be placed automatically (habitually) into a 
particular account and there are psychological costs to transferring it. Income which falls 
                                                
12
 In the United States and Netherlands respectively. 
13
 It should be noted that this change was framed by the US government as a “pseudo- ” tax cut influencing 
further households’ budgeting choices. Kahneman and Tversky (1984, 1986) discuss framing and their 
relevance in consumption choices. 
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into the future account, F, will not be moved if these internally-imposed costs are greater 
that the willpower effort associated with the corresponding reduction in consumption.  
 
Support for the hypothesis that the source helps to determine the account is offered by 
Cherry (2001) who finds that people are more likely to exhibit “other-regarding 
behaviour” when money is a gift than when it is earned, suggesting a system of mental 
accounts. Henderson and Peterson (1992) find that people are more likely to purchase a 
vacation when they receive $2,000 as a gift than as a work bonus while O’Curry (1996) 
finds that people are more likely to purchase frivolous goods with winnings from a 
football pool than an equivalent sum from overtime pay. This evidence suggests that a 
more complex system than pooling all income and then allocating money to mental 
accounts is in operation. Rather, the source (amongst other factors) actually plays a role 
in determining the mental account into which income is assigned. 
 
The evidence suggests not only that mental accounts exist as a means of controlling 
behaviour but also that different sources of income are credited to different mental 
accounts14.  
 
Since accounts are used for specific purposes, Levin (1998) calculates MPC for different 
categories of goods. He finds that large purchases such as holidays or durable goods are 
more likely to be purchased out of the asset account and groceries out of the current 
income account. He divides the asset account into liquid and illiquid assets and finds that 
the MPC out of the liquid asset account is positive for some categories of goods while the 
MPC out of the illiquid asset account is never significantly different from zero. This is true 
for those whom he considered to be credit constrained and those who are not, indicating 
that capital market imperfections are not a determining factor and that the costs of 
consuming out of illiquid assets consist largely of self-imposed psychological costs. This is 
                                                
14
 Hart (2005) suggests that culture is a determinant in how people or households view money and their 
attitudes towards it. Although some forms of mental accounting may be near universal, its exact form is 
likely to be influenced by cultural and other factors. China for instance has a savings culture, whilst 
Japanese household finance is traditionally organised by females. Religion may play a role where moral 
codes or duties (such as zakat in Islam) encourage particular attitudes. Gender and age may also be factors 
in determining mental account systems (as well as interactions between these two variables and other 
factors). Financial savoir faire will impact on mental accounting systems and can be related to availability of 
information within a country (institutions and education are important in this aspect as well as the typical 
financial culture within a home). Similarly, consumption needs and choices will influence the mental 
accounting structure. These needs and choices will, in turn, be influenced by surroundings, culture, religion, 
age, etc. (Colloredo-Mansfeld, (2005) summarise the link between culture and consumption). 
 52
supported by the laboratory studies of Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Lewis and Winnett 
(1995). 
 
Levin (1998) extends the theory in Shefrin and Thaler (1988) to separate assets. That is, 
he hypothesises that the MPC out of different assets will differ. For example, the MPC out 
of changes in wealth invested in shares will not be equal to MPC out of changes in 
housing value. He finds that for three out of the eight spending categories, the 
coefficients on housing assets and liquid assets are significantly different. The impact of 
housing wealth is never significantly different from zero suggesting that changes in 
housing value has no effect on consumption at all. Future income has more explanatory 
power suggesting that households are more comfortable consuming out of future wealth 
(change in expected future income) than other forms of non-liquid wealth.  
 
In addition, he tests the hypothesis that liquidity constraints are responsible for the 
differing MPC rather than behavioural mental accounting reasons. Levin (1998) divides 
the data into those whom he judges to be liquidity constrained and others. He finds that 
the unconstrained group has a lower MPC out of illiquid forms of wealth than those who 
are constrained, the opposite to the result that would be expected if liquidity constraints 
were responsible. 
 
Theoretically, the test between external and internal liquidity constraints rests on the fact 
that if the liquidity constraint is external, the value of illiquid assets will impact on 
consumption as long as other more liquid assets are still being held. This is because the 
increase in the value of this asset will simply increase total wealth. The value of illiquid 
assets will cease to affect consumption when the more liquid assets are depleted, 
because only then will the liquidity constraint become binding. When the liquidity 
constraint is internally imposed however, whilst the more tempting (more liquid) assets 
are not depleted, the value of the less tempting assets will not impact on consumption 
decisions unless more liquid (more tempting) assets have been exhausted. Formally, 
conventional model expenditure patterns will follow: 
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while the behavioural model with internally-imposed constraints will follow: 
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 where Aliquid ≈ 0   (2.16) 
 
The results are more in harmony with a behavioural lifecycle model of mental accounting 
where the constraints are internally imposed than with a conventional model with 
liquidity constraints. 
 
Chapter 6 extends the mental accounting literature to show that the MPC out of different, 
equally liquid sources of income differ and goes on to analyses the main uses of 
remittance income. Figure 2-1 illustrates the key differences between the traditional and 
behavioural life cycle models which are tested in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 2-1: Graphical representation of differences between traditional and behavioural lifecycle models 
 
Notes: Inc i indicates income from source i=1,2,…; Cons j indicates consumption of good category j=A, B,… . 
In tests in Chapter 6, all income sources (including remittances) are equally liquid. 
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2.5 REMITTANCES AS INSURANCE 
2.5.1 Remittances as an ex-post coping strategy 
Studies analysing actions taken by households in order to cope following shocks tend to 
focus on estimating which of a variety of potential coping strategies at their disposal 
households choose to use following different shocks. Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) 
model remittances as an ex post coping strategy following a shock using a panel logit 
model described by (2.17) to estimate the probability of receiving remittances from each 
of several sources. 
 
Pr(Remittances
)exp(1
)exp(
)
,
,
,
XS
XS
h
tvh
h
tvhh
tv ϕβµ
ϕβµ
++−
++
=     (2.17) 
 
where htvS ,  indicates a shock suffered by household h in village v at time t, and X captures 
all household characteristics. 
 
They find that asset poor households receive gifts in kind following livestock loss. 
Migration is used as a coping strategy for all groups in the case of crop or livestock loss.  
 
Fafchamps and Lund (2002) take a similar perspective, but model the value of 
gifts/remittances received and the value of loans taken following shocks, rather than the 
likelihood of a household engaging in these strategies. Using carefully collected data, they 
are able to construct network variables indicating the characteristics of households within 
the same informal lending and gift networks and include these as regressors, as well as 
both household shocks and network shocks. They therefore use (2.18) for both 
remittances received and loans. 
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where hnty , represents income from gifts/remittances and credit. The village variables are 
replaced with network variables denoted by the n subscript. Different specifications of 
(2.18) allow for the inclusion of household and village fixed effects which also, in some 
specifications act as instruments for the subjective shock variables. They instrument 
shocks using household characteristics since it is possible that households’ ability to cope 
with shocks is correlated with the likelihood of being subject to a shock.  
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Fafchamps and Lund (2002) find that both borrowing and gift income increase following 
shocks, and households whose networks face negative shocks see gift and loan income 
decrease. When shocks are instrumented, network shocks impact negatively on 
borrowing, but do not affect gifts. The authors suggest that this is because many gifts are 
ritual in nature (e.g. funerals) causing the gifts to be made to meet social obligation even 
in the face of network shocks. Focussing on specific shocks, households having to meet 
funeral expenses increase their borrowing and see an increase in remittance income. 
Unemployment is insured through borrowing. 
 
Fafchamps et al. (1998) estimate a version of (2.18) with livestock sales as a dependent 
variable. They analyse livestock sales following shocks and find weak evidence that 
livestock sales help to compensate for a small percentage of loss resulting from shocks. 
Decomposing shocks into idiosyncratic and covariant shocks reveals that there exists 
some degree of risk sharing amongst households in villages. 
 
Park (2006) estimates similar ex post coping strategy models to (2.18) using Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) and estimating the value of net transfers received; sale of 
assets; loans; and number of household members working (as a proxy for increased 
labour market participation). He finds that net remittance income increases when the 
household head has a child that lives outside of the village of origin, but decreases if 
children live within the village. Remittances increase as household economic status (as 
measured by education, age and sex of the household head) declines, and decrease 
following economic hardship. The author suggests that this is indicative of the fact that 
most shocks are covariant in nature. Households which are isolated from other 
households tend to sell livestock during following shocks, whilst other households do not. 
Unfortunately, Park (2006) treats all shocks equally as one “hardship dummy”, and fails to 
control for village fixed effects in this analysis. 
 
Pan (2007) uses Ethiopia Rural Household Survey and takes a similar perspective to Park 
(2006), modelling the amount of transfers received by households. She estimates the 
model separately for transfers received from the Ethiopian Government / Non-
Governmental Organisations and transfers from friends / family members. Pan (2007) 
first models expected income, and treats the error terms as the shock variable. This is 
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decomposed into continuous idiosyncratic and covariant shock variables which are then 
entered into the regressions estimating receipt of remittances. To check for robustness of 
her models, the shock variables are instrumented using lagged shocks. She finds that 
covariant income shocks are partly insured by government transfers and NGOs, but 
idiosyncratic shocks are not. There is also weak evidence to suggest that idiosyncratic 
income shocks are partly insured by transfers from friends and relatives, but these 
networks do not insure covariant shocks. 
2.5.2 Consumption smoothing models 
This constitutes the second main branch of the theoretical and empirical models used for 
understanding the impact of shocks in developing countries, and the extent to which they 
are insured. 
 
Under the perfect risk sharing hypothesis idiosyncratic shocks should not impact on the 
growth in consumption once aggregate shocks are taken into account. Cochrane (1991) 
proposes a simple test for complete consumption insurance.  
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where the left hand side variable is household h in village v’s non-durable consumption 
growth, and S represents idiosyncratic shocks. Under perfect consumption insurance, β=0, 
that is, idiosyncratic shocks have no impact on change in consumption. This specification 
however, needs to be augmented to control for community shocks. Thus, either 
community shocks can be entered directly (e.g. Gertler and Gruber, 2002) or community 
and time interactions can be used to control for unobserved aggregate shocks (Skoufias 
and Quisumbing, 2003; Harrower and Hoddinott, 2005). Some authors (Mace, 1991; 
Townsend, 1994; Asfaw and von Braun, 2004) use change in average community income 
in place of the unobserved community shocks. Household characteristics, X are also 
included as control variables (Harrower and Hoddinott, 2005; Dercon et al., 2005; 
Skoufias and Quisumbing, 2003). 
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In (2.20), using shocks, rather than change in income is justified by the theory that shocks 
change income, which in turn impacts on consumption15. Mace (1991) also suggests that 
it is preferable, since a zero coefficient on change in income is an extreme test of 
consumption smoothing as it suggests that both permanent and transitory income are 
insured whilst a zero coefficient on a shock variable suggests that it is merely the shock 
that is insured, and not its impact on permanent income. Since shocks are assumed to 
affect the growth rate of consumption through their impact on income, numerous 
authors (e.g. Harrower and Hoddinott, 2005) estimate regressions using household 
income, rather than shocks and round and regional dummies. So that, 
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where D are round and region dummies. Dercon and Krishnan (2000) perform regressions 
similar to (2.20) to find that both idiosyncratic shocks and the covariant village rainfall 
index impact on consumption with the coefficient on village rainfall being significantly 
more important than those for idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
Several authors have also chosen to use change of the log of average community (or “risk-
sharing network”) income, )(ln
,vt
y∆  as a proxy for community shocks (Mace, 1991; 
Townsend, 1994; Asfaw and von Braun, 2004) as in (2.20)16: 
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Analysing consumption smoothing in Columbia and Nicaragua, Barrera and Pérez-Calle 
(2005) note that a “particular group of observations [may have] a different consumption 
smoothing parameter than the general one”, given by β. They therefore allow the slope 
and intercept of this parameter to vary for different categories of households. This may, 
                                                
15
 A basic regression revealed that, in the data set used, covariant shocks impacted on income levels, whilst 
household shocks did not. Shocks and income levels are investigated in more detail in section 7.4, but the 
output of this initial basic regression is given by: 
Income before remittances = 7.27 + 0.02*Sick member + 0.14*Death - 0.30*Flood – 0.88*Drought 
    (0.27)        (0.74)              (-1.99)       (-3.12) 
where t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficients. N=2031; F=3.50; r2=0.0074. 
16
 In addition, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) use village wages and prices to control for aggregate shocks, and 
with changes in shock variables, as in (7): 
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for example, be relevant for rural/urban difference or, in Chapter 7, for households which 
receive remittances, and those which do not.  
 
Barrera and Pérez-Calle (2005) include interaction terms as shown in (2.23), and this 
might also be tested by splitting the sample. Barrera and Pérez-Calle (2005) also estimate 
a version of (2.23) in which they replace shock variables with change in income. This 
analysis augments this to include interaction terms between both household and 
community shocks, and remittances. 
 
 
(2.23) 
 
 
where 1I  represents interaction terms for household shocks, 
h
tvS , , and 2I  interactions for 
community shocks, tvS , . 
 
Several authors have modified the models described in order to assess particular 
questions or deal with potential econometric problems. With regard to self-reported 
health shocks – one of the key reported shocks in Chapter 7 – Asfaw and von Braun 
(2004), Gertler and Gruber (2002) and de Weerdt and Dercon (2006) note the potential 
for measurement error, the predictability of this shock, and long run effects on 
consumption. In order to overcome the measurement error issue Asfaw and von Braun 
(2004) and Gertler and Gruber (2002) first difference the shock variable, as in (2.24) so 
that, in Gertler and Gruber (2002), it takes a value of 1 if a household member moves 
from ill to healthy and -1 if a member moves from health to ill. Under the assumption that 
measurement errors are specific to the individual and constant over the short period, this 
eliminates this problem. The issue of household characteristics such as education 
influencing such a judgement is eliminated through controlling for fixed factors, X, or 
household fixed effects. 
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Dercon et al. (2005), de Weerdt and Dercon (2006) and Fafchamps et al. (1998) look at 
the persistent effects of shocks on current consumption by estimating current 
consumption against recent and distant past shocks. In (2.25) below, lagged values of the 
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shock variables are introduced, with β1 giving the short run impact of a given shock on 
current consumption, and β2, the persistent impact. This model is therefore estimated in 
levels rather than differences. 
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Dercon et al. (2005) augment (2.25) by including lagged consumption as a dependent 
variable to control for initial income. Their model is given in (2.26): 
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The problem of predictability of health shocks is discussed in de Weerdt and Dercon 
(2006). They run a fixed effects regression estimating the probability of a health shock on 
household characteristics, consumption in period t-1 and time dummies. In order to verify 
the robustness of their results they are then able to run two versions of the standard 
model – one for the full sample, and one excluding all observations which had correctly 
predicted health shocks.  
 
A final theoretical point to note concerns the dependent variable. Where data permit, 
most studies have chosen to estimate separate models for food and non-food 
consumption (e.g. Asfaw and von Braun, 2004; de Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Barrera and 
Pérez-Calle, 2005; Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Park, 2006), since some categories of 
consumption might be insured whilst other are not.  
2.5.3 Review of empirical evidence of shocks and consumption smoothing 
This section focuses on evidence from developing countries. Studies estimating different 
versions of the basic hypothesis that shocks impact on consumption but can be insured 
have generated a wide range of results with some authors able to reject the full insurance 
hypothesis and others not. In general, results indicate that food consumption is more 
likely to be insured than other consumption, but this result varies depending upon the 
country studied. Health shocks are potentially devastating for a household but their 
largely idiosyncratic nature makes them a good candidate for insurance. Weather shocks 
are undoubtedly covariant in nature, and are therefore difficult to insure within the 
context of small communities. These two contrasting shocks are therefore especially 
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interesting to examine. This section reviews the key findings of recent empirical papers 
and a summary of key findings is presented in Table 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of key findings from studies of the risk sharing hypothesis 
Study Key conclusions 
De Weerdt and Dercon 
(2006) - Tanzania 
Unable to reject hypothesis that health shocks are insured. When only 
unexpected health shocks are included, a shock results in a 7.3% 
reduction in consumption 
 
Asfaw and von Braun 
(2004) - Ethiopia 
Household heads' health shocks impact negatively on purchased food 
consumption, but not on total food consumption - in-kind food gifts 
substitute for purchased food. 
 
Barrera and Pérez-
Calle (2005) - Colombia 
and Nicaragua 
Health shocks have significant negative impact for Colombia. Urban 
households suffer more following shocks (less insured) than rural ones. 
Food consumption suffers less than non-food consumption. 
 
Harrower and 
Hoddinott (2005) - 
Mali 
Health shocks do not impact on change in consumption - these shocks 
are therefore fully insured. Loss of livestock has a negative impact. 
Household consumption affected by covariant shocks. 
 
Gertler and Gruber 
(2002) - Indonesia 
An income shock results in a consumption decrease of 0.35 units for 
each unit decrease in income. A decline in the health of the household 
head results in decreased labor market participation and therefore 
decreased wage income. 
 
Irac and Minoiu (2007) 
- Romania 
Household consumption varies with covariant shocks. Weather shocks 
cause households to increase non-food consumption by 55-75%, 
perhaps due to repairing damage. Poorer households' food 
consumption is as well insured as richer households but richer 
households better able to increase non-food consumption following 
crop damage (repairing damage?). 
 
Dercon and Krishnan 
(2000) - Ethiopia 
Higher than average rainfall has positive impact on consumption. Crop 
damage has positive impact on consumption (repairing damage?). 
 
Dercon et al. (2005) - 
Ethiopia 
Health shocks decrease household consumption by 9% and drought 
causes household consumption to decrease by 19%. The impact of 
these shocks is persistent, having an impact on consumption level 
despite having occurred 2-5 years previously. 
 
Park (2006) - 
Bangladesh 
Food consumption risk is pooled amongst small clusters of houses and 
amongst relatives. Food consumption is insured against shocks more 
effectively than non-food consumption. 
 
Townsend (1995) - 
Thailand 
Consumption insurance hypothesis rejected with MPC out of 
idiosyncratic changes of income of between 0.29 and 0.85 depending 
upon the region. Bangkok exhibits lowest degree of risk pooling. Farm 
households in north of Thailand exhibit highest degree of risk pooling 
and entrepreneurs the lowest. 
 
Townsend (1994) - 
India 
Health shocks and unemployment do not impact significantly on 
household consumption, and are therefore insured. 
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De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) analyse the impact of risk sharing networks in insuring food 
and non-food consumption against illness in rural Tanzania. They take advantage of a 
data set in which every household in a village was interviewed and asked to name who 
they turned to in the case of negative shocks. There were 1126 “network partners” for 
120 households of which two thirds were within the village. This allows the authors to 
estimate their model replacing average village consumption with average network 
consumption for each household, constructed using the consumption of all other 
households in the sharing network which were one or two steps apart in terms of 
“geodistance”. They run first differences and instrumental variables (IV) regressions, 
instrumenting for network effects using changes in household characteristics, livestock 
values and remittances from outside the network. They also note that some health shocks 
are predictable, and so run a regression predicting health shocks based on first round 
household characteristics. The IV regression is then re-run excluding all households for 
which the model correctly predicted a health shock, that is, including only unpredicted 
health shocks. De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) are unable to reject the hypothesis that 
health shocks are insured, with the relevant coefficient being negative but insignificant in 
most cases. However, when only unexpected shocks are included, an unexpected health 
shock results in a 7.3 per cent decrease in consumption. Network consumption matters 
for insuring non-food consumption, but is not significant in the case of food consumption. 
 
Asfaw and von Braun (2004) estimate the impact of negative health shocks for the 
household head on change in consumption in rural Ethiopia using (2.21). They include in 
their preference shifters, age of household head and its square, household size and the 
change in logged income, which is instrumented with lagged income and lagged asset 
ownership and, in some specifications, a wealth index is interacted with the illness 
dummy. They do not however include the wealth index on its own meaning that this is 
included only for households with sick members. They analyse purchased food 
consumption, total food consumption and non-food consumption (excluding medical 
expenses) separately, and find a negative and significant impact of illness on purchased 
food consumption, but no significant impact for total food consumption. They therefore 
conclude that household heads’ illnesses are insured through food gifts, and that 
purchased food stuffs and food gifts are substitutes. A positive and significant coefficient 
on their wealth index/illness interaction leads them to conclude that wealthier 
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households with less liquidity constraint tend to be better able to take advantage of risk 
sharing. The fact that they do not include wealth assets as an individual regressor for the 
whole sample means that this conclusion may be questionable. Non-food consumption is 
not insured against health shocks. 
 
Barrera and Pérez-Calle (2005) estimate (2.23) for food consumption and total 
consumption using data from Colombia and Nicaragua. They include health shocks for the 
household head and other members, death and childbirth. They also include indicators 
for unemployment, and natural disasters such as flood and drought. The interaction term 
described in (2.23) allows them to capture differences between asset-rich households and 
others whilst rural/urban differences are captured by splitting the sample and re-
estimating their model for each group. All regressions are run separately for each country. 
The authors find that health shocks and death have a significant and negative impact on 
change in consumption for Colombia, whilst few other shock variables are significant. 
Substituting income for shock in (2.23) the authors find that a one unit change in income 
leads to a 0.065 unit change in consumption in Colombia, and a 0.091 unit change in 
Nicaragua with urban households exhibiting more response than rural ones. In addition, 
the impact on food is less than on total consumption. This should not be surprising since 
food consumption is likely to be less elastic than other consumption. In most models, 
home ownership plays no role in smoothing income.  
 
Analysing rural Mali, Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) find similar results to Barrera and 
Pérez-Calle (2005). Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) find a similar negligible propensity to 
consume out of income changes of between zero and 0.07. They split the sample to 
analyse positive and negative shocks separately and find that consumption responds 
more strongly to positive shocks than negative ones, with elasticities of 0.116 and 0.041 
respectively. Income changes do not appear to impact on consumption changes for asset 
poor households. Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) find that, after controlling for 
household characteristics and covariant shocks, only one of the three shocks included in 
the study impacts on consumption change. Loss of livestock due to theft or death has a 
negative impact, and is significant in most model specifications. Illness or inability to 
cultivate available land has no impact.  
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Gertler and Gruber (2002) use Indonesian data to analyse the impact of various 
definitions of ill health on labour force participation and consumption. They exclude 
medical expenditure from total consumption and find that if the household head moves 
from the highest level of their health index (Activities of Daily Living (ADL) index) to the 
lowest level, household consumption reduces by 20 per cent. Next, they re-estimate their 
model replacing the shock variable with change in income. An OLS regression suggests 
that for each unit decrease in income, consumption falls by 0.03 units. Instrumenting for 
the change in income in order to take into account its potential endogeneity however, 
results in a decrease in consumption of 0.35 units for each unit decrease in income. The 
link between health and income is tested by estimating a version of the model described 
with change in labour market participation as the dependent variable. A decline in the 
health of the household head results in decreased labour market participation, and 
therefore decreased wage income. 
 
Irac and Minoiu (2007) study 364 rural Romanian households using data collected in 2003 
and 2004. They regress food, non-food and total consumption separately and include 
weather shock, crop failure, illness, unemployment and maternity as well as region-round 
interaction dummies. For each dependent variable, Irac and Minoiu (2007) run an OLS 
regression, and 2SLS instrumenting for number of newborn children and, perhaps 
surprisingly, for change in number of children under 14 years, using the age of the 
household head and its square, education of household head and the lagged number of 
members as instruments. As in Harrower and Hoddinott (2005), F-tests for the null 
hypothesis that region-round interaction dummies are jointly equal to zero are strongly 
rejected. They therefore conclude that household change in consumption varies with 
regional shocks. The weather shock dummy indicates that households which suffer from 
this shock increase their non-food consumption by 55-75 per cent. Households are then 
classified into rich and poor categories, and (2.23) is estimated using interaction variables. 
The authors conclude that there is “no evidence that richer households better insure food 
consumption than poorer households. However, after crop failure, richer households’ 
growth rates of non food consumption … and total non-durable consumption are higher 
than those of poorer households” [p.169]. 
 
Park (2006) estimates models for rural Bangladesh using OLS and 2SLS in which change in 
income is instrumented with land ownership and non-farm business assets. Food and 
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non-food consumption are estimated separately although results are similar. He also 
estimates separate models for households within a village, within a cluster (part of a 
village) and for related households in different villages. Park (2006) finds evidence that 
food consumption risks are pooled within small clusters, and amongst relatives living in 
different villages, but not within non-related households in different villages. Generally, 
elasticities for non-food consumption are greater than those for food consumption, as 
one would expect. Finally, non-relatives appear to share risks to non-food consumption 
more than relatives.  
 
Dercon et al. (2005) estimate (2.26) using data collected in rural Ethiopia in 1999 and 
2004. They include covariant and idiosyncratic shocks including climatic shocks such as 
drought, health and crime. Descriptive statistics reveal that idiosyncratic and covariant 
shocks have a similar reported impact on consumption or asset loss (assets are sold in 
order to maintain consumption) on average for a household. They find that few of the 
shocks impact on consumption. Exceptions are drought and illness of a household 
member. Those shocks occurring between 1999 and 2004 decrease household 
consumption by 19 and 9 per cent respectively. They go on to disaggregate shocks 
occurring between 2002-2004 and 1999-2001 to enter them separately to assess the 
persistence of shocks. They find that drought and illness occurring between 1999 and 
2002 decrease 2004 consumption by 13 and 14 per cent respectively. A decrease in the 
price of agricultural produce has a persistent negative impact on consumption in the main 
agricultural regions of the country. Similar results are obtained whether or not 1999 
(initial) consumption (instrumented with further lags, and lagged asset ownership) is 
included as a regressor. 
 
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) estimate a version of the basic model using panel fixed 
effects for three rounds of rural Ethiopian data and capturing covariant shocks with 
wages, which is itself proxied with a dummy indicating peak labour period for the village. 
They find that village rainfall index has a strongly positive impact on consumption. 
Increased prices have a negative impact on consumption and consumption increases 
during the peak labour period. Perhaps surprisingly a higher crop damage index and 
having suffered from livestock disease has a positive impact on consumption. 
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Townsend (1994, 1995) studies Thai and Indian data to estimate various versions of the 
basic model described above. He finds that, for India, neither unemployment nor sickness 
impacts significantly on household consumption. Furthermore, the largest “marginal 
propensity for a household to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income [was] 0.14 
in any of the three villages”. There is thus a significant degree of risk sharing. Studying 
Thai data, he rejects emphatically the consumption insurance hypothesis, with marginal 
propensities to consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income of between 0.29 and 0.85 
depending upon the region, with Bangkok exhibiting the lowest degree of risk sharing. Re-
running the regressions for different occupations, Townsend (1995) finds that farm 
households in the north do exhibit risk sharing, whilst entrepreneurs exhibit the lowest 
degree of risk-sharing. Attempting to answer the question “does insurance deteriorate 
with distance?”, he replaces average county consumption with average national 
consumption, and analyses the impact on the coefficient on change in household income. 
He gets mixed results but finds that for farm households in three of the six regions 
studied, coefficients on household income increase significantly, leading to the conclusion 
that for this category of household, there exists less insurance at the national level, than 
within their own county. Townsend (1995) does not however have any data on the means 
of risk sharing, but rather concludes this on the basis of the strength of income shocks on 
consumption after controlling for average income at the county and then the national 
level.  
 
Chapter 7 attempts to improve on this last result using data on the geographical source of 
remittances, one of the main means of risk sharing. In addition, data on shocks 
themselves, rather than simply income, allow to test whether remittances from different 
geographical sources are used to compensate for different shocks. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the literature related to each part of a remittance flow when 
viewed from an individual or household level. In 2.3 the literature on motivations to remit 
is considered, finding that different studies draw different conclusions. Indeed there 
appears to be elements of altruism, (co-)insurance, investment and payment for current 
or past services in remittance flows. 
 
Section 2.4 focused on mental accounting models and discussed conclusions of relevant 
studies. There is widespread support for the mental accounting hypothesis that people 
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both view and treat income from different sources differently. How this works in practice 
is, however, likely to be strongly related to the culture and context. Similarly, there is no 
clear agreement on how remittances are used with evidence varying according to the 
country of study. 
 
Section 2.5 looked at the insurance literature in a development context. Here, the 
evidence favours, on balance, the idea that households in developing countries are able 
to partly protect themselves against some types of shocks, but the evidence is not clear 
cut. In addition, there is little work regarding the source of the insurance (for example, 
savings, credit, remittances, sale of assets), although it is likely that households engage in 
a variety of coping strategies following a shock. 
 
This thesis aims to extend the literature in each of these areas. Chapter 5 is able to 
compare the differing motivations for remitting depending upon the relationship 
between the sender and the receiver. In Chapter 6 the mental accounting hypothesis is 
extended to equally liquid income, and uses consumption functions to understand how 
remittances are used. Chapter 7 offers remittances as a source of insurance, and make 
the important extension that the geographical sources of remittances matter in an 
agricultural context in which weather plays a role in determining income causing local 
incomes to be strongly correlated. 
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2.7 APPENDIX 
This appendix gives calculations from models discussed in section 2.1. 
 
Altruistic model 
The utility functions of the sender, s and receiver, r are shown below: 
),()()1(),( srrssssrss CCUCVCCU ββ +−=     (A2.1.1) 
),()()1(),( rssrrrrsrr CCUCVCCU ββ +−=     (A2.1.2) 
Solve in terms of V(C): 
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)()()1(),( rrssssrss CVCVCCSoU γγ +−=      (A2.1.3) 
 
Incorporating transfers, consumption can be re-written to be equal to income, I, less 
transfers, T. Thus:  
 
)()()1(),( TIVTIVCCU rrssssrss ++−−= γγ     (A2.1.4) 
 
To find the optimal level of transfers from the sender’s perspective, maximise the 
sender’s utility with respect to transfers: 
 
 68
( )
)0(0
)()(
)1( >=
+∂
∂
+
−∂
∂
−−=
∂
•∂
ifT
TI
V
TI
V
T
U
r
r
s
s
s
s
s
γγ    (A2.1.5) 
 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) then assume that there are no negative transfers from the 
sender to the receiver, and impose a felicity func`on sa`sfying VXY0 and VXX<0, V(.)=ln(.). 
Thus: 
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Then solve for the optimal level of transfers from the sender’s perspective, T*: 
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This has several properties: 
 
(1) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s income: 
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(2) Transfers are falling in the receiver’s income: 
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In addition, Rapoport and Docquier (2006) note that: 
(3) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s degree of altruism: 
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(4) And that transfers are falling in the degree of altruism of the receiving household: 
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Insurance model 
The sender’s, s expected utility is given below: 
 
)()()1()( sIVIVTIVEU sB
ss
G
sss ++−+−= ππ     (A2.1.11) 
 
Note that in the actuarially fair case, sT π= so π/Ts = . Thus, indemnities paid in the 
case of shock are increasing in transfers (at a constant rate): 
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Imposing log utility, expected utility becomes: 
 
)ln()ln()1()ln( sIITIEU sB
s
G
s ++−+−= ππ     (A2.1.13) 
 
Solve for optimal level of transfers, T*: 
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This insurance model has several properties: 
(1) Transfers are increasing in the sender’s first period income (as with previous 
altruistic model): 
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(2) Transfers are decreasing in the sender’s bad state income: 
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(3) Transfers are increasing in the probability of a bad state (potentially proxied by 
education, unemployment or legal status if abroad): 
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3 DATA DESCRIPTION AND EXPLORATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to introduce the data used in each of the 
three main empirical chapters. To this end, relevant descriptive statistics of the main 
variables used are presented for each of the data sets. In addition, it is noted why the 
data used are suitable and useful for the purpose in each case. 
 
Secondly, each data set contains unique information which can be informative regarding 
the empirical context of the overall study. Thus the Family Transfer Project (FTP) focuses 
on individual (rather than household) transfer behaviour, the 1998 Integrated ousehold 
Survey (IHS98) looks at differences between male and female headed households and the 
Complementary Panel Survey (CPS) contains information on differences between 
remittances receiving households, remittances sending households, and those which do 
not engage in remittance transfers at all. 
 
Although each data set is unique with its own focus and information, some comparison is 
both possible and informative, and this is made in section 3.5. 
 
Consumption details are not collected in the FTP. Instead asset indexes are used as a 
wealth indicator. In addition, data on wage income earned during the previous week is 
reported. This is imperfect as it excludes all non-wage cash income and all in-kind income. 
 
Similar income details are collected in the IHS2 and the CPS. This is collected on both an 
individual level and household level, and data are then compared to ensure no 
duplication. Income includes that resulting from the sale of agricultural produce; paid 
income (including both salary income and casual labour); income resulting from business 
activities; remittances; and loans. More detailed questions are asked in a section on 
remittances. 
 
Expenditure is collected at household level. This is considerably more detailed in the IHS2 
than in the CPS. Each contain similar information on durable expenditure over the 
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previous year. However, the IHS2 allows individuals to report very detailed specific 
expenditure including ‘stamps’ and ‘sports club membership fee’. This level of detail 
allows for the construction of various consumption categories, discussed below. 
 
The CPS imposes more rigid consumption categories – for example, ‘staple food’; 
‘vegetables’; ‘meat or fish’; ‘fertiliser’; and ‘paraffin’. Data from these are used to 
construct a total consumption variable, a food consumption variable, and a non-food 
consumption variable. 
The FTP collected data only in cash income in the form of wages. Data on both cash and 
in-kind remittances were collected however. In order to estimate the value of in-kind 
remittances, the compilers collected up-to-date market information in the place where 
the remittances were received. This allowed them to place cash values on in-kind 
remittance receipts, and it is these values which are used in the analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
The IHS98 collected data on both cash and in-kind consumption. However, in order to test 
the mental accounting hypothesis, it is important that income be as fungible as possible 
and that the household is able to choose easily how to spend the income. For example, 
even though one might be able to convert an in-kind gift into cash and then to use the 
cash to purchase other goods, the transaction costs involved may be prohibitive. This 
would introduce a bias in the estimates towards consumption of the same goods given, 
when, with zero transaction costs, this would not be the case. Therefore, only cash 
income and consumptions are used in Chapter 6. 
 
The CPS collected data on non-cash food consumption. In addition, it collected 
information on in-kind remittances as well as cash remittances. In both cases, the 
respondents were asked to estimate the value of the consumption or the gift. Although 
this is not ideal, this is a common way to value such goods. 
 
All models in this study make use of asset indexes. Each of the three data sets collect 
information on ownership of assets of different assets. The IHS98 asks respondents to 
estimate the amount they would receive if they were to sell each asset today. This allows 
for the construction of variables indicating the value of fixed and variable assets. 
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The FTP and CPS however collect data on asset ownership, but do not place any value on 
assets. One possibility would be use place each asset in the regression as a dummy 
variable indicating ownership or not of an item, as a continuous variable (how many 
cattle?), or as a categorical variable (quality of housing on a 3 point scale). An alternative 
is to use Principle Components Analysis (PCA) in order to generate an asset index. 
 
The aim of PCA is to create a standard normally distributed index for the whole sample. 
The index value for each household is the variable to be estimated such that: 
 
Household Index Value = a1 + a2 Asset 1 + a3 Asset 2 + ... + error 
 
Note that coefficients of ai=1 results in an identical index to that created if each asset is 
simply added up. However, it is useful to weight each asset since, for example, it might 
not be desirable to have ownership of one chicken to be the same as the ownership of 
one cow. The ai gives these weights. 
 
The method focuses on the covariances amongst the assets and aims to maximise the 
proportion of the common and unique variance which is explained by the index. However, 
it is unlikely that in one single index, one hundred per cent of the variances will be 
explained (that is, it is unlikely that the error will be zero). Thus, several indexes are 
actually estimated in each case, and the index used is the index which explains the 
greatest part of the variance and covariance of the assets included. In all cases, the asset 
index used explains between 50 and 60 per cent of the variance and covariance of the 
assets included. 
 
Details of the exact assets included are given below Table 3.1 for the FTP and in footnote 
21 for the CPS.  
3.2 MALAWI FAMILY TRANSFER PROJECT 
Chapter 5 studies motivations to remit using individual level data. This data set was 
chosen because the theory necessitates information on both sender and receiver 
characteristics. In addition, this data set allows this study to extend the existing research 
by analysing whether and how the relationship between the sender and the receiver 
matters in motivating remittances. 
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The Malawi Family Transfers Project (FTP) was carried out in three rural areas of Malawi 
(Balaka in the southern region, Mchinji in the centre and Rumphi in the north) between 
June and August, 1999. The three areas in which the survey was conducted are both 
similar and broadly representative of rural areas in Malawi in socioeconomic terms and 
with regards to commercial activities (markets, banks,…) and institutions (post offices, 
clinics,…) (Weinreb, 2001; 2002). 
 
The data were collected by the University of Pennsylvania Population Studies Center 
(Social Networks) for the purpose of analysing gifts and remittance flows from a number 
of different perspectives. There are 616 females and 501 males in the main households 
surveyed. There are more females due to lower response rates amongst males, polygamy 
and absence. The sampling purposively targeted working-age households and made 
efforts to interview both the household head and his wife. Males and females reported 
remittances sent and received on an individual (not household) level. Figure 3.1 gives the 
potential transfer relationships. 
Figure 3.1: Potential remittance flows 
3.2.1 Characteristics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
children. Thus Chapter 5 analyses remittance flows that are inter-household but intra-
family. The average age of respondents was around 33 years with males being on average 
around six years older than females. Almost all respondents are married and respondents 
have 3.7 years of education on average. Interestingly, there is little difference between 
males and females in this respect. (Amongst their parents however, only around 50 per 
cent of mothers had any education compared with over 80 per cent of fathers, showing 
Household 
Male Female 
Parents 
Father Mother 
Children 
Sons Daughters 
Siblings 
Brothers Sisters 
There are 1145 potential remittance 
flows between the male or female and 
their parents; 522 between the male or 
female and their children, and 3945 
with siblings. Remittance flows are 
studied for all relationships described 
separately, and only for adult relations 
who do not reside in the same 
household as the respondent, 
explaining the small number of  
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key generational difference.) Self-reported health status was, on average over 8/10 
although 28 per cent of respondents reported having suffered from ill health during the 
previous month. Average weekly wage income was over MK300 for men compared with 
around MK100 for females, and on average, men had a far higher asset index score. In 
addition, many respondents reported looking after the children of the relatives with 
whom they have transfer relationships. 
 
Table 3.1: Respondents’ characteristics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 1010 33.29 10.64 1 73 
Years education 1131 3.71 3.32 0 14 
Married 1166 97.00%  0 1 
Female respondent 1166 55.06%  0 1 
Eldest child 1166 19.47%  0 1 
Health rating (1=lowest to 10=highest) 1165 8.14 1.94 1 10 
Health problem in last month 1166 28.22%  0 1 
Wage income last week (MK) 1117 222.33 1087.00 0 20000 
Asset index * 1117 0.00 1.73 -2.08 11.79 
Sibling in house 1166 6.35%  0 1 
Nephew/Niece in house 1166 12.18%  0 1 
Grandchild in house 1166 9.35%  0 1 
Matrilineal ethnicity 1166 23.76%  0 1 
Patrilineal ethnicity 1166 37.14%  0 1 
Mixed (Chewa) ethnicity 1166 39.11%   0 1 
Notes: *Created using Principle Components Analysis and includes ownership of bed, radio, bike, lamps, pit 
latrines, cattle, goats, pigs, poultry, land and quality of housing material. The mean of the asset index is 
around zero by construction
17
. 
 
On average, parents are 60 years of age (fathers 64 years and mothers 57 years), and 
respondents rated their parents’ health at around 6.2/10 on average (with little 
difference between fathers and mothers). Parents had an average of 7.9 heirs, and 66 per 
cent of them reported having some schooling (54 per cent of mothers and 82 per cent of 
fathers). Over a third of parents live in the same village as the interviewed child. Nearly 
seven per cent of respondents reported looking after a sibling. 
 
Table 3.2: Parents’ characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age Parents 1144 60.09 11.88 32 99 
Health Parents 1139 6.23 2.35 1 10 
Heirs 1147 7.89 2.74 1 20 
Sibling in respondent's house 1147 6.80%  0 1 
Schooling 1147 66.17%  0 1 
Parent lives in same village as respondent 962 37.63%   0 1 
                                                
17
 Lawley and Maxwell (1963) give a clear discussion of Principle Components Analysis. 
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Since working age respondents were purposively targeted, and these data are used to 
analyse only inter-household remittances, very few respondents had adult children living 
outside of the family home. There are thus only 522 potential dyads, or remittance 
relationships between respondents and their children. 
 
The average reported health level of the children was around 8.4/10, and children were 
on average around 23 years of age. There are more daughters than sons, probably due to 
daughters leaving the home to marry at a younger age than sons, indeed on average 
daughters were younger than sons. Around two thirds of children were married, and 27 
per cent had moved to a city or abroad. Respondents reported having an average of 4.4 
children, and receive remittances from an average of 1.35 of these. Over 17 per cent of 
respondents reported having a grandchild in their household but the data do not indicate 
to which child the grandchild belongs. 
 
Table 3.3: Children’s characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Health of son/daughter (1=lowest, 10=highest) 522 8.43 1.78 1 10 
Number of children parents have 522 4.38 1.89 1 11 
Number of sons/daughters remitting to parents 522 1.35 1.36 0 5 
Age of son/daughter 522 22.94 5.76 15 63 
Eldest son/daughter 522 45.02%  0 1 
Parents have one of children's children in household 522 17.43%  0 1 
Daughter (not son) 522 59.77%  0 1 
Son/Daughter lives in city or abroad 522 27.01%  0 1 
Son/Daughter married 522 64.56%   0 1 
 
Respondents’ siblings are on average around 31.8 years and respondents rated their 
health at 8.14 on average. Around half of siblings are sisters and half brothers. Nearly a 
quarter of all siblings live either abroad or in a city inside Malawi, with this being the 
major difference between respondents and their siblings. In nearly 13 per cent of cases, 
the respondents reported looking after a sibling’s child. Again, unfortunately the data do 
not indicate to which sibling the child belongs. 
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Table 3.4: Siblings’ characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age of sibling 2916 31.78 11.49 15 96 
Health of sibling 3945 8.14 1.95 1 10 
Sister 3945 50.37%  0 1 
Eldest sibling 3945 12.19%  0 1 
Sibling lives abroad or in city 3945 24.41%  0 1 
Respondent household has nephew/niece 3945 12.75%   0 1 
3.2.2 Remittance flows 
Although both husbands and wives were interviewed in the majority of cases, 
respondents reported remittances sent and received on an individual bases. Thus, 
remittances sent from the male to a son is not the same as that sent from the female to 
the same son. Respondents reported remittances sent and received since the end of the 
previous growing season – a period of around four to five months. Detailed information is 
given regarding the remittances, and estimated values of goods (collected in the field) are 
used to value physical (as opposed to cash) gifts. 
 
There are 1145 potential remittance dyads between the respondents and their parents. 
Of these, respondents reported remitting to parents since the last agricultural season in 
around 65 per cent of cases, and received remittances from parents in 50 per cent of 
cases. Excluding zero remittance flows, the average remittances sent to parents was 
MK245 and the average value of remittances received from parents was MK205. (MK is 
Malawi Kwacha, the local currency unit. At the time of the survey US$1 ≈ MK70.) 
 
Between respondents and children there are 522 potential remittance relationships with 
respondents giving to children in just over half of all cases an average amount of MK300, 
and receiving remittances from children in around 38 per cent of cases with the average 
amount received being around MK200. 
 
Respondents reported remitting to siblings in 35 per cent of the 3945 potential cases, and 
received from them in around a quarter of cases. Average remittances sent and received 
are similar at around MK185.  
 
It is possible that there is some degree of reporting bias since more respondents reported 
giving than receiving in all cases. However, due to sampling, this seems realistic in the 
case of parents and children. It is perhaps less likely with regard to siblings, and it is 
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interesting to note that there is little difference in the value of remittances sent and 
received in this case, and the gap between the number of respondents reporting sending 
and receiving remittances is smaller for siblings than for parents and children. 
 
Table 3.5: Incidence and values of remittance flows 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent <--> Parents       
Respondent--Y Parent 1145 64.37%     
Parent--Y Respondent 1145 50.57%     
Value of remittances to parent (excl. zeros) 737 244.57 435.6 1 5000 
Value of remittances from parent (excl. zeros) 579 205.13 489.84 5 6350 
Respondent <--> Children       
Respondent --YChildren 522 51.72%  0 1 
Children--Y Household 522 37.74%  0 1 
Value of remittances to children (excl. zeros) 275 300.24 455.16 4 4000 
Value of remittances from children (excl. zeros) 198 200.82 420.65 4 5000 
Respondent <--> Siblings       
Respondent --Y Sibling 3945 35.18%     
Sibling --Y Respondent 3945 26.84%     
Value of remittances to sibling (excl. zeros) 1389 180.03 418.73 1 7503 
Value of remittances from sibling (excl. zeros) 1061 188.4 572.3 2 15000 
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3.3 MALAWI INTEGRATED HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
Chapter 6 uses a large cross-sectional data set to test for the existence of mental 
accounting, a psychological theory that postulates that income from different sources is 
used differently. The focus is on testing the theory and then estimating the uses of 
remittances in particular. The Malawian Integrated Household Survey was carried out 
from November 1997 to October 1998. Urban households and those judged by the 
Malawian National Statistical Office to have unreliable income and consumption data 
were dropped to leave a representative sample of 5644 rural households across Malawi. 
This large sample data set includes detailed income and consumption variables as well as 
a wide range of household characteristics. For these reasons, these data are used rather 
than the short panel, discussed in 3.4 and used in Chapter 7, to study consumption habits, 
and significant efforts are made to minimise the risk of unobserved heterogeneity. Apart 
from urban-rural differences, one key source of potential unobserved heterogeneity 
results from intra-household bargaining. That is, the person controlling the remittance 
income has different preferences to other members of the household. In particular 
remittance income may accrue to females from husbands working away from home. For 
this reason, the analysis in Chapter 6, and the descriptive information given here are 
broken down by male and (de facto) female heads of household. 
3.3.1 Household characteristics 
The average male household head is around 40 years of age and has 4.5 members of 
which 2 are children. Female heads comprise of around 26 per cent of the total and tend 
to be older with an average age of 44 years. The average household size is smaller that 
their male counterparts at 3.8 members and 1.9 children. Nearly 90 per cent of male 
heads are married compared with 28 per cent of female household heads. The smaller 
household size for female headed households (FHH) thus appears to be explained partly 
by the lack of husband and partly by the lack of children. Female headed households 
could be split into several groups: some females are likely never to have been married, 
reducing the number of likely children. Others will be divorced or widowed, perhaps with 
some children living outside of the household. Those who are still married are likely to 
have husbands working away from the home. These are therefore considered de facto 
household heads. 
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Half of FHH and 43 per cent of male headed households (MHH) reported working in 
agriculture. There is no difference in acres of land owned between MHH and FHH, with 
each group owning on average 1.85 acres. This should not be surprising, as a large 
proportion of the Malawian population follows matrilineal or mixed customs whereby 
land is inherited through females. Section 1.3 gives more detail regarding the Malawian 
context. 
 
Education is given by a discrete variable from zero to six where zero is illiterate, one is 
literate but has no formal education, two indicates some primary education, three 
indicates having completed primary education, four indicates some secondary education, 
five indicates having completed secondary education and six is further or higher 
education. The average value is 2.24/6 for male heads and 2.03 for female heads. 
 
Around a quarter of all households were interviewed during the “hungry season” 
between December and February inclusively. This is the time period before the harvest 
during which food is scarce, and this “season” can have an impact on household 
behaviour. A dummy controlling for this season is therefore included where necessary. 
 
Around 15 per cent of households reside in the largely patrilineal north and 44 per cent 
reside in the matrilineal and mixed south. The remainder live in the central (capital) 
region of the country, which has mixed matrilineal/patrilineal customs. 
3.3.2 Income 
All income and consumption values were annualised, placed in per adult equivalent (PAE) 
terms and adjusted for the regional price level. The survey was carried out from 
November 1997 to October 1998 during which time the country experienced a relatively 
high inflation rate; International Financial Statistics show an inflation rate of 29.75 per 
cent during 1998. During the survey, information was collected on local prices in each of 
the regions where the survey was carried out. This information was then used to 
construct monthly food, non-food and total price indexes for each region. These price 
indexes correspond more closely to the purchases of the households surveyed and are 
more detailed than the inflation data collected by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. All 
monetary values are adjusted according to the time the household was surveyed and the 
region in which they are situated.  
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Average reported non-business PAE household income is Malawian Kwacha18 (MK) 1866 
annually with average consumption equal to MK2063. Average non-business income is 
higher in FHH than MHH, but consumption is higher in MHH than FHH. Income sources 
are varied with many households receiving income from several sources and the 
percentage of households receiving income from any given source is similar for MHH and 
FHH. Around 19 per cent of households reported accessing credit during the previous 
year. 22 per cent had business income, 46 per cent received farm income and 20 percent 
received salary income. For those that receive it, salary income is the most important 
source of income in terms of average value. 
 
Around 22 per cent of households reported receiving remittance income during the 
month preceding the survey. The mean yearly income from this source was MK1409 for 
those that received them. Excluding business income, mean remittances are worth 
around 43 per cent of the average total income of receiving households. They are thus an 
important source of income for these households. For those that receive remittances 
income, it is worth an average of MK1440 for MHH and MK1605 for FHH. This may be the 
result of geographically split households in which the husband works away from home 
and remits income to the de facto female head. 
3.3.3 Consumption 
Consumption is classified into food; education; health; farm; household (e.g. personal and 
household hygiene, communication, transport); clothing; and fuel categories as well as 
total non-durable consumption. The kwacha value of consumption of each category is 
presented, and values are similar for both MHH and FHH for all categories. 
 
In addition, many households also reported significant non-cash consumption (largely 
home produce) with this being equal to around 68 per cent of non-business income. This 
should not come as a surprise in an agricultural economy such as Malawi’s where many 
households produce a large proportion of their own food consumption. The analysis in 
Chapter 6 however, focuses on easily fungible cash income and consumption. 
3.3.4 Asset holdings 
Respondents were asked to list their assets and to estimate the value of them by 
indicating how much they would receive for them if they were to sell them today. Fixed 
                                                
18
 During the period of the survey US$1≈MK70. Note that only rural households are analysed where the 
price level is typically around one third that of urban areas. 
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assets include land and housing, and liquid assets include livestock and items such as 
bicycles and household appliances. The average value of fixed assets was MK2119 or 114 
per cent of average non-business yearly income. FHH actually reported owning assets 
totalling slightly more than MHH for both fixed and liquid assets. This is potentially due to 
the fact that Malawi as a whole is biased towards matrilineal systems with females 
owning more than males. 
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3.4 MALAWI COMPLEMENTARY PANEL SURVEY 
Chapter 7 uses the Malawian Complimentary Panel Survey (CPS) to help understand 
whether remittances can help to moderate the impact of shocks such as sickness or 
drought. This chapter requires panel data in order the test the theories which are largely 
based on changes in consumption levels following shocks. In addition, this data set 
provides information on idiosyncratic shocks faced by the households. The larger sample 
size of the IHS98 is therefore sacrificed to ensure sufficient information.  
 
The CPS was undertaken by the Center for Social Research (CSR) in Malawi with technical 
assistance from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) between January 
2000 and July 2002. Four rounds of interviews were conducted yielding an unbalanced 
panel of 2550 observations. This study focuses on the 2355 rural households since urban 
households are likely to have access to different, additional means of income smoothing. 
Banking services are prevalent in urban areas, and employers often provide basic credit 
and saving services for their employees. The Malawian urban economy, although strongly 
linked to the rural, agricultural economy is vastly different in employment and industrial 
structure, and food is readily available in urban areas, even during times of scarcity in 
rural areas.  
 
Malawi’s history of migration combined with its lack of formal rural financial 
infrastructure means that remittances have developed as an important means of 
minimising risk and are thus an important source of both income and expenditure for 
households. This is the case for both intra-family and inter-household transfers. This data 
set indicates that remittances make up around 10 per cent of rural total income for 
households which also send them. Traditional gift exchange is an important part of rural 
life in Malawi, helping to smooth consumption and decrease risk faced with the lack of 
accessible financial infrastructure. This makes Malawi an ideal setting to study remittance 
flows from an insurance perspective. 
 
Descriptive statistics reveal informative differences between households which remit and 
those which do not, and between households which receive remittances and those which 
do not. In particular, the data reveal that senders and receivers exhibit very similar 
characteristics which tend to be different from the wider population. In the discussion 
that follows, the data are based on initial conditions, that is, the data collected during the 
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first round of the survey, and the characteristics used as control variables in the empirical 
analysis19. 
 
One outstanding result is that remitters are more likely to receive remittances themselves, 
and receivers are more likely to remit than the total sample. 44 per cent of receivers also 
remit against 31 per cent of the total sample, and 38 per cent of senders also receive  
remittances against 31 per cent of the total sample. Remittances flow in both directions 
suggesting that there is a strong insurance motive for these flows. It is unfortunate that, 
unlike in the Malawi Family Transfer Project data, sending and receiving households are 
not matched making it difficult to tell if two households engage regularly in mutual gift 
exchange. 
 
Sending and receiving household heads tend to have better education (4.56 and 5.36 
years respectively) than the average of 4.11 years. Furthermore senders and receivers are 
more likely to be better connected than other households. 24 per cent of sending 
household heads and 21 per cent of receiving household heads reported belonging to a 
local business group20 compared with around 14 per cent for households that neither 
send nor receive remittances. 51 per cent of sending household heads and 55 per cent of 
receiving household heads reported belonging to a religious group compared with 47 per 
cent percent of the whole sample. Senders and receivers also tend to be slightly more 
involved in political groups (local parties) and social groups (such as sports or acting clubs 
or women’s groups). 
 
These results should not be surprising. It could be that these groups offer a secure 
environment within which gift exchange can be carried out. Membership of a religious 
organisation might encourage trust for example. Furthermore, gift exchange within the 
context of a club might increase the social penalties associated with non-reciprocation, 
helping to increase security. 
 
A further reason why households which participate in remittance flows tend to be better 
connected than other households may relate to social and economic standing. Members 
of business clubs may have higher or more secure income, and receive gifts from others 
                                                
19
 This is done to avoid endogeneity issues regarding household characteristics and due to data limitations 
(information on some variables was collected only during the first round). 
20
 Local business groups are primarily farmers’ clubs, or talking shops for shop-keepers or maize traders. 
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because they are seen as good people to have in a social network in times of difficulty. 
Other desirable groups to have in one’s social network are those with salaried jobs. 
Senders and receivers are both more likely to have a household member with a salaried 
job. The causality in these examples is likely to go both ways. Those with better jobs or 
steadier income are more likely to be able to remit and would tend to be amongst the 
“best” people to have in a social network ensuring they also receive remittances. 
 
It is notable that senders and receivers have significantly higher asset scores for both 
livestock and non livestock indexes21 and higher food and non food consumption levels 
than other households. In short, sending and receiving households are wealthier than the 
average. 
 
                                                
21
 Assets used in the factor analysis include ownership of livestock, ownership of household furniture (e.g. 
tables, bed, chairs), household appliances and similar (e.g. radio, cooker, bicycle), and variables indicating 
quality of home (quality of walls, roofing, floor), access to electricity and water and number of hectares of 
land owned by the household. The asset index takes an average value of zero for the full sample (including 
urban households) and is normally distributed. 
 
8
7
T
a
b
le
 3
.7
: 
S
e
le
ct
e
d
 d
e
sc
ri
p
ti
v
e
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
fr
o
m
 C
o
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
 P
a
n
e
l 
S
u
rv
e
y
 
  
F
u
ll
 S
a
m
p
le
 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
 R
e
ce
iv
e
rs
 
N
o
n
-R
e
ce
iv
e
rs
 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
 S
e
n
d
e
rs
 
N
o
n
-S
e
n
d
e
rs
 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 
O
b
s 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
O
b
s 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
O
b
s 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
O
b
s 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
O
b
s 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
A
g
e
 o
f 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 H
e
a
d
 
6
2
7
 
4
6
.3
5
 
1
6
.3
1
 
1
6
4
 
4
5
.9
1
 
1
5
.1
8
 
4
6
3
 
4
6
.5
1
 
1
6
.7
0
 
1
9
4
 
4
2
.1
6
 
1
4
.8
2
 
4
3
3
 
4
8
.2
3
 
1
6
.6
1
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
H
e
a
d
 (
Y
e
a
rs
) 
6
8
7
 
4
.1
1
 
3
.5
3
 
1
8
4
 
4
.5
6
 
3
.6
6
 
5
0
3
 
3
.9
4
 
3
.4
7
 
2
1
2
 
5
.3
6
 
3
.6
2
 
4
7
5
 
3
.5
5
 
3
.3
5
 
F
e
m
a
le
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 H
e
a
d
 
6
8
7
 
0
.2
5
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.2
7
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.2
4
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.1
6
 
- 
4
7
5
 
0
.2
9
 
  
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 S
iz
e
 
6
8
7
 
5
.7
5
 
2
.5
2
 
1
8
4
 
5
.8
9
 
2
.7
6
 
5
0
3
 
5
.6
9
 
2
.4
2
 
2
1
2
 
6
.1
9
 
2
.6
1
 
4
7
5
 
5
.5
5
 
2
.4
5
 
H
e
a
d
 M
a
rr
ie
d
 
6
8
3
 
0
.7
5
 
- 
1
8
3
 
0
.7
0
 
- 
5
0
0
 
0
.7
6
 
- 
2
1
1
 
0
.8
2
 
0
.3
8
 
4
7
2
 
0
.7
1
 
- 
A
n
y
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
A
cc
e
ss
e
d
 C
re
d
it
 
in
 P
re
v
io
u
s 
1
2
 m
o
n
th
s 
6
8
7
 
0
.1
4
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.1
5
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.1
3
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.2
1
 
0
.4
1
 
4
7
5
 
0
.1
0
 
- 
A
n
y
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
w
it
h
 S
a
la
ri
e
d
 
Jo
b
 
6
8
7
 
0
.1
3
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.1
6
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.1
1
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.1
7
 
0
.3
7
 
4
7
5
 
0
.1
1
 
- 
H
e
a
d
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
B
u
si
n
e
ss
 
G
ro
u
p
 
6
8
7
 
0
.1
6
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.2
1
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.1
5
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.2
4
 
0
.4
3
 
4
7
5
 
0
.1
3
 
- 
H
e
a
d
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
R
e
li
g
io
u
s 
G
ro
u
p
 
6
8
7
 
0
.4
7
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.5
5
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.4
4
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.5
1
 
0
.5
0
 
4
7
5
 
0
.4
5
 
- 
H
e
a
d
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
G
ro
u
p
 
6
8
7
 
0
.1
1
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.1
1
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.1
1
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.1
7
 
0
.3
8
 
4
7
5
 
0
.0
8
 
- 
H
e
a
d
 M
e
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
S
o
ci
a
l 
G
ro
u
p
 
6
8
7
 
0
.2
8
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.3
0
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.2
8
 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.3
1
 
0
.4
6
 
4
7
5
 
0
.2
7
 
- 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
 S
e
n
d
in
g
 D
u
m
m
y
 
6
8
7
 
0
.3
1
 
- 
1
8
4
 
0
.4
4
 
- 
5
0
3
 
0
.2
6
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
 R
e
ce
iv
in
g
 D
u
m
m
y
 
6
8
7
 
0
.3
1
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2
1
2
 
0
.3
8
 
0
.4
9
 
4
7
5
 
0
.2
2
 
0
.4
1
 
A
ss
e
t 
In
d
e
x
: 
N
o
n
 L
iv
e
st
o
ck
 
6
1
6
 
-0
.1
5
 
0
.6
7
 
1
6
8
 
-0
.1
0
 
0
.5
9
 
4
4
8
 
-0
.1
7
 
0
.6
9
 
1
9
0
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.8
6
 
4
2
6
 
-0
.2
3
 
0
.5
4
 
A
ss
e
t 
In
d
e
x
: 
Li
v
e
st
o
ck
 
6
1
6
 
0
.0
2
 
0
.7
1
 
1
6
8
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.7
0
 
4
4
8
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.7
2
 
1
9
0
 
0
.1
2
 
0
.7
4
 
4
2
6
 
-0
.0
3
 
0
.7
0
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 I
n
co
m
e
 
b
e
fo
re
 R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
s 
(M
K
) 
6
8
7
 
2
9
6
1
 
1
4
0
5
9
 
1
8
4
 
2
3
6
3
 
4
3
2
0
 
5
0
3
 
3
1
8
0
 
1
6
2
2
1
 
2
1
2
 
6
0
4
8
 
2
4
1
1
6
 
4
7
5
 
1
5
8
3
 
4
5
8
4
 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
ce
s 
a
s 
p
e
r 
ce
n
t 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
m
o
n
th
ly
 i
n
co
m
e
 
5
4
2
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.2
7
 
1
8
4
 
0
.2
6
 
0
.4
1
 
- 
- 
- 
1
9
3
.0
0
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.2
8
 
3
4
9
 
0
.0
9
 
0
.2
6
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 F
o
o
d
 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 
6
8
7
 
4
1
4
 
1
0
6
2
 
1
8
4
 
5
3
4
 
1
6
8
8
 
5
0
3
 
3
7
0
 
7
0
4
 
2
1
2
 
6
2
8
 
1
6
3
0
 
4
7
5
 
3
1
9
 
6
4
8
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 N
o
n
-F
o
o
d
 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 
6
8
7
 
9
0
0
 
4
3
4
7
 
1
8
4
 
9
4
3
 
3
0
0
8
 
5
0
3
 
8
8
5
 
4
7
4
6
 
2
1
2
 
1
8
4
4
 
7
0
5
5
 
4
7
5
 
4
7
9
 
2
1
4
8
 
M
o
n
th
ly
 P
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
 T
o
ta
l 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 
6
8
7
 
1
3
1
4
 
4
6
0
8
 
1
8
4
 
1
4
7
7
 
3
7
8
0
 
5
0
3
 
1
2
5
5
 
4
8
7
9
 
2
1
2
 
2
4
7
1
 
7
4
5
7
 
4
7
5
 
7
9
8
 
2
2
6
3
 
  
 88
Households reported the geographical sources of their remittance income over the 
month previous to the survey. Over a third of rural households reported receiving 
remittances, with more cases of remittances coming from local areas (village and home 
district) than distant places (other districts, urban areas and abroad). 
 
Table 3.8: Percentage of households receiving remittances from different sources 
Receive Remittance From: Obs Mean 
Village 2355 18.3% 
District 2355 11.2% 
Other District 2355 7.7% 
Urban Area 2355 1.9% 
Abroad 2355 1.1% 
Local* 2355 26.8% 
Distant† 2355 10.6% 
Total 2355 34.6% 
Notes: *composed of village and district remittances; † composed of remittances from other districts, urban 
areas and abroad. 
 
Households also reported recent shocks. In particular, they reported whether a 
household member and which member had suffered from a health shock during the 
previous two weeks22. Secondly, in cases in which a household member had left since the 
previous round, they reported the reason for their absence allowing for the construction 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a household had suffered from a recent 
death.  Drought and Flood indicator variables were constructed using reports from 
Famine Early Warning System Network23 reports from Malawi, and are equal to 1 if a 
household lives in an area which suffered from a flood or drought since the previous 
round, and 0 otherwise24. Thus, there are two idiosyncratic or household shocks (death 
and sickness) and two community or covariant shocks (flood and drought)25. Table 3.9 
reports that around three per cent of households reported suffering from a death; nearly 
two per cent suffered from drought, and around 6.5 per cent from flooding. Over half of 
                                                
22
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to know the severity of the health shock. In addition, since these are self-
reported health shocks, there is a risk of measurement error (potentially correlated with education). This is 
an unavoidable issue, but efforts are made to correct for this by controlling for household characteristics 
and ensuring results are robust to fixed effects (see discussion in Chapter 7). 
23
 Reports available at: http://www.fews.net/malawi/  
24
 Floods and droughts are only considered shocks if they happened during a relevant season, so for 
example, no rain during the dry season is not considered to be a drought. 
25
 Recall periods for death were since the previous round, floods and droughts are indicated as having 
occurred since the previous round up until 1 month prior to the survey, sickness is reported during the 
previous two weeks, and the recall period for remittances is one month. There is thus the potential for a 
short overlap period for remittance receipts and death, and for sickness and remittances. Unfortunately for 
sickness it is not possible to know which came first within the context of the data used. Nonetheless, the 
results remain of interest. 
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all households suffered from a health shock. This study will focus separately on health 
shocks, analysing separately male and female members, and adults and children. 
 
Remittance receivers are more likely to have suffered from the two idiosyncratic shocks 
analysed (health shocks, and death), whilst remittance receivers are less likely to have 
suffered from the covariant shocks, flooding and drought. 
 
Table 3.9: Percentage of households suffering from shocks 
 Variable Total Sample Remittance Receivers Non Receivers 
 Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Health 2355 54.0% 816 56.7% 1539 52.5% 
Death 2355 3.3% 816 4.0% 1539 2.9% 
Flood 2355 6.5% 816 5.3% 1539 7.1% 
Drought 2355 1.7% 816 1.6% 1539 1.8% 
 
Table 3.10 shows simple correlations between shocks and remittances received from local 
areas, and more distant areas in both value and indicative terms. Idiosyncratic shocks are 
associated with increased likelihood of receiving local remittances and increased value of 
local remittances, and are significant for value received. Covariant shocks and receipt of 
local remittances are negatively associated and are significant in three out of the four 
cases. These relationships are unsurprising. Local remittances are likely to increase 
following idiosyncratic shocks if there is some degree of insurance or altruism in 
remittance giving. That remittances decrease from local areas following covariant, 
community shocks such as flooding and droughts is, likewise, to be expected. Most local 
households would have been affected, and potential givers would therefore find it more 
difficult to give remittances. 
 
Where significant, covariant shocks are positively associated with remittances from 
further afield, whilst there are conflicting signs and no significant correlations between 
idiosyncratic shocks and remittances received from distant places. Neither of these 
results should be surprising. Covariant shocks such as flooding and droughts are difficult 
to insure close to home, but remittances from unaffected areas can help to ease the 
impact of these shocks. Theoretically, one might anticipate that remittances from far 
away can ease the impact of idiosyncratic shocks as well as those from closer to home, 
with distant relatives as well as neighbours assisting households which suffer from these 
shocks. However, as noted by Posner (1980), it is reasonable to assume that, at least in 
the case of health shocks, the problem of information asymmetry is reduced closer to 
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home. This would encourage local insurance of such shocks. Secondly, where a shock 
requires immediate expenditure such as medical expenditure or on funerals, local 
insurance is preferable in economies with little formal financial infrastructure, and where 
travel is difficult26. 
 
Table 3.10: Correlations between shocks and remittance receipts 
  Shock 
  Health Death Flood Drought 
Local Remittances (Dummy) 0.0308 0.0237 -0.0455* -0.0364* 
Distant Remittances (Dummy) 0.0294 0.0067 -0.0060 0.0493* 
Local Remittances (Value) 0.0355* 0.0341* -0.0408* -0.0251 
Distant Remittances (Value) -0.0235 -0.0021 0.0788* -0.0034 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level 
 
3.5 A COMPARISON OF THE DATA SETS 
Average education levels for males in the IHS98 is 2.24 out of a possible six, compared 
with 2.03 for females. There is thus a clear difference between males and females. The 
FTP however indicates that educational differences between males and females are zero. 
Both the CPS and the FTP report years of education. The average in the CPS is 4.11 years, 
compared with 3.71 yeas in the FTP. This is surprising since it is likely that the purposive 
sampling of working age adults in the FTP (therefore largely excluding the elderly) is likely 
to result in a better educated sample. 
 
Other differences between the IHS98 and the FTP are the result of purposive sampling in 
the FTP. For example, the average age of respondents in the FTP is around 33 years, 
compared with over 40 years in the IHS98. In addition, 97 per cent of FTP respondents 
were married compared with around 73 per cent in the IHS98. The FTP deliberately 
targeted working aged adults rather than a representative sample of the rural population. 
For this reason, respondents are, on average, younger, and more likely to be married.  
 
Although the FTP and the IHS98 were conducted at a similar time (IHS98 in 1998 and FTP 
in 1999) the value of remittances are difficult to compare. Firstly, the FTP reports 
individual receipts, whilst the IHS98 reports household receipts. Secondly, the recall 
period is one month for the IHS98, but several months for the FTP. Finally, and most 
importantly, the FTP reports the value of remittances received from family members 
                                                
26
 This might be expected to change, as it is becoming increasingly easy to transfer funds using mobile 
phone credit, even in rural areas. 
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specified only, whilst the IHS98 reports value of remittance receipts from all people, 
including friends and neighbours. The CPS indicates that remittances from non family 
members are likely to be important.  
 
The average age of household heads is around 46 years in the CPS, compared with around 
41 years in the IHS98. In both surveys around a quarter of households are headed by 
females, and a similar proportion is married. The average household size is 5.75 in the CPS 
but around 4.3 in the IHS98. These similarities and differences are likely to be the result of 
sampling and the larger sample of the IHS98 is likely to be more representative of the 
rural Malawian population. 
 
Each of the data sets has a number of advantages and disadvantages. Although each one 
has been selected for the purpose, there remain issues. The two cross-sectional data sets 
have one major, but obvious disadvantage – they are not panel data. Although every 
effort has been taken to minimise the risk, it is not possible to be certain that individual 
heterogeneity does not impact on any of the results. For example, when studying mental 
accounting, it would be ideal to know that an individual changes their behaviour when 
their income composition changes, rather than simply that individuals with different 
income compositions have different consumption habits. 
 
Panel data has its own intrinsic (given issues involved in collecting data) issues. One major 
issue is that of sample attrition. The first round interviewed 758 households, although key 
data was collected for only 687 of these. The second round interviewed 667 households, 
the third round, 631, and the fourth round interviewed 499 households. Thus, around 73 
per cent of households interviewed during the first round were also interviewed during 
the final round. This however disguises the fact that a number of households were came 
back in later rounds after having dropped out. For example, 25 households were not 
interviewed during the second round, but were interviewed during the third round. For 
these households it remains possible to focus on differences in consumption levels 
between the two (or more) rounds in which they were interviewed. This minimises the 
impact of the sample attrition. Nonetheless, the low sample size in round 4 is potentially 
an issue. Analysis suggests that this is largely due to issues collecting the data and not 
largely due to the characteristics of the households that were not interviewed during the 
final round. For example, household asset index scores (which were collected only during 
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the first round) are not significantly different for households surveyed during the fourth 
round compared with that for all households. For these reasons, no adjustments have 
been made for the fourth round sample. However, this could be regarded as a weakness 
in the panel data. 
 
The other disadvantage of the panel data set used lies in the collection of the data on 
shocks. It did not, for example, collect data on community level shocks. This information 
has been added to the data set from an outside source, and all households in the regions 
that suffered are assumed to have been effected. Secondly, the time period for data 
collected on sickness and death does not match exactly that for consumption, meaning 
that any impact of these shocks on consumption (change) is likely to be at least partly a 
lagged impact. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has elucidated key aspects of the data used in each empirical chapter. The 
motivations for using each data set are provided and descriptive statistics of relevant 
variables are provided and discussed. Any adjustments made, for example, for prices are 
noted, and the unique and relevant aspects of each data set are exploited to provide a 
wider picture of the empirical context. Finally, attention is draws to several differences 
between the data sets. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the econometric methodologies used in this thesis. Each section 
discusses the major ideas behind each concept, before focussing on points most relevant 
to the study undertaken. In particular, it aims to show why particular econometric 
techniques have been used, and, at times, why certain techniques are not used. Thus as 
well as providing an overview of the methods used, it justifies the econometric methods 
chosen. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a number of econometric issues and their resolutions or robustness 
tests specifically relevant to that chapter. These are explained in the chapter itself in 
order to ensure that the “flow” of the thesis is maintained, and that the discussions are in 
their most suitable context. This chapter presents the technical elements of the 
econometrics used, and some of the arguments for the choice of the basic models used. 
 
4.2 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are used in chapters 5 and 7. Chapter 5 uses OLS 
to understand the factors which contribute to the value of the net remittances an 
individual receives from each three of different relative groups. The aim is to make some 
attempt to understand the motivations for remitting. Chapter 7 uses OLS to estimate 
pooled panel models (and various robustness tests) for the impact of shocks on per capita 
consumption growth for households. 
 
This section briefly sketches the main hypotheses of OLS including any corrections made 
for (potential) violation of these with a focus on correcting “clustering” of standard errors, 
an important issue in chapters 5 and 7. 
 
(1) Linearity. 
As indicated above, there should be a linear relationship between the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables. Certain non linearities can be accommodated through 
simple adjustments to the model however. For example, in all empirical chapters in this 
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thesis, both age and its square are used as regressors. This allows for the possibility for a 
quadratic relationship between age and the dependent variable. 
 
(2) Exogeneity. 
The expected value of the error term, conditional on the regressors is zero for all 
observations.  
 
E(εi | X) = 0     (i=1,2,3,…,N)    (4.1) 
 
Several implications follow from this assumption. Firstly, through the Law of Total 
Expectations27, the unconditional mean of the error term is also zero: 
 
E(εi) = 0          (4.2) 
 
Secondly, the error terms are orthogonal to the covariates for all observations: 
 
E(xjkεi) = 0    (i,j=1,2,3,…,N; k=1,2,3…,K)  (4.3) 
 
Alternatively stated, the distribution of the error term does not depend on the covariates. 
 
This condition is likely to be violated in one of two circumstances. Firstly in the case of 
missing variables where no proxy is available, the impact of the omitted variable will go 
into the error term. If however, the omitted variable is correlated with an included 
regressor, then the error term will be correlated with a regressor. An oft-used example is 
in equations estimating wages as a function of education and ability (Mincer equations). 
Since it is difficult to observe ability, and proxies are not always available, the impact of 
this variable goes into the error term. However, ability is likely to be somewhat correlated 
with the included education variable. 
 
Secondly, this assumption is violated if the dependent variable is simultaneously 
determined with a regressor, as is potentially the case in an extension to Chapter 7 where, 
it is argued, current health shocks are potentially determined simultaneously with current 
consumption levels. In this case instrumental variables (IV) can be used to correct for the 
simultaneity. This is discussed below as a correction. 
                                                
27
 The Law of Total Expectations is given by: E[E(y|x)]=E(y). 
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(3) No (perfect) multicollinearity. 
Perfect multicolinearity exists if one explanatory variable is exactly linearly related to 
other explanatory variables. In this case, the model becomes unestimateable, and one 
variable will have to be dropped. 
 
This is particularly an issue for dummy variables. For example, in all chapters regional 
control variables are included for the three main Malawian regions (North, Centre, South). 
In each case one of these has to be dropped since any one of these is exactly linearly 
related to the others. The coefficients on the included dummies are then interpreted in 
relation to the excluded, or baseline, variable. In Table 6.1 the excluded region is the 
Central region, and the North dummy exhibits a positive and significant coefficient for 
male headed households, whilst the South dummy is not significantly different from zero. 
This is interpreted as evidence that, other things being equal, northern households have a 
higher per adult equivalent consumption than their central counterparts, whilst their 
central and southern counterparts do not differ significantly, on average. 
 
Imperfect multicollinearity deserves some discussion. In this case, regressors are not 
perfectly correlated, but are highly intercorrelated. Some degree of intercorrelation 
amongst explanatory variables is to be expected, but high correlation can be an issue in 
smaller samples. 
 
A high degree of correlation between explanatory variables can mean that results are 
particularly sensitive to deletion of variables. This is likely to be the case where included 
variables are actually acting as a proxy for a third, unincluded variable, possibly 
unbeknownst to the OLS user. For example, in a study on house prices, “distance from the 
house to a main road” and “distance to the nearest bus stop” might be included as 
regressors. If these are both proxying for “remoteness of the house”, and are highly 
correlated, both might produce high standard errors (low t-values), and become 
insignificant, whilst including only one of them renders that variable significant. Including 
only one of these as a proxy for remoteness would have been sufficient. 
 
One indication of a possible multicollinearity problem is a high r2, but low levels of 
significance. This is because two or more variables might be capturing the same 
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underlying issue (e.g. remoteness), ensuring that this is captured by the regression as a 
whole, but does not appear to be captured by any single regressor. As a word of caution, 
it should be noted that multicollinearity does not, by itself cause a high r2 and/or low t-
values. 
 
Several ways have been suggested to measures the effect of multicollinearity. The most 
popular of these is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). This is defined as: 
 
2
1
1
)ˆ(
i
i
r
VIF
−
=β         (4.4) 
 
where 2
ir  is the r2 for the regression of xi on the other explanatory variables. Maddala 
(2001: p.272) notes that the )ˆ( iVIF β  can be interpreted as the ratio of the “actual 
variance of iβˆ  to what the variance of iβˆ  would have been if xi were to be uncorrelated 
with the remaining x’s”. Although, ideally, there would be no correlation amongst the x’s, 
this is highly unlikely in the context of microeconometric studies such as those in this 
thesis. 
 
Maddala (2001: p.272) goes on to say that the VIF is “not very useful and does not 
provide us with guidance on what to do with the problem. It is more of a complaint that 
things are not ideal” (as should be expected). In addition, it does not indicate whether the 
presence of “multicollinearity presents a problem in making inferences”. Although other 
measures have been suggested, these are also highly imperfect. 
 
Goldberger (1991) frames issues of multicollinearity as a problem of lack of observations, 
or (tongue-in-cheek) “micronumerosity”. He notes that the main consequence of 
multicollinearity is to increase the standard errors. This happens quite correctly, because 
there is increased uncertainty about which variable is actually affecting the dependent 
variable. However, larger standard errors can also be the result of low sample size. In an 
interview for Economic Theory (Keifer, 1989) Goldberger terms a sample size of N=0 as 
“perfect micronumerosity”, and a “small” sample size as “near micronumerosity”. Large 
samples can therefore minimise any impact of multicollinearity, and, in sufficiently large 
samples, multicollinearity should not be considered an important issue. Alternatively put, 
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the problem of multicollinearity is actually a problem of micronumerosity, and the issue is 
minimised in “large” samples. 
 
Several methods can be used to reduce the risks of multicollinearity, of which one is used 
in chapters 5 and 7; that of principle components analysis (PCA). This is used to create 
asset indexes for each household, rather than entering a large number of categorical 
variables indicating ownership or quality of different items.  
 
Although discussed here for completeness, this is the last discussion of multicollinearity in 
this thesis. There is no sure-fire way to detect multicollinearity, and, in constructing all 
models presented in this thesis, all indications suggest that there is no cause for concern. 
Sample sizes can be considered “large”, all results were found to be robust to a fairly 
large number of changes in variable inclusion and specification, and there is not, overall, 
any indication that more variables should (in some sense) have been significant. In 
addition, no model presented includes both an r2 that appears excessively large and t-
values that appear excessively low. Although the checks described above have been made 
throughout the thesis, Maddala (2001) considers that multicollinearity is not, in itself, a 
problem, whilst in one of the most complete and dependable guides to the methods and 
applications in microeconometric studies such as this, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) give 
only a cursory mention of multicollinearity.  
 
(4) Homoskedasticity. 
Also known as spherical error variance, this assumption states that the expected variance 
of the error terms is equal for each observations: 
 
0)|( 22 >= σε XE i    (i=1,2,3,…, N)    (4.5) 
 
In addition, it is assumed that there is no correlation amongst error terms (no 
autocorrelation): 
 
0)|( =XE jiεε    (i, j = 1,2,3,… , N; i≠j)   (4.6) 
 
If this assumption is not satisfied, then the error terms are said to exhibit 
heteroskedasticity. It can be shown that, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, OLS 
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estimates are unbiased but inefficient (e.g. Maddala, 2001; Hayashi, 2000). This means 
that tests of hypothesis, including significance levels, will not be correct.  
 
Heteroskedasticity is difficult to observe since it is not known a priori what form it takes, 
and the tests designed to detect heteroskedasticity are imperfect (Ramsey RESET test, 
White test, Breusch-Pagan test).  
 
This thesis therefore corrects all error terms for potential heteroskedasticity using 
White’s (1980) method. This correction is discussed below. 
4.2.1 Corrections 
Some of the assumptions maintained to hold in the basic model cannot be assumed in 
some of the models presented in this thesis. For example, all models are corrected for 
potential heteroskedasticity, and some are corrected for clustering of error terms. In 
addition, IV is used in one extension where the exogeneity assumption is likely to have 
been violated. These corrections are discussed in this section. 
4.2.1.1 Heteroskedasticity 
White’s (1980) method for correcting for heteroskedasticity is used throughout the 
empirical chapters of this thesis. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors ensure that 
standard errors and other statistics are reliable, even if the error variance is not constant. 
That is even if the second moment of the error term is some function, f(.) of the 
regressors. 
 
)()|( 2 XfXE i =ε         (4.7) 
 
This is the case regardless of the form the heteroskedasticity takes (and including 
homoskedasticity), which is not necessarily known to the user. White (1980) shows that 
the standard errors of the coefficients can be adjusted to be reliable in the presence of 
any form of heteroskedasticity. The heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of iβˆ  is 
shown by White (1980) to be: 
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where 2uˆ are the residuals obtained from an initial OLS regression of y on x. Correction 
can also be made for N/(N-K) degrees of freedom. 
Sribney (2007) explains the difference between the “baseline” standard errors and the 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors:  
“In [basic standard errors] the squared residuals are summed, but in [heteroskedastic robust 
standard errors]… the residuals are multiplied by the x’s … and then "squared" and summed. Hence, 
any difference between them has to do with correlations between the residuals and the x’s. If big 
(in absolute value) [ui] are paired with big xi, then the robust variance estimate will be bigger than 
the OLS estimate. If, on the other hand, the robust variance estimate is smaller than the OLS 
estimate, what’s happening is not clear at all but has to do with some odd correlations between 
the residuals and the x’s. If the OLS model is true, the residuals should, of course, be uncorrelated 
with the x’s. Indeed, if all the assumptions of the OLS model are true, then the expected values of 
(1) the OLS estimator and (2) the robust … estimator [is] approximately the same when the default 
multiplier is used.” 
Since it is not always possible to detect heteroskedasticity or be sure whether or not it is 
present, and since White’s (1980) correction ensures that standard errors are robust, 
even under homoskedasticity, this thesis always makes this adjustment. 
4.2.1.2 Clustering 
Household data collected in developing countries is often sampled by cluster. That is, in a 
first stage, villages are randomly selected and in a second, households or individuals are 
randomly selected from each village. This introduces the issue of village specific 
unobservable effects. Deaton (2000: p.73) lists a multitude of reasons why observations 
within a village, or other cluster, might be more similar within the cluster than across 
clusters. For example, “local eccentricities are copied by those who live near one another”, 
if villages are widely separated geographically “their inhabitants may belong to different 
ethnic or religious groups, they may have distinct occupational structures as well as 
different crops and cropping patterns”. The difference in agricultural patterns and shocks 
means that it is essential to adjust standard errors for potential clustering in Chapter 7 
which focuses on these issues. Deaton (2000: p.97) goes on to explain that:  
 
“[w]here agriculture is important … there will usually be more homogeneity within villages than 
between them. This applies not only to the types of crops and livestock, but also to the effects of 
weather, pests, and natural hazards. If rains fail for a particular village, everyone engaged in 
rainfed agriculture will suffer, as will those in occupations that depend on rainfed agriculture. If the 
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harvest price is good, prices will be low for everyone in the village, and although the effects will 
spread out to other villages through the market, poor transport networks and high transport costs 
may limit the spread of low prices to other survey villages. Indeed, there is often only one market in 
each village, so that everyone in the village will be paying the same prices for what they buy, and 
will be facing the same prices for their wage labour, their produce, and their livestock. This fact 
alone is likely to induce a good deal of similarity between households within a given sample 
cluster” 
 
In OLS analysis, the assumption is that survey data are independent. As noted by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005), this is often not the case. This is particularly true for 
developing countries and will cause error terms to be correlated within clusters. 
 
This is potentially a serious issue in chapters 5 and 7. Chapter 7 studies the impact of 
regional shocks on households. Since all households in a particular district, or sub-district, 
are considered to have been potential victims of flooding or drought, other, unobserved 
factors not directly captured by the shock variables, may cause the error terms of 
households within these districts to cluster. It is therefore important to adjust standard 
errors for this. 
 
Chapter 5 poses a similar issue. Individuals from the same family can appear several times 
in a single regression. Unobserved family characteristics may cause error terms to cluster, 
and make this correction necessary. 
 
The cluster corrected, robust standard error of coefficients is given by: 
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where ∑ ∗=
clusterj
iij xu ε  and nc the total number of clusters. The εi represent the residual 
for the i’th observation, and xi is a row vector of regressors (Sribney, 2007). In other 
words, the cluster standard error replaces the errors of the robust standard error by the 
sums of the error terms over each cluster. Correction is also made for “degree of cluster 
freedom” (dfc) given by 
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dfc  (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
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Sribney (2007) explains the difference between the heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors, and the cluster corrected standard errors: “If the variance of the clustered 
estimator is less than the robust (unclustered) estimator, it means that the cluster sums 
of εi*xi have less variability than the individual εi*xi. That is, when you sum the εi*xi within 
a cluster, some of the variation gets cancelled out, and the total variation is less. This 
means that a big positive is summed with a big negative to produce something small—
there is negative correlation within cluster.” 
 
The correction for clustering used in this thesis is Stata’s “cluster” option. This makes the 
assumption that within-cluster unobservable factors are uncorrelated with the regressors, 
and corrects the standard errors for clustering. Under this assumption, the parameters 
are consistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In Chapter 7, results are corrected for 
clustering at the district level (the level at which community shocks occur), even during 
the panel analysis. This is necessary if the unobserved factors are not constant over time. 
Since households are subject to different shocks at different times, it is likely that these 
factors are not consistent over the period of the survey. In Chapter 5, standard errors are 
corrected at the household level using the same technique since several individuals 
connected to the central households surveyed are included in each regression.  
4.2.1.3 Two Stage Least Squares 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is used in an extension presented in Chapter 7 in order to 
correct for simultaneity. The dependent variable, per capita consumption is estimated as 
a function of present and previous shocks. However, contemporaneous health poses the 
issue of simultaneity; it is not obvious that the direction of the causality is uniquely health 
shock to current consumption. It is possible that current consumption might also impact 
on the likelihood of suffering from a health shock. 
 
This analysis needs to be constricted as a simultaneous equations model (SEM): 
 
 
 
Current consumption = f(Current health shock, lagged health shock,  
Current death, Lagged death, Current drought, Lagged drought,    
Current flood, Lagged flood, X)      (4.10) 
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Current health shock = f(Current consumption, •) 
 
where X includes all other variables and • includes X and all other shock variables. Both 
community shocks are considered exogenous since an individual household’s 
consumption will not impact on these shocks. There is potential to consider what is 
termed “current death” as endogenous since consumption might impact on likelihood 
that a household suffers from death. However, the construction of the variable makes 
this unlikely. Whilst health shocks are recent (previous 2 weeks), deaths can have 
occurred at any point since the previous round. Current consumption is not realised until 
the time of the survey. Thus, in some sense, current deaths can be considered to be 
already lagged (and hence exogenous), and lagged deaths to be lagged by an additional 
period. 
 
Under simultaneity, the coefficients estimated by OLS are inconsistent. In a sufficiently 
large sample however, consistent estimates can be obtained using IV. Formally, the issue 
of simultaneity arises when we estimate: 
 
111211 uzyy ++= βα         (4.11) 
222122 uzyy ++= βα        (4.12) 
 
where y1 can be thought of as consumption, y2 health shocks, and zi all exogenous 
variables. The error terms for each model are given by ui, and the αi and βi are the 
coefficients. 
 
Under simultaneity, a regression of y1 (consumption) on y2 (health shocks) gives 
inconsistent estimates of both α1 and β1. Assuming that α1*α2 ≠ 1, then the reduced form 
of the model, whose parameters can be consistently estimated by OLS is given by: 
 
1 2 2 1 1 1y z z vπ π= + +         (4.13) 
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But Chapter 7 is interested in the consistent estimation of α1 and β1, that is, the impact of 
a health shock and other variables on consumption, and not the parameters π1 and π2 
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given by the reduced form. It uses 2SLS to estimate the structural equations on which the 
extension focuses. 
 
The system of equations is set up as follows: 
 
11111 uzxConsHealth +++= γβα       (4.14)  
2222 uxHealthCons ++= βα        (4.15) 
 
where health shocks at time t (Health) are modelled as a function of per capita 
consumption at time t (Cons), control variables common to both sets of regressions, x1, 
and z, variables which impact on health shocks, but not on consumption. Consumption at 
time t is modelled as a function of health shocks at time t and x2 which includes all control 
variables. Time subscripts are omitted for clarity and conciseness. 
 
In Chapter 7, lagged log per capita income and number of household members over the 
age of 55 years are included in z. These are shown to be positively correlated with health, 
but exogenous to the consumption model in 4.18 (they pass over- and under-identifying 
restrictions). They can thus be used as instruments to identify the parameter α2 in 4.18. 
That is, 2SLS makes it possible to assess the impact of a current health shock on current 
consumption. 
 
In the first stage, Health is regressed against all exogenous variables. The predicted values, 
HealthHat, are obtained, and replace x2 in 4.18. In addition, the error in 4.18 then 
becomes a composite error term: 
 
33 uHealthHatCons += α        (4.16) 
 
where )(3 HealthHatHealthu −+= φε . 2SLS therefore estimates α3, which is a consistent 
estimator for α2 since HealthHat is asymptotically uncorrelated with the error term. 
Replacing with the notation above, Hayashi (2000: p.192) describes why this estimator is 
consistent: 
 
“If the fitted value [HealthHat] were exactly equal to the least squares projection 
),|(ˆ * zxHealthHatE , then neither [ε] nor [Health-HealthHat] would be correlated with 
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[HealthHat]: [ε] is uncorrelated because it is uncorrelated with [x, z] and [HealthHat] is a linear 
function of [x, z], and [Health-HealthHat] is uncorrelated because it is a least squares projection 
error. The fitted value [HealthHat] is not exactly equal to ),|(ˆ * zxHealthHatE , but the 
difference between the two vanishes as the sample gets larger. Therefore, asymptotically, 
[HealthHat] is uncorrelated with [u3].” 
 
The Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions is made. This tests whether the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The null hypothesis is that this is true. A 
rejection should therefore cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. The Kleibergen-
Paap test is relevant where the instruments are correlated with the with the excluded 
variables, but only weakly. In addition, the Kleibergen-Paap is the heteroskedastic 
equivalent of the Cragg-Donald test, which performs the same operation but is valid only 
under homoskedasticity (which is never assumed in this thesis). This statistic is essentially 
an F-statistic from the first stage of the regression (with adjusted confidence intervals) 
which tests the null hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the regression (Stock 
and Yogo, 2004). It is therefore essential to reject this null hypothesis. 
4.3 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
This thesis uses panel, or longitudinal, data in Chapter 7. Panel data, or robustness to 
panel methods, is often considered to be the most reliable econometric methods. Whilst 
OLS allows the user to control for as many variables as the data (and degrees of freedom) 
will allow, there might be other, unobserved factors which influence the dependent 
variable. If these factors are also correlated with any of the independent variables, the 
coefficients will be biased. 
 
Methods such as fixed effects (FE) offer a means to eliminate the impact of unobserved, 
but temporally constant unobservables, helping to reduce the likelihood of any these 
biasing the coefficients. Chapter 7 uses FE in order to show that OLS results are robust to 
these methods. 
 
Panel data models can be written as: 
 
ititititit uxy ++= βα
'
   i=1,2,3,…, N; t=1,2,3,…,T  (4.17) 
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where household (in this thesis) and time subscripts are i and t respectively28. The yit is a 
scalar dependent variable, 
itx is a K*1 vector of K independent variables and uit is the 
error term. 
 
Equation 4.20 gives the pooled panel model which can be estimated consistently using 
OLS provided that the model is correctly specified and that the regressors are not 
correlated with the error. 
 
Chapter 7 uses, in part, a version of the pooled panel model which includes time dummies. 
This is given by: 
 
ititit
T
s
itssitit uxDy +++= ∑
=
βγα '
2
,       (4.18)   
 
where D is a time dummy included for each time period, s, with the baseline time period 
dropped in order to ensure no perfect multicollinearity. This method aims to sweep away 
any temporal factors which impact on all households. As shown in Chapter 2, the 
dependent variable used in Chapter 7 is change in log consumption. 
 
Fixed Effects treats the error term slightly differently. The error term can be divided into 
two components: uit = µi + vit where µi represents an unobservable, household specific 
effect which is time invariant, and not captured by any control variables and vit is the 
remaining, “well behaved”, error term. The model thus becomes: 
 
itiitititit vxy +++= µβα
'
       (4.19) 
 
If the µi term can be treated as distributed independently of the regressors, then random 
effects (RE) models can be used. This is a stronger assumption than that required with FE. 
Since the aim in Chapter 7 is to ensure results are robust to panel methods, and 
robustness to FE is a stronger result than robustness to RE, the focus here is on FE. 
 
The µi terms are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated which do not vary over 
time. Each household is assumed to have some individual heterogeneity which is 
                                                
28
 Here, the i and t subscripts are written explicitly to emphasise the panel nature of the data. 
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unobserved and which impacts on the dependent variable, and since it is not possible to 
assume that this is uncorrelated with the other variables, the aim is to control for this, 
ensuring consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. This unobserved 
heterogeneity is swept away using dummy variables for each household. Thus, this 
method is sometimes known as Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and can be 
written: 
 
ititit
N
j
itjjit vxDy ++= ∑
=
βα '
1
,        (4.20) 
 
where N household dummies are included equal to 1 if i=j and 0 otherwise. Alternatively 
put, the intercept is allowed to differ for each observation, but remains constant over 
time. 
 
4.4 PROBIT MODELS 
Probit models aim to understand which variables contribute to the likelihood of an event 
taking place. In Chapter 5, which studies motivations for remitting, they assess the 
contribution of different factors to the probability that someone will send or receive 
remittances. In Chapter 7 probit regressions are used to answer a specific question; 
whether shocks (death, sickness, flooding, and drought) impact on the likelihood of 
receiving remittances from different geographical sources. This section discusses the 
pooled probit models used in chapters 5 and 7, and the random effects probit models 
which are presented in chapter 7. 
 
Probit models can be thought of as modelling a latent variable, R*, which follows an OLS 
format, with all usual assumptions: 
 
εβ += '* ii xR          (4.21) 
 
However, rather than observing R*, it is only possible to learn whether or not an event 
has taken place. Thus, we observe: 
  
Ri = 1 if Ri* Y 0        (4.22) 
 0 if Ri* ≤ 0 
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This thesis uses probit models to predict whether or not individual i receives remittances 
from individual j in Chapter 5 depending upon the characteristics of i and j. Chapter 7 
aims to understand whether shocks effect the probability of remittances from near and 
distant sources using probit models. Thus, 
 
)()|1( xfxRP ii ==         (4.23) 
 
where, R=1 when i receives remittances and 0 otherwise. The function, f(.) is specified as: 
 
'
( ) ( ' ) ( )
x
if x x z dz
β
β φ
−∞
= Φ = ∫        (4.24) 
 
where x contains a constant, Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) and φ  is the standard normal density function (pdf). 
 
Although we observe only whether a household/individual sent or received remittances, 
the model predicts the probability that any household/individual sent/received 
remittances using explanatory variables contained in x. Unlike the linear probability 
model (LPM), which uses OLS, the probit ensures that predicted probabilities lie between 
zero and one. 
4.4.1 Random effects probits 
Random effects probit models extend the basic analysis to include a temporal dimension. 
In initial models, pooled probits are run: 
 
)'()|1( βititit xxRP Φ==        (4.25) 
 
As with fixed effects, however, it is possible to imagine that there might be some 
unobserved effects which are specific to each individual, but constant over time, ci. The 
estimated model therefore becomes: 
 
)'(),|1( iitiitit cxcxRP +Φ== β       (4.26) 
 
Since there are no lagged dependent variables, the main assumption here is that the ci 
appears additively inside the )(•Φ . Ideally, this would be estimated using a fixed effects 
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method in which dummies control for all unobserved heterogeneity which is time 
constant. Unfortunately, this model does not produce consistent parameters (Wooldridge, 
2002). Treating the ci as an unobservable random variable in the same vein as (xit, Yit) 
produces the random effects probit model. This can be estimated consistently but relies 
on the additional assumption: 
 
ci | xi ~ N(0, σc
2)        (4.27) 
  
That is, that ci and xi are independent and that ci is normally distributed. The parameters, 
β and σc
2 can be estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In addition, 
since the variance of the latent variable is 1, the proportion of variance due to the 
unobserved effects can be estimated as ρ=σc
2/1+σc
2. This result is reported in all relevant 
regressions as rho. 
 
Wooldridge (2002) notes that correcting for heteroskedasticity is important in both 
pooled and random effects due to likely heteroskedasticity of error terms.  
 
4.5 TOBIT MODELS 
It is possible to think of Tobit models as an extension to probits. Rather than observing 
only whether an event occurred or not, however, we observe 0 if the latent variable, 
iR is 
less than or equal to 0, and observe 'ix β ε+ otherwise. 
  
iR  = εβ +
'
ix   if 0
* >iR       (4.28) 
  0   if 0* ≤iR  
 
where *
iR  is the latent variable which can take any positive or negative value and satisfies 
all classical linear model assumptions. However, we observe iR  only when 
*
iR  is positive. 
Thus: 
 
),0max( *ii RR =         (4.29) 
 
 
The probability of any iR  being equal to zero is: 
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)/(1)|0( ' σβiii xxRP Φ−==       (4.30)  
   
 
where, as before, the subscript i indicates household i,  Φ  is the standard normal 
distribution and σ  is the standard error of the regression. The marginal effects of this 
model are of particular interest. 
 
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) show that in this model, the marginal effects of the latent 
variable, R*, are given by the coefficients, β. In cases in which the data are truly censored, 
and it is possible to have negative values of R, then these are the parameters of interest. 
However, the next section shows that some adjustments are required in order to obtain 
the impact of the independent variables on R, and these adjustments are particularly 
relevant for consumption functions. This can be decomposed into two parts: (1) the 
change in R of those above the zero (or another value), weighted by the probability of 
being above the limit; and (2) the change in the probability of being above zero, weighted 
by the expected value of R, if above. This is shown in the following section for 
consumption functions. 
4.5.1 Consumption functions and Tobit models 
Consumption functions are estimated in Chapter 6 which studies the impact of income 
from different sources on household consumption choices. In particular, Tobit models are 
used to estimate consumption functions for different categories of good, g. It aims to 
understand whether remittances are used differently from other sources of income. OLS 
is the standard methodology used for estimating cross-sectional consumption functions.  
 
However, in a developing context, a large proportion of households report zero 
consumption of several categories of good, biasing the regression coefficients. Several 
corrections are possible. One option is to use a Heckman two-step model, which first 
models likelihood of consuming goods in category g, and then uses the results to correct 
the OLS regression for amount spent. This method is most suitable if it can be argued 
convincingly a priori that different factors influence the decision to spend on good 
category g, and the amount spent. 
 
Deciding between using Tobit models and Heckman models presents a number of 
difficulties in this case. There is not, for example, one variable which should obviously 
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enter the first stage which could also be dropped from the second stage. However, in 
each case, it might be possible to identify such variables. For example, when studying 
MPC education, a variable indicating whether not the respondent has children may 
determine whether or not the household spends on education, but not how much.  
However, it is not possible to use this variable for every consumption function estimated. 
It would thus be necessary to identify different variables in each case (if it is possible to 
identify one at all). 
 
This would present the difficulty of comparing at best Heckman models with different 
variables excluded, and at worst, a selection of different Heckman and Tobit models. One 
of the aims is to be able to run regressions which are as comparable as possible in order 
to understand the impact of the same set of variables on the dependent variable. This is 
of utmost importance in Chapter 5 in which the aim is to understand how certain 
variables impact on remittance receipts and to compare the impact of each variable 
depending upon the relationship between the sender and the receiver. In Chapter 6, in 
which the aim is to obtain MPCs out of different income sources for each of several 
consumption categories, it is useful to be able to understand the different uses of income. 
 
Models which render such comparisons less reliable would reduce the level of confidence 
when comparing the different regression results. It should be noted however, that the 
results of any one individual regression might be more reliable. The choice is therefore a 
difficult one, and the ‘correct’ choice not immediately obvious. Due to the weight this 
thesis attaches to being able to being able to make reliable comparisons between 
regressions, Tobits are favoured. However, the reader should bear in mind these issues 
whilst reading the results. 
    
In Chapter 5, in addition to estimating net remittances received using OLS, and probability 
of sending and receiving remittances, Tobit models for the amount of remittances 
received and sent are estimated. As for Chapter 6, there exist a significant number of 
people that send/receive zero remittances. Estimating an OLS model will bias the 
coefficients. Again here, if it can be argued a priori that different factors determine 
whether or not remittances are sent and how much is remitted, a Heckman model can be 
used. Such models have been estimated by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) who use a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not a household migrant had been settled in 
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his/her new location for over a year as the omitted variable in the second stage. That is, 
having been settled in the host country is argued to determine likelihood of the migrant 
sending remittances, but not the value sent. It is possible, but not immediately obvious, 
that this might be the case, but there are no obvious variables which might fulfil this role 
in the data used in this study. In addition, the data used here allow studying both the 
amount sent and the amount received by the respondent. It is unlikely that the same 
variable could be dropped in each circumstance. In the interest of comparability, this 
thesis chooses to use Tobit models for both the value of remittances sent and the value 
received. 
 
Several studies use Tobit models to estimate consumption functions. Examples include 
Kinsey (1983) who studies food consumption outside of the home; Sharpe, Abdel-Ghany 
and Silver (1995) who compare spending patterns of lone-parent and two-parent 
Canadian families; and Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe (1997) who compare old and young 
spending patterns. In all cases Tobit models are used since some households exhibit zero 
consumption of certain categories of good. 
 
McDonald and Moffit (1980) show that the expected value of the dependent variable, Cg 
can be decomposed into two parts: (1) the change in Cg of those above the zero (or 
another value), weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and (2) the change in 
the probability of being above zero, weighted by the expected value of Cg, if above. Thus, 
in Chapter 6, this thesis follows these studies in reporting marginal propensities to 
consume out of different income sources given by:  
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Wooldridge (2002: p.523-524) shows that his can be reduced to: 
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where )/( σβxΦ  is the probability of observing a positive response, given x. This can be 
thought of as a scaling factor which adjusts the Tobit coefficients. Where )/( σβxΦ  is 
close to unity, there are unlikely to be many zero expenditures reported for the 
categories, and the estimated MPC collapses to the Tobit coefficient. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the econometrics used during chapters 5 to 7. Although a 
variety of techniques are used, it has shown why the selected ones have been chosen and 
are relevant in each case. Where it would help the overall flow however, discussion has 
been left to the individual chapter. This allows particular idiosyncrasies or robustness 
tests to be considered within their specific context. Despite this, the major econometric 
methodologies used are explained and justified, and links to other studies and 
econometric texts noted. The following three chapters use the methods discussed here to 
contribute to the understanding of remittances in the context of rural Malawi. 
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5 WHY DO PEOPLE REMIT? MOTIVATIONS FOR 
REMITTING IN RURAL MALAWI 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at remittances at their genesis, when the sender decides to remit. It 
seeks to answer the question, “what motivates people to remit?” and extends current 
studies in several ways. Firstly, the data contain information on remittance flows in both 
directions. That is, this chapter is able to model both net remittance flows and 
motivations to remit from each side of the remittance relationship, or dyad. At the time 
of writing, only VanWey (2004) is able to do this. Secondly, the data provide information 
not only on a household and their children (as is the case for most studies), but also on 
their parents and siblings. This allows this chapter to estimate motivations for remitting 
for each relationship and to assess any differences. This is important since it seems likely 
that a child will not remit for the same reasons as a parent. Thirdly, all remittance flows 
are from an individual, rather than a household perspective. This has several advantages 
and disadvantages. The major disadvantage is that remittances can be viewed as a part of 
a household activity. That is, remittances might be given to one member but used for the 
benefit of several members, or, alternatively, that the household has decided as a whole 
to send a migrant away to earn money and to pool income. This would make the 
household level more appropriate, and is supported by literature stemming from the New 
Economics of Labour Migration (Bloom and Stark, 1985). This however makes an 
assumption which is not entirely appropriate for the current data. Firstly, it is not clear 
that all households that receive remittances do so because of an economic decision to 
migrate. Rather, other (cultural) factors are likely to predominate – notably marriage or, 
in the case of children, individual career aspirations. This is particularly the case for 
siblings who have left the same household as the respondents (that of their parents). 
Secondly, studies which analyse remittances on a household level tend to use the head’s 
characteristics. Here information on remittances and characteristics were collected on an 
individual level making it possible to use the husband’s or wife’s characteristics, as 
appropriate. One possibility would be to include the characteristics of both the husband 
and the wife, but this would result in all observations for which data are absent on one of 
the partners (single heads or no-response) being dropped. In any case, even though the 
analyses are conducted at an individual level, the data contain (almost) as much 
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information as most household level studies, which control for the head’s characteristics 
(here replaced with the individual recipient’s characteristics) and the household 
characteristics such as household size (which are also included in this study). Given these 
data limitations, this chapter proceeds with studying remittances from the individual 
perspective, but the limitations do suggest several extensions, notably studying only 
those households whose potential remittance partners live outside of their home district 
and using only those households with both male and female data and including both sets 
of characteristics. 
 
The results show that different variables affect remittances in different relationships. As 
in other studies, one single motivation does not drive remittances. Indeed such a 
conclusion would perhaps be somewhat surprising given that an individual or a groups of 
individuals are likely to have several motivations to remit; one motivation to remit does 
not necessarily preclude another. In addition, some motivations may actually be 
complementary – the threat of disinheritance for example, may ensure that a child pays 
an insurance “indemnity” to a parent. Despite these complications, the results are 
informative. In particular, there is evidence that parents and siblings remit in order to 
help “insure” health shocks suffered by the respondent. Children increase remittances to 
respondents as the reliability of the respondent as an insurer increases and as their own 
risk of a shock increases – children therefore remit to their parents, in part, in order to 
insure themselves. There is a strong element of bi-directionality in remittance flows 
between respondents and their parents, and respondents and their siblings but this is not 
the case for their children. Respondents are more likely to remit to parents and siblings 
whose health is poorer suggesting a strong degree of altruism on the part of the 
respondents. There is tentative evidence that children remit to respondents for 
inheritance motivations, and that respondents remit to their own parents for the same 
reason. Overall, altruism appears to be a strongest motivation to remit for all groups. 
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter follows other papers summarised in Chapter 2 in modelling remittances as a 
function of sender and receiver characteristics. The data used have the advantage of 
containing the value of remittance flows in each direction of the transfer relationship and 
for each individual. In addition, the sampling purposively targeted working age adults in 
order to understand the transfer relationships between themselves and their parents, 
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their children, and their siblings. Thus, it is possible to compare and contrast motivations 
for remitting for each group.  
 
It is worth noting that the remittance flows between the respondent and their parents 
could be regarded as equivalent to flows between the respondent and their children since 
in both cases the relationship is parent-child. Equations are nonetheless estimated 
separately since the respondent is unlikely to view their parents and children in the same 
way, or as fulfilling the same function with regards to transfer relationships. Remittance 
flows are therefore likely to exhibit different characteristics. In addition, since working 
age adults were targeted, there is a large age difference between the respondent and 
their parents in terms of age with parents being on average around 60 years and 
respondents around 33 years. This can make a significant difference in terms of 
inheritance anticipations, and it is interesting to allow estimated parameters for the two 
groups to differ. 
 
All remittance flows are between individuals rather than households. That is, the male 
and female in the targeted household reported remittances sent and received individually. 
Thus remittance flows between, for example, the female and her eldest son, are treated 
as a separate remittance flow to that between the female and her second son, which in 
turn, is a different remittance flow from the flow between the male and second son. 
Before estimation, it was verified the male and female did not report the same 
remittance flow. 
 
Since remittances are estimated in dyads, it is possible for one individual to appear in the 
regression more than once, and members of the same family will appear multiple times in 
a single regression. This introduces a potential problem of clustering of errors into the 
regressions. All regressions are therefore corrected for potential clustering at the 
household level (Deaton, 1997: pp.74-78). In addition, all standard errors are corrected 
for potential heteroskedasticity using White (1980). 
 
Although net flows capture an important component of the remittance relationship, 
there is little distinction between those who do not engage in a potential remittance 
relationship and those who give and receive a similar amount. For this reason it is useful 
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to extend the analysis by estimating a series of probit regressions indicating both whether 
or not remittances were sent to and received from a potential transfer partner. 
 
In addition to probits, Tobit models are estimated for the value of remittances sent by 
each side of the dyad. Tobits are appropriate since the value of remittances is censored at 
zero. It is not clear, a priori, that the choice of whether or not to send remittances is 
determined by variables different from those which determine amount sent. Tobit 
models are therefore favoured over Heckman selection models. The estimated Tobits 
include the same variables as the probits. Estimation methods are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
 
As with the OLS and probits, error terms are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity 
using White (1980) and, since individuals from the same household appear several times, 
potential clustering of errors at the household level is corrected for. 
 
Similar discriminating hypotheses can be used in each case. Those used by other authors 
were summarised in the literature review and the following section draws on the 
theoretical conclusions and empirical methodologies elucidated in Chapter 2 to show the 
discriminating hypotheses used when evaluating the results. 
5.2.1 Discriminating hypotheses 
This study focuses on four motivations for remitting: altruism, inheritance, payment for 
services and co-insurance. This last motivation is divided into insurance premium 
payments and insurance indemnities or payouts. The tables in this section summarise the 
expected signs of coefficients on the discussed variables under each of the motivations. 
 
Under altruism, remittance receipts from a parent would be decreasing in the 
respondent’s wealth, as indicated by the theoretical model in Chapter 2 (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006). If remittance flows are altruistic, a parent would also increase 
remittance flows (or the likelihood of remitting) if the respondent suffers from a health 
shock and decrease remittance flows as the respondent’s health improves.  
 
If a parent’s remittances are an insurance premium, they are likely to increase as the 
respondent become a more reliable insurer. Thus, they are increasing in the respondent’s 
wealth and health. In addition, they can be expected to increase as the likelihood that a 
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parent suffers from a negative shock increases, as shown in the theoretical insurance 
model described in Chapter 2 (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). Thus, as a parent ages, s/he 
is likely to increase remittances, and parents in better health will remit less. Under the co-
insurance/income pooling hypothesis, we are likely to observe remittance flows in each 
direction. Therefore, there will be a positive association between the likelihood that a 
parent remits to the respondent, and the likelihood that a respondent remits to his/her 
parent. This variable might also capture traditional gift-sharing motivations (Mauss, 1990). 
 
If remittances from a parent are insurance payouts, a respondent is more likely to receive 
or to receive more remittances as wealth decreases. Having suffered from a health shock 
will increase remittance flows under this motivation. 
 
The data permit the analysis of one service provided by the respondent for their parents: 
that of looking after a sibling. If remittances are payment for this service then remittances 
or likelihood of receiving remittances will be higher for respondents who reported looking 
after a sibling. 
 
If respondents remit to parents for altruistic motivations, the number of heirs (potential 
remitters) will have a negative impact on remittances as other people are likely to ensure 
that the parents have a good quality of life (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). Respondents 
will be less likely to remit or remit less to their parents if their parents are in better health. 
 
Like parents, respondents are more likely to choose to insure themselves with their 
parents if their parents make better insurers. Thus, if remittances are an insurance 
premium, they will decrease in the parent’s age, and increase in the parent’s health and 
schooling. As before, under the co-insurance/income pooling hypothesis, we are likely to 
observe remittance flows going in each direction. Both respondents and their parents are 
more likely to practice co-insurance if they do not live near each other due to weather 
patterns – and therefore income – being less correlated as distance increases. Chapter 7 
focuses on remittances as insurance for shocks, with the geographical source of 
remittances being of the utmost importance for community shocks such as floods or 
droughts. 
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If remittances to a parent are an insurance indemnity, there will be a negative correlation 
between remittances and the parent’s health, which, in the absence of a health shock 
variable, will partly capture health shocks. 
 
If respondents remit to their parents in order to safeguard inheritance, with competition 
from other potential heirs, remittances will be increasing in the likelihood of inheriting. 
Thus they increase with age, and decrease as health improves. The number of heirs a 
parent has an ambiguous effect. As heirs increase, so does competition to inherit, 
creating a positive impact on remittances. This is especially true in the Malawian culture 
in which inheritance does not automatically go to the eldest son/daughter, but is 
determined by a committee of surviving relatives who assess which children deserve to 
inherit based on whether or not they are seen to have done their duty towards their 
parents (Takane, 2007). Heirs might equally have a negative impact as both the 
probability of inheriting and the amount likely to be inherited decline. De la Brière et al. 
(2002) find that remittances are increasing in inheritable land but decreasing in the 
number of heirs and conclude in favour of an inheritance motive. 
 
The impact of a parent living in the same village is not clear since, traditionally, children 
who stay in the village of origin are more likely to inherit. This might serve to help 
guarantee inheritance without the need for remitting, or social customs might require 
remittances to be sent in order to safeguard inheritance. 
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Table 5.1: Motivations for remitting for the Respondent-Parent dyad 
Parent's motivations for remitting to Respondent 
  Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Respondent's wealth Negative Positive Negative - 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's general 
health 
Negative Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent suffered 
health shock 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive - 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent looks after 
sibling 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- Positive 
Parent's age 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Parent's health 
 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Parent lives in same 
village 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's motivations for remitting to Parent 
 
Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Parent's age 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive - 
Parent's heirs Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive / 
Negative 
- 
Parent's health Negative Positive 
Negative / No 
Direct Impact 
Negative - 
Parent's schooling 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive - 
Parent sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
Parent lives in same 
village 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
? - 
 
Table 5.2 shows expected signs on coefficients under each motivation for children’s 
remittances to respondents. Impacts are the same as for a parent remitting to the 
respondent with one addition. If children remit for insurance purposes, neither the 
number of children (potential heirs) nor the number of them remitting should impact on 
remittances as each risk-averse child will choose to be fully insured (Agarwal and 
Horowitz, 2002). If remittances from children are altruistic in nature however, the 
number of children alone would have a negative impact as all children can potentially 
provide altruistic funds to ensure the respondents’ standard of living is maintained. 
However, under the assumption that children have some knowledge of how many of their 
siblings are remitting, then what will matter is not the number of children, but the 
number of children who actually remit. Under altruism, remittances will therefore be 
declining in the number of children remitting, whilst under an insurance hypothesis 
neither variable will have an impact. 
 
If remittances are, in part, motivated by inheritance, the number of children will reduce 
the expected inheritance for any one child whilst the number of children remitting will 
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increase competition. Remittances from children to respondents will therefore be 
declining in number of children and increasing in the number remitting. 
 
Under insurance, a child is more likely to insure him/herself with a respondent who is a 
more reliable insurer. Thus, if remittances are a form of insurance premium they will be 
increasing in the respondent’s wealth and health. It is possible that older respondents will 
be seen as worse insurers suggesting a negative impact, but the sampling targeted 
working-age adults so that this might not be a consideration. Children are also more likely 
to require insurance as the risk of a shock to themselves increases; children in better 
health will therefore be less likely to remit to their parents under this motivation. 
 
Coefficients under remittances as insurance indemnities all follow the same sign for 
children remitting to respondents as for parents remitting to respondents, which is 
discussed above. 
Table 5.2: Motivations for remitting for the Respondent-Child dyad 
Children's motivations for remitting to Respondent 
  Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Respondent's wealth Negative Positive Negative Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's 
general health 
Negative Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent suffered 
health shock 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent looks 
after grandchild 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
Respondent sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Number of children 
respondent has 
Negative/No 
Direct Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
Number of children 
remitting 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's age 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact/Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Child lives in city or 
abroad 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
? 
No Direct 
Impact 
Child's health 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's motivations for remitting to Parent 
 
Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Child's health Negative Positive 
Negative / No 
Direct Impact 
- - 
Child lives in city or 
abroad 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- - 
Child sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- - 
 
Table 5.3 shows expected signs on coefficients under each motivation for siblings’ 
remittances to respondents and respondents’ remittances to siblings. No discussion 
regarding inheritance is made since siblings rarely inherit from each other. 
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As before, under sibling altruism, the remittances should be decreasing in the 
respondent’s wealth, but increase if the respondent has suffered from a recent health 
shock. Under co-insurance, remittance receipts will increase as the respondent makes a 
better or more reliable insurer; remittances will therefore increase in the respondent’s 
wealth and health. For the same reasons as outlined above, remittances will be higher if 
the respondent and their sibling live far apart. A sibling is more likely to choose to insure 
him/herself as his/her health deteriorates resulting in a negative relationship between 
the sibling’s health and remittances.  
 
As before, if remittances are an insurance payout/indemnity, remittances should increase 
following a health shock, and if remittances are payment for looking after the sibling’s 
child, looking after a nephew/niece should have a positive impact on remittances. 
 
From the respondent’s perspective, altruistically motivated remittances are decreasing in 
the quality of the sibling’s health, whilst insurance premiums are increasing in this 
variable. The impact of a sibling’s health if remittances are partly an insurance indemnity 
is likely to be negative if the overall health score is sensitive enough to capture a part of 
the shock, but with no direct impact otherwise. 
Table 5.3: Motivations for remitting for the Respondent-Sibling dyad 
Sibling's motivations for remitting to Respondent 
  Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Respondent's wealth Negative Positive Negative - 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's 
general health 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent suffered 
health shock 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive - 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent looks 
after nephew/niece 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
No Direct 
Impact 
- Positive 
Respondent sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Sibling lives in city or 
abroad 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Sibling's health 
No Direct 
Impact 
Negative 
No Direct 
Impact 
- 
No Direct 
Impact 
Respondent's motivations for remitting to Sibling 
  
Altruism 
Co-insurance 
(premium) 
Co-insurance 
(indemnity) Inheritance 
Implicit 
payment for 
services 
Sibling's health Negative Positive 
Negative / No 
Direct Impact 
- - 
Sibling lives in city or 
abroad 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- - 
Sibling sends 
remittances 
No Direct 
Impact 
Positive 
No Direct 
Impact 
- - 
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5.2.2 Model specification 
As noted in equation 2.7 in Chapter 2, all models estimated take the form: 
 
Remittances = f(Receiver characteristics; Sender characteristics)   (5.1) 
 
where ‘Remittances’ is the value of remittances sent or received (Tobit), net remittances 
(OLS) or whether or not remittances were received (probit) and f(.) is the relevant 
function (Tobit, OLS, probit). The receiver and sender characteristics are potentially 
difficult to select, but should include any control variables which are standard to include 
on individual or household level studies – for example, age, marital status and sex – and 
variables which theory and previous empirical studies have found to be of importance. As 
such, all variables which make it possible to make discriminating hypotheses regarding 
the motivation for remittances should be included. This includes the respondent’s wealth 
and their health, as well as information on the remittance partner’s health, and 
geographical location. 
 
In addition, data availability presents a constraint on variable inclusion. For example, it 
would be ideal to include information on a sibling’s level of education, on whether 
respondents’ remittance partners recently suffered from a health (or other) shock, and on 
the level of wealth of respondents’ remittance partners. Unfortunately these data are not 
available. Discussion of variables included and their descriptive statistics are given below. 
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics for Respondent-Parent remittance flows 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net remittances from parent 1083 -54.04 504.10 -4910 6175
Received remittances from parent 1083 0.51 0.50 1
Value of remittances from parent 1083 108.97 370.99 0 6350
Sent remittances to parent 1083 0.65 0.48 1
Value of remittances to parent 1083 163.00 365.40 0 5000
Income 1083 255.66 1290.40 0 20000
Asset index (farm) 1083 0.03 1.28 -0.62 15.42
Asset indes (non-farm) 1083 0.13 1.56 -2.00 3.06
Education (years 1083 4.61 3.31 0 14
Age 1083 30.45 8.81 1 61
Male 1083 0.42 0.49 1
Married 1083 0.98 0.14 1
Household size 1083 3.53 1.89 1 14
Respondent eldest child 1083 0.23 0.42 1
Health (1-10) 1083 8.36 1.78 2 10
Health problem in last month 1083 0.25 0.43 1
Sibling in house 1083 0.12 0.33 1
Parent's age 1083 55.85 18.25 0 99
Parent's health (1-10) 1083 6.29 2.31 1 10
Parent lives in same village 1083 0.34 0.47 1
Parent has some schooling 1083 0.71 0.45 1
Number of heirs parent has 1083 7.99 2.75 1 20
Mother (not father) 1083 0.55 0.50 1
Matrilineal heritage 1083 0.15 0.36 1
Patrilineal heritage 1083 0.44 0.50 1
Northern village (Mwankhunikira) 1083 0.08 0.28 1
Northern village (Mwahenga) 1083 0.30 0.46 1
Central village (Mkanda) 1083 0.41 0.49 1  
 
Table 5.5: Summary statistics for Respondent-Child remittance flows 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net remittances from child 430 -93.18 511.39 -4000 5000
Received remittances from child 430 0.37 0 1
Value of remittances from child 430 88.33 305.68 0 5000
Sent remittances to child 430 0.55 0 1
Value of remittances to child 430 181.50 391.64 0 4000
Income 430 308.79 1231.73 0 20000
Asset index (farm) 430 0.12 1.47 -0.62 7.08
Asset indes (non-farm) 430 0.14 1.65 -2.00 3.06
Education (years 430 4.65 3.26 0 13
Age 430 48.37 8.37 25 73
Male 430 0.56 0 1
Married 430 0.97 0 1
Household size 430 4.44 2.02 1 12
Health (1-10) 430 7.49 1.96 2 10
Health problem in last month 430 0.41 0 1
Grandchild in house 430 0.19 0 1
Number of children 430 4.60 1.99 1 11
Number of children remitting 430 1.44 1.39 0 5
Child's age 430 23.95 9.99 15 88
Eldest child 430 0.44 0 1
Child's health 430 8.40 1.81 1 10
Child lives in city/abroad 430 0.30 0 1
Child married 430 0.62 0 1
Child daughter (not son) 430 0.60 0 1
Matrilineal heritage 430 0.23 0 1
Patrilineal heritage 430 0.44 0 1
Northern village (Mwankhunikira) 430 0.07 0 1
Northern village (Mwahenga) 430 0.28 0 1
Central village (Mkanda) 430 0.30 0 1  
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Table 5.6: Summary statistics for Respondent-Sibling remittance flows 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Net remittances from sibling 2876 -18.30 340.99 -7503 7000
Received remittances from sibling 2876 0.29 0.46 1
Value of remittances from sibling 2876 58.66 226.21 0 7000
Sent remittances to sibling 2876 0.39 0.49 1
Value of remittances to sibling 2876 76.95 268.41 0 7503
Income 2876 275.16 1332.61 0 20000
Asset index (farm) 2876 0.13 1.43 -0.62 15.42
Asset indes (non-farm) 2876 0.28 1.61 -2.00 3.06
Education (years 2876 5.99 3.17 0 14
Age 2876 32.95 9.89 15 73
Married 2876 0.98 0.15 1
Household size 2876 3.91 2.15 1 15
Respondent eldest child 2876 0.18 0.38 1
Health (1-10) 2876 8.26 1.92 2 10
Health problem in last month 2876 0.29 0.45 1
Niece/nephew in house 2876 0.14 0.35 1
Sibling's age 2876 32.05 11.69 15 96
Sibling eldest child 2876 0.12 0.32 1
Sibling's health (1-10) 2876 8.23 1.91 1 10
Sibling lives abroad or in city 2876 0.26 0.44 1
Sister (not brother) 2876 0.50 0.50 1
Matrilineal heritage 2876 0.13 0.34 1
Patrilineal heritage 2876 0.53 0.50 1
Northern village (Mwankhunikira) 2876 0.11 0.31 1
Northern village (Mwahenga) 2876 0.35 0.48 1
Central village (Mkanda) 2876 0.35 0.48 1  
5.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.3.1 Respondents and their parents 
Regression results for respondent-parent transfers are reported in Table 5.7 in the 
Appendix to this chapter. Net remittances from parents, shown in column 1 are 
decreasing in the asset index, that is, those with lower wealth receive more net 
remittances from their parents than wealthier respondents. This is consistent with 
parental altruism. The probits and Tobits in columns 2-5 which model likelihood and value 
of (the latent variable of) remittances from each side of the dyad separately reveal that 
this is largely driven by the fact that wealthier respondents are more likely to give and 
give more to their parents than their poorer counterparts. The altruism model illustrated 
in Chapter 2 shows that under altruism, transfers are increasing in the sender’s income 
but Van Dalen et al. (2005), De la Brière et al. (2002) and Rapoport and Docquier (2006) 
note that this is consistent with both altruism and inheritance motivations. 
 
The Tobit in column 5 shows that those who reported higher earned income actually give 
less to their parents than others. This might be explained in several ways; if those who 
earn higher income levels tend to be more asset-poor than others, then this group is 
likely to remit less to their parents and favour using earned income to build up their own 
asset base. However, descriptive statistics reveal a positive and significant correlation 
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between asset ownership and income (r=0.1935, p<0.001) suggesting an alternative 
explanation is likely. Under mental accounting, discussed in Chapter 2 and tested in 
Chapter 6, different sources of wealth are used for different purposes out of choice. It is 
possible that respondents choose to give to their parents out of asset wealth, but do not 
remit to their parents out of cash income. Indeed, higher cash income is actually 
associated with lower remittances sent to parents suggesting a negative marginal 
propensity to remit out of cash income. That is, money from other sources that would 
have been remitted is combined with money from high levels of cash income and used for 
household consumption, rather than being remitted. This prima facie evidence of mental 
accounting is investigated further in Chapter 6. 
 
Net remittances from parents are higher for respondents who reported suffering from a 
health problem during the previous month. This is consistent with both altruistic 
motivations and insurance payouts or indemnities from parents to children. Having 
suffered from a health shock is of the correct positive sign but is (marginally) insignificant 
for both likelihood of receiving from parents (probit in column 2) and value of 
remittances received from parents (Tobit in column 3). Having suffered from a health 
shock has a negative but insignificant impact on remittance sent to parents.  
 
Although there are no data on whether or not a parent recently suffered from a health 
problem, a parent’s general health is negatively associated with likelihood of the 
respondent sending remittances (column 4), and is of the correct (negative) sign but 
insignificant for the value of remittances sent in column 5. This result is consistent with 
altruism (better parental health attracts lower remittances), or, possibly, insurance since 
overall parental health will include any recent shock as it is not possible to control for this 
using this data set. 
 
Parents who have some education are more likely to remit and remit more than parents 
with no education. Parental education is likely to capture, in part, their wealth and social 
status. If this is the case, this is consistent with altruism on the part of parents, as 
described in the theoretical model in Chapter 2. Interestingly, parental education has no 
impact on either decision to remit or value of remittances sent by the respondent to their 
parents. This is expected to be positive under both co-insurance and inheritance motives. 
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Better educated respondents are more likely to receive remittances (column 2) from their 
parents and receive more (column 3). Combined with the fact that parents with education 
are more likely to remit, this is likely to capture the fact that better educated (and 
wealthier) parents are more likely to have better educated (and wealthier) children. 
Within this context remittances would then seen as a form of inter-generational wealth 
transfer encouraged by a bequeath motive29.  
 
A parent’s age has no impact on remittances sent by the respondent. This is expected to 
be positive under the inheritance motivation and negative under co-insurance. Under 
altruism, it would have no direct impact. Remittances from parents to the respondent 
however follow an inverted U-shape in parental age. If parents remit for insurance 
purposes age is expected to be positive (as is the case) as older parents are likely to 
require more insurance due to the increased risk of a shock, and the square either 
positive or insignificant. The square is however negative and significant. One explanation 
might be that as parents get older they do indeed choose to remit more to the 
respondents as insurance premiums. Once they reach a certain age however, their ability 
to afford these premiums decreases. Turning points after which remittances from parents 
decline are between 36.8 years and 43.2 years in columns 1-3, perhaps making this 
explanation unlikely. As stated in Chapter 1 however, Malawian life expectancy is around 
39 years (Morah, 2007; Conroy et al., 2006: p.65). 
 
Net remittances from parents who live in the same village as the respondent tend to be 
lower than for those who live in another village. This is consistent with parents remitting 
for an insurance motivation – those who live in the same village make worse insurers 
following climatic shocks which impact on everyone in the village. They are likely however 
to make better insurers for idiosyncratic household shocks as indemnities can be 
accessed more quickly. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Respondents are 
more likely to remit (column 4) and remit more (column 5) to parents who live in the 
same village. This could be as a result of transaction costs of remitting to parents who live 
further afield. Equally, social pressure to support parents might be stronger when both 
live in the same village. 
 
                                                
29
 Fan (2005) discusses intergenerational transfers in the context of the “survival of the gene”. 
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The more heirs a parent has, the more likely respondents are to remit to them (column 4). 
Although there is no information on parental wealth, this is tentative evidence of an 
inheritance motivation for remitting since it may indicate competition amongst potential 
inheritors. Interestingly, parents with more heirs are also more likely to remit (column 2). 
 
Respondents who receive remittances from their parents are more likely to remit in turn, 
and vice versa. A large proportion of transfer relationships are therefore bi-directional. 
This result is consistent with remittances serving as insurance or income pooling as part 
of a survival strategy. This result is in line with “balanced reciprocity as mutual insurance” 
discussed by Platteau (1997). Equally it is likely to capture, in part, any mutual social 
obligations to remit (Mauss, 1990).  
 
Unsurprisingly, motivations for respondent-parent remittance flows are mixed. 
Nonetheless, there is strong support for altruistic giving in both directions. In addition, 
some results are also consistent with co-insurance motivations.  
 
5.3.2 Respondents and their children 
Regressions for respondent-child transfers are reported in Table 5.8 in the Appendix to 
this chapter. Net remittance receipts from children are decreasing in income. This is 
consistent with altruism on the part of the son/daughter.  It is interesting to note 
however that wealth is insignificant. It could be therefore that respondents receive 
remittances from children as insurance indemnities from short-term income shocks 
rather than due to altruism which might be likely to respond more to assets. Income and 
assets are insignificant in both probit models, but turn significant in the Tobit model in 
column 5. Although the likelihood of sending remittances to a child is not affected by 
assets or income, the value of remittances sent is positively related to income and asset 
wealth. This is consistent with respondents acting altruistically towards their children, and 
giving to children out of both income and asset wealth. This is in contrast to parents, 
whom respondents appear to remit to only out of asset wealth. 
 
Columns 1-3 show that net remittances from children (column 1), likelihood of receiving 
remittances (column 2), and value of remittances received from children (column 3) are 
all positively and significantly related to health. At the mean (around 7.5/10 in the 
regression), a unit increase in the respondent’s health increases the likelihood of 
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receiving remittances from their children by around 3.4 per cent. Healthier respondents 
are more likely to receive and receive more remittances from their children. This is 
consistent with the co-insurance hypothesis with children remitting insurance premiums 
to their healthy parents – healthier respondents make better insurers. Having suffered 
from a health shock during the previous month is insignificant suggesting that whilst 
children are insuring themselves with respondents, they do not pay out insurance 
indemnities to them. In addition, the better the child’s health, the lower net remittances 
respondents receive. This again is consistent with the hypothesis that children choose to 
insure themselves with their parents; parents in better health make better insurers, and 
children in better health are less likely to require their parents’ insurance. 
 
Relatedly, the better educated are respondents, the more likely and the more they 
receive from their children (columns 2 and 3). At the mean (4.6 years), an additional year 
of education increases the likelihood that a child will remit by around 1.9 per cent. The 
Tobit model (column 3) indicates that an additional year of education increases the value 
of the latent variable by around MK28. This is again consistent with the hypothesis that 
better educated respondents make better insurers. 
 
Respondents receive less net remittances from their children if they look after their 
grandchildren. Although the data do not indicate to which son/daughter the grandchild 
belongs, the evidence indicates that remittances are not a payment for this service. 
Indeed, respondents who look after their grandchildren receive less than others. 
Although potentially initially surprising, this should not be unexpected within the 
Malawian context in which around 14 per cent of the population is HIV positive (Morah, 
2007). HIV disproportionally affects those of working and child-bearing age and 
grandparents are often left to care for the children (Conroy et al., 2006). This result could 
therefore be interpreted as evidence of altruism of respondents towards their 
grandchildren. 
 
The coefficients on number of children and number of children remitting in the 
remittance receipt models in columns 2 and 3 are of particular interest. The more 
children a respondent has (living outside of the household), the less likely s/he is to 
receive remittances from any one of the children and the less s/he receives in terms of 
value. At the mean number of children living away from home (around 4.6) increasing the 
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number of children by one reduces the likelihood of receiving remittances from any one 
of them by around 7.3 per cent. Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) suggest that this can be 
interpreted as evidence of altruism as the more children there are to look after the 
parents the less responsibility there is on any one of them to do so. Both Agarwal and 
Horowitz (2002) and Naufal (2008) find similar results and interpret this as evidence of 
altruism. 
 
This study goes one step further however. Unlike Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) and 
Naufal (2008), this study is able to identify how many children are actually remitting. The 
results show that the more children there are actually remitting, the more likely and the 
more money the respondent receives in remittances from any one of them. The marginal 
effect at the mean (around 1.4 remitting children) is particularly large at around 29.6 per 
cent, that is increasing the number of children remitting by one will increase the 
likelihood that the respondent will receive remittances from any other child by nearly 30 
per cent. The positive coefficient on this variable suggests that there is competition 
amongst children to (be seen to) assist their parents. 
 
This is consistent with inheritance motivations to remit since, as previously discussed in 
Malawi, inheritance does not automatically go to the eldest child, but is decided by a 
committee of surviving senior relatives on the basis of who is seen to have fulfilled their 
duty towards their parents (Takane, 2007). To assess this hypothesis further, the number 
of children remitting is interacted with the asset index. A positive coefficient is expected 
on this since the children will be prepared to compete more strongly the more they stand 
to benefit. This coefficient is however, insignificant. 
 
There is a lower degree of reciprocity between respondents and their children than 
between respondents and their parents. The probit model in column 4 indicates that 
respondents who receive are more likely to give, however there is no evidence that 
children reciprocate with this variables being insignificant in columns 2 and 3.  
 
Eldest children are more likely to remit to respondents, and remittance value in the Tobit 
in column 3 is positive but marginally insignificant. This might be interpreted as evidence 
of eldest children safeguarding inheritance in other cultures, but is unlikely to be the case 
in Malawi for reasons previously discussed. A control for the child’s age is used so this 
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variable is unlikely to capture issues related to older children being more established 
economically. Instead, this may capture some of the social responsibility assigned to elder 
children vis-à-vis the respondents. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, married children are more likely to give and give more to 
respondents than their unmarried counterparts. It seems likely that married children have 
more responsibility towards their new family and are therefore less able to remit than 
their unmarried counterparts making this an unlikely result. However, it is also possible 
that wealthier children are able to attract a partner more easily, and that these also remit 
more to respondents. In addition, respondents are also less likely to send and send less to 
their married children. If children’s marital status and wealth are positively correlated, 
then this result is consistent with respondents behaving altruistically towards their 
children: wealthier children receive less.  
 
The dummy indicating whether or not the child lives in a Malawian city or abroad is 
consistently insignificant. This is expected to be positive under the co-insurance 
hypothesis as living in areas where income patterns are uncorrelated helps to reduce risk 
if incomes are partly pooled.   
 
Respondent-children transfers show evidence of children insuring their parents against 
income, but not health shocks. Children exhibit both altruism and inheritance motivations. 
No one motivation appears to dominate in this case however. 
5.3.3 Respondents and their siblings 
Results from respondent-sibling regressions are presented in Table 5.9 in the Appendix to 
this chapter. Net remittances from siblings exhibit the opposite pattern to those of 
children. They are decreasing in asset wealth of the respondent but increasing in income. 
Other regressions show that this is driven by remittances sent by respondents to their 
siblings. Respondents appear to share their (long term asset) wealth with siblings, but not 
their short term income, with a similar mental accounting explanation as that suggested 
for parents seeming plausible.  
 
Net remittances from siblings increase as the respondents’ health declines suggesting 
siblings remit for altruistic motives. In addition, siblings are more likely to remit to 
respondents who have recently suffered from a health problem – having suffered from a 
 131
health shock in the previous month increases the likelihood of having received 
remittances from a sibling by around 6.7 per cent compared with not having had such a 
shock. Column 3 indicates a positive association between having suffered from a health 
shock and the value received, but this is insignificant. This is consistent with insurance 
payouts or altruistic motivations. Interestingly, respondents who reported suffering from 
a recent health problem were 5.9 per cent more likely to send remittances to their 
siblings. This could be an indication that siblings provided help to sick respondents, but 
that respondents also “repaid” the help within a fairly short time period. The distinction 
between gifts and loans may not be clear. Udry (1990) for example finds that repayment 
of loans in rural northern Nigeria is conditional upon the borrower’s and lender’s 
economic situation. A similar situation may exist in rural Malawi.  
 
Both respondents and their siblings are more likely to remit the better their own health is, 
with an increase in one unit of respondent’s (sibling’s) subjective health increasing the 
likelihood of his/her remitting to a given sibling (the respondent) by around 2.2 (1.5) per 
cent at the mean. Respondents are also more likely (1.8 per cent at the mean) to remit to 
their siblings and remit more as the sibling’s health declines. This is consistent with 
altruism on the part of the respondent. 
 
As with parents, there appears to be a great deal of reciprocity with those giving to 
siblings more likely to receive from them, and vice versa. Receiving remittances from a 
sibling increases the likelihood that a respondent will remit to the same sibling by around 
21.7 per cent, whilst remitting to the sibling increases the likelihood of receiving by 
around 19 per cent. This is consistent with co-insurance/income pooling motivations for 
remitting. 
 
Net remittances from siblings residing in a city or abroad are higher than from those 
residing in rural Malawi. The Tobit model in column 3 indicates that total remittances 
received from siblings living in cities or abroad are higher than from other siblings, but 
remittances sent to siblings (and the likelihood of remitting to them) are lower. Since 
such siblings are likely to earn more, this could be evidence of altruism (they give because 
they can afford to do so), or of a family survival strategy (sending some people to work in 
the city and pooling income), or repayment of implicit loans to fund the migration. 
Alternatively the transaction costs involved in such transfers are prohibitive for rural 
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Malawians but not for those residing in cities or abroad. Without additional information, 
it is not possible to untangle this further. 
 
The age of the sibling and its square are highly significant in all regressions. There is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between sibling’s age and remittances received from the 
sibling, but a U-shaped between the sibling’s age and remittances sent to the sibling. 
Siblings remit more to respondents as they get older but at a declining rate. Turning 
points based on columns 1-3 are estimated at between 47.1 years and 64.2 years. By 
contrast, as their siblings age, respondents remit less but at a decreasing rate. Estimated 
turning points fall within the same region. Descriptive statistics reveal that the 
respondents and their siblings have similar mean ages with respondents being on average 
33.3 years (standard deviation of 10.6) and their siblings being on average 31.8 years 
(standard deviation 11.5), it is not clear what is driving this. The data reveal only one 
socio-economic characteristic for which respondents differ vastly from their siblings; that 
of residency. The sampling surveyed rural households ensuring all respondents were rural, 
but around a quarter of siblings live either abroad or in Malawian cities. This difference is 
potentially revealing. If income is flatter over the lifecycle for rural dwellers than for 
urban dwellers (that is, if urban Malawian lifecycle earnings follow a more western 
pattern than their rural counterparts), then urban earnings peak in mid to late life and 
then decline. During the peak, urban Malawians might send remittances back to their 
village. However, during earlier and later life, during which urban incomes are low, rural 
siblings financially support urban brothers and sisters. Without further information on 
urban income dynamics, it is not possible to ascertain whether this is the case. If true, 
then these results might be due to altruism, or an implicit income sharing agreement. 
 
It is interesting though that receiving remittances increases likelihood of sending 
remittances and vice versa. Thus, an implicit agreement could be kept alive by constant 
mutual gift-giving with the net amount received by the respondent from their urban 
sibling changing from negative to positive and then back to negative throughout the 
lifecycle. 
 
Overall Respondent-Sibling remittance flows reveal a strong altruistic component with 
some evidence of co-insurance.  
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5.3.4 Comparing and contrasting motivations 
The coefficients on the wealth variables show slightly different motivations to remit for 
each group. There is some indication that both parents and children behave altruistically 
towards the respondents with net remittances increasing as wealth decreases. 
Remittances from respondents to all others are increasing in wealth. This is consistent 
with altruism or seeking to insure themselves on the part of the respondents.  
 
Net remittances from parents and likelihood of receiving remittances from a sibling both 
increase following a health shock offering evidence that parents and siblings behave 
altruistically towards respondents. This result is also consistent with the co-insurance 
hypothesis. 
 
Receipt of remittances from children increase as the reliability of the respondents as 
insurers improves; respondents with more education and those in better health are more 
likely to receive remittances from their children. In addition, as the child’s risk of a shock 
declines (as his/her health improves) remittances to the respondents decrease. It appears 
that remittances from children are, in part, insurance premiums. This is not true of 
respondents with respect to their own parents however. In this case, as a parent’s health 
improves the respondent is less likely to send remittances, and to send less. Although age 
is not significant in any of the relevant models, one possible explanation is that 
respondents are potentially good insurers due to the fact that working age adults were 
purposively targeted. Respondents’ parents are unlikely to make reliable insurers due to 
their age. Respondents should therefore turn elsewhere for insurance. One possible 
option is a sibling. 
 
Respondents behave overwhelmingly altruistically towards their siblings however. In 
particular, they remit more as the sibling’s health declines – the opposite result to that 
expected if respondents sought to insure themselves with their siblings. Respondents are 
also more likely to give to a parent as the parent’s health declines. Health has no impact 
on remittance flows from respondents to their children. 
 
There is strong evidence that remittances are bi-directional in the case of siblings and 
parents. This is likely to capture a degree of risk pooling, but might also capture other 
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social reasons for gift-giving. In the case of children, the respondents appear to respond 
to their children’s gifts, but the opposite is not the case. 
 
There is tentative evidence that remittances from respondents to their parents include an 
element of an inheritance motive with remittances increasing in the number of heirs a 
parent has, and in the parent’s education (where education is likely to be positively 
correlated with wealth). Other explanations are possible here though, as previously 
discussed. Although not conclusive, there is stronger evidence that children compete for a 
parent’s inheritance (or other non-tangible things a parent can provide such as affection 
or access to networks) through remittances, with remittances increasing in the number of 
children remitting. This result is the opposite to that which would be expected under pure 
altruism, as modelled in Chapter 2.  
 
Although included in all regressions, the variable indicating whether or not the household 
looks after a child of the remitter is not significant in any probit or Tobit models. This 
might be because the variable is not sensitive enough, indicating only whether the 
respondent’s household looks after a nephew/niece/sibling/grandchild, and not to whom 
the child belongs. Alternatively, it could be that remittances in this context are simply not 
payment for this service. It seems likely that there are cases in which remittances are 
payments for this service, but equally it could be that looking after the child is due to the 
extreme poverty of the other household, so that seeing a resulting increase in 
remittances is unlikely. 
 
Household wealth in terms of the asset index and income is insignificant across all 
regressions for remittances received. This is in contrast to Lucas and Start (1985) and De 
la Brière et al. (2002) who find a positive relationship, and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) 
VanWey (2004) and Van Dalen et al. (2005) who find a negative relationship. 
Respondents’ wealth appears to be more important in their own remittance choices 
rather than those of others, in all cases. 
 
In all cases, males are more likely to send remittances and to remit more but they are 
significantly less likely than females to receive remittances from their parents. Daughters 
are less likely to remit and remit less than sons. These results reflect the male control of 
wealth in Malawi, despite a matrilineal dominance in most regions. Matrilineal and 
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patrilineal groups receive more from their children than the mixed group, and the 
patrilineal group receives more from siblings than other groups, other things being equal. 
Tribal differences have been evaluated by Mtika and Doctor (2000) using this data set, 
and are studied with respect to the respondent-child relationship in section 5.4 below. 
5.4 AN EXTENSION: CHILD REMITTANCES BY GENDER AND TRIBE 
The data allow the user to identify households by tribal origin, and to focus separately on 
remittance flows from sons and daughters to mothers and fathers. This section estimates 
Tobit models for the value of remittances sent from children to their parents for each of 
the following relationships: son to father (male respondent); daughter to father; son to 
mother (female respondent); and daughter to mother. The child-respondent relationship 
is focused on since there exists information on the respondents’ wealth and there is 
potential for remittances to be partly motivated by inheritance. Motivations for remitting 
(and social responsibilities) are likely to differ by gender according to tribal heritage. Thus, 
respondent wealth is entered separately for each of the three tribal groups in order to 
identify any differences in the behaviour of sons and daughters with respect to their 
parents’ wealth depending upon inheritance customs. 
 
The regressions are presented in Table 5.10 in the appendix to this chapter, and several 
results of interest are discernable. In matrilineal tribes, male remittances to the mother 
increase as her wealth decreases. However, male remittances to the father increase as 
the father’s wealth increases. The opposite results can be found for patrilineal tribes. That 
is, poorer fathers attract more remittances, but richer mothers attract more remittances. 
 
These results are consistent with the idea that sons give out of altruism, or have a social 
responsibility to give to the parent who tends to control the household wealth when the 
parent is poor. Giving to the parent who tends to control less of the household resources 
increases as s/he becomes richer, suggesting these remittances are more motivated by 
the hope of inheritance. Although the data do not contain relevant information, it is 
possible that, in matrilineal systems, the father’s wealth is available upon his death to any 
child, whilst in patrilineal systems, any wealth the mother owns is similarly available to 
any child, encouraging competition. 
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No coefficients on asset indexes are significant for remittances from daughters suggesting 
that daughters are less motivated by this variable than their brothers, and that their 
behaviour does not differ depending upon tribal origin. 
 
Although other coefficients are not permitted to differ by tribal origin, several results are 
worth noting. Remittances from sons are negatively associated with either parent having 
suffered from a recent health shock, and this is significant in the case of remittances to 
fathers. Sons do not therefore insure health shocks. Conversely, daughters appear to give 
to either parent when they suffer from a health shocks. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
Motivations to remit are difficult to untangle due to the fact that a single individual can 
have multiple motivations, and one motivation might actually be complementary to 
another. Studying motivations within the context of groups of individuals is therefore 
especially difficult, and the results of this chapter reflect the mixed motivations to remit. 
Despite this, the results indicate a strong element of altruism in the motivations to remit 
for all groups. The evidence for altruism is strongest between respondents and their 
parents and respondents and their siblings. Children appear to remit, in part, to insure 
themselves with the respondents. The strong evidence of reciprocity might also be a 
reflection of a co-insurance motive. 
 
In addition to these results, there is weak evidence for some inheritance motivations, but 
little evidence that remittance flows in this context can be interpreted as payment for the 
service studied – looking after the sender’s child. 
 
Finally, prima facie evidence of mental accounting is uncovered with respondents 
appearing to share wealth in some forms with others, but not wealth in other forms. The 
mental accounting hypothesis and the uses of remittance receipts is studied using a 
different data set in Chapter 6. 
 
The results offer several potential extensions. One interesting addition would be to study 
separately the motivations for remitting depending upon the geographical source of the 
remittances. That is, to study separately motivations depending upon whether the 
remitter lives in the same village as the respondents or whether they live further afield. A 
second extension would lie in focusing on the child-respondent relationship and separate 
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remittance flows by sons and daughters. This could further be broken down by tribe given 
that some tribes are matrilineal, some patrilineal and some mixed making any inheritance 
motivations different for sons and daughters in each tribe. This is done in the present 
study by allowing the coefficient on asset ownership to differ depending upon whether 
the household is from a matrilineal, patrilineal or mixed tribe. There are not, 
unfortunately, enough data in this set to permit allowing all coefficients to differ by tribal 
origins. Finally, it is possible to use only households for which data on the male and 
female exist and include both sets of characteristics, ensuring a more household level 
study. 
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6 MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND REMITTANCES 
  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter extends the analysis of the previous chapter from the motivations for 
remitting to how the remittance receiver perceives and uses this income source. The 
chapter draws on the economic psychology literature discussed in Chapter 2 to show that 
remittance receipts are not simply combined with other income, but rather, are used for 
specific purposes. Otherwise put, equally liquid assets are shown to be not fungible. Male 
and female headed households are analysed separately, and are shown to have different 
consumption preferences. However, in both cases, remittance income exhibits a lower 
marginal propensity to consume than other income sources. In addition, despite their 
differences, male and female headed households concur in one key aspect: remittances 
are used to fund education. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter extends Levin’s (1998) analysis to include equally liquid income from a 
variety of sources and tests the mental accounting hypothesis for a developing country, 
Malawi. Formally, a household’s consumption of good g, Cg  , is a function of its J income 
sources, Y, and its ownership of K categories of assets, A: 
 
Cg= Cg (Y1,Y2, …, YJ ; A1, A2, … , AK)      (6.1)  
 
In addition to allowing MPC out of each wealth category to differ as in Levin (1998), the 
MPC out of different, equally liquid income sources are also allowed to differ. As required 
by the behavioural lifecycle model, the different MPC results, at least in part, from 
internally (not externally) imposed constraints. The varying MPC are due to behavioural 
reasons such as mental accounting. More specifically agents voluntarily choose to spend 
differently out of different income sources so that a one-unit increase in current wages is 
not treated in the same way as the same increase in current remittance income.  
    
1 2
...
J
C C C
Y Y Y
∂ ∂ ∂
≠ ≠ ≠
∂ ∂ ∂
        (6.2) 
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Based on (6.1) and (6.2), estimation of MPCs are made using Tobit models since some 
households exhibit zero consumption of some categories of good. Each category of 
income is entered separately as required by each test: 
 
' ' '
0 1 2 3i ij ik iC Y A Xβ β β β ε= + + + +       (6.3) 
 
where iC  is the ith household’s total consumption (excluding durable goods
30
) in per 
adult equivalent terms; ijY  denotes the household income from the jth income source, 
and Aik denotes the value of fixed and liquid assets owned by the household. 
Finally iX represents a vector of control variables including household characteristics such 
as age of the household head, education level of household head and regional dummies 
included to capture systematic differences between regions due to preferences or culture 
and ε  is the error term. All error terms are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity 
using White (1980). 
 
The model is estimated separately for male and female headed households. This is 
important in order to minimise the potentially large impact of intra-household bargaining 
relationships. Since a large proportion of household remittance income is likely to accrue 
to the female (say, from husbands working away from home), this may give the female 
greater power over household spending decisions, producing different MPC out of 
different income sources. Analysing separately male and female headed households 
minimises the risk of this31. In addition, the study analyses only rural households. Rural 
and urban households differ widely in their consumption preferences, goods available, 
and their access to credit and other sources of income. Focusing on rural households 
(which make up around 85 per cent of the Malawian population) makes the study more 
relevant for this group and minimises the potential for a large degree of unobserved 
heterogeneity distorting the results. 
 
Total consumption is regressed against each of the income variables entered separately; 
fixed (illiquid) and liquid assets; a series of dummies for different sources of income and 
control variables. Mental accounting theory suggests that the MPC out of different 
                                                
30
 Since durable goods can be seen to provide a service making them income as well as expenditure, and 
introducing the problem of simultaneity into the model.  
31
 McElroy (1990) and Katz (1995) discuss the intra-household bargaining process.  
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sources of income is not identical even where the income is equally liquid. That is, 
households choose not to treat income from different sources identically. Results are 
presented in Table 6.2 in the appendix to this chapter and the evidence for mental 
accounting is discussed in Section 6.3.1 below. 
 
After presenting evidence for mental accounting models, it is interesting to ask what 
remittance income is used for. The Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis model posits 
that the marginal propensity to consume any given category of good will be equal for 
each income source and change in wealth. Income from a given source is not allocated to 
a particular consumption category. By contrast, behavioural mental accounting models 
suggest that mental accounts are used for specific purposes. Since income from different 
sources is assigned into different mental accounts, the MPC for good (g) out of one 
source of income will not equal the marginal MPC good (h) out of the same source of 
income. And the MPC for the specific good (g) from source (1) will not equal the MPC (g) 
out of (2). 
 
1 1
,
g h
C C
g h
Y Y
∂ ∂
≠ ≠
∂ ∂
        (6.4) 
 
1 2
,
g gC C
i j
Y Y
∂ ∂
≠ ≠
∂ ∂
        (6.5) 
 
The adult equivalent consumption for each of seven categories is regressed against each 
income source entered separately, income dummies and control variables as in the 
previous section. In addition, dummy variables controlling for total consumption quartile 
are included (with the lowest consumption quartile omitted). This is necessary due to 
potentially different behaviour amongst households with different total income levels. 
Therefore dummies indicating total consumption quartile are included to capture the fact 
that those with high incomes are likely to behave differently from those with lower 
incomes. This is in line with basic Engel curves which suggest that the proportion of 
income spent on necessities is lower for richer households than for poorer ones. 
 
The model specification is determined by the hypothesis that households use income 
from different sources in different ways. Thus, the specification is given by: 
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Cg = f(Salary Income; Farming Income; Remittance Income; Asset Value;  
Control Variables)       (6.6) 
 
That is, consumption of good g is a function of the different equally liquid incomes, assets 
(split by fixed and liquid assets in order to test whether these might be used in different 
ways, as suggested by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and shown empirically by Levin (1998)), 
and control variables. 
 
The control variables fall into three categories: (1) those which are traditionally used in 
any household or individual study and which would be difficult to justify excluding; (2) 
those which are specific to this study given the nature of the data; and (3) those which 
are specific to the cultural context. The first category includes the age and its square of 
the household head, the head’s marital status, sex and education level. The second group 
includes the household size and number of children, since there may be economies of 
scale for certain consumption groups. In addition, it includes consumption quartiles in 
order to control for systematic differences in consumption habits between different 
wealth groups. Income source dummies are also included in order to ensure that the 
coefficients on the values of these sources are not biased by constraining each income to 
the same constant. In addition, this helps to identify any differences in behaviour 
depending upon whether or not a household receives income from a particular source. 
Variables that fit into the third category include the number of acres of land owned and 
whether or not the head works in agriculture. In Malawi, agriculture is of particular 
importance (as discussed in Chapter 1), and the number of acres owned and employment 
in this industry compared with others might have large differences in household 
behaviour making it an important control variable. Other variables that fall into this group 
are hungry season, and the regional controls, since behaviour can be effected by the 
season and the region.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are given below: 
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for variables used included in models 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Food 4037 916.88 1040.28 0 17043.05 1435 877.74 982.86 0 10696.58
Education 4037 27.23 198.62 0 6150.00 1435 26.23 265.90 0 6150.00
Health 4037 39.83 115.29 0 2440.00 1435 34.43 83.36 0 1382.40
Household 4037 1654.12 2144.93 10.95 36966.28 1435 1570.61 1720.98 0 16559.68
Farm 4037 121.62 256.18 0 4770.00 1435 145.19 453.63 0 9721.32
Clothing 4037 308.30 682.62 0 21924.00 1435 310.93 586.75 0 8954.80
Fuel 4037 112.95 640.04 0 25760.00 1435 96.80 354.13 0 10546.20
Salary 4037 618.58 2005.67 0 52864.08 1435 569.41 1851.19 0 16511.45
Remittances 4037 294.27 1985.82 0 69600.00 1435 355.29 1632.40 0 22344.00
Farm 4037 187.71 537.36 0 15395.47 1435 209.01 616.36 0 8850.00
Fixed assets 4037 1968.16 4973.48 0 103455.00 1435 2070.88 5462.09 0 125000.00
Liquid assets 4037 895.52 3694.98 0 113830.90 1435 926.43 3778.58 0 113522.70
Loan 4037 0.20 0 1 1435 0.19 0 1
Business 4037 0.22 0 1 1435 0.22 0 1
Farm 4037 0.46 0 1 1435 0.46 0 1
Salary 4037 0.20 0 1 1435 0.18 0 1
Remittances 4037 0.22 0 1 1435 0.22 0 1
Acres owned 4037 1.84 1.79 0 32 1435 1.88 1.79 0 23.20
Consumption quartile 1 4037 0.19 0 1 1435 0.20 0 1
Consumption quartile 2 4037 0.33 0 1 1435 0.34 0 1
Consumption quartile 3 4037 0.32 0 1 1435 0.30 0 1
Consumption quartile 4 4037 0.16 0 1 1435 0.16 0 1
Age 4037 40.08 14.91 16 114 1435 44.49 16.70 14 99
Works in agriculture 4037 0.43 0 1 1435 0.50 0 1
Married 4037 0.90 0 1 1435 0.28 0 1
Number of children 4037 2.00 1.77 0 12 1435 1.91 1.63 0 9
Household size 4037 4.45 2.35 1 18 1435 3.79 2.20 1 16
Education 4037 2.23 1.55 0 6 1435 2.03 0 6
Hungry season 4037 0.25 0 1 1435 0.26 0 1
Northern dummy 4037 0.14 0 1 1435 0.17 0 1
Southern dummy 4037 0.45 0 1 1435 0.41 0 1
Central dummy 4037 0.42 0 1 1435 0.43 0 1
Female Headed HouseholdsMale Headed Household
 
 
For each of the categories of consumption analysed, some households reported zero 
consumption levels. These observations are treated as censored at zero making the Tobit 
model appropriate32. As in the previous OLS estimates, error terms are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity. 
 
Finally, after presenting results showing how remittance receipts are used, the question is 
posed as to whether or not remittances can serve to alter household consumption habits. 
This is suggested by previous results, and can be further supported by findings that show 
that remittances can be used as a form of insurance (e.g. Dercon et al., 2005; Harrower 
and Hoddinott, 2005). Remittances help households to smooth consumption and reduce 
risk. The receipt of remittances therefore may change household consumption habits. 
Thus, households which receive remittances will exhibit different MPC to those which do 
not. An additional, intuitive reason is that households that benefit from remittance 
income may also benefit from increased knowledge of the outside world, which 
                                                
32
 McDonald and Moffit (1980) and Wooldridge (2002: pp.525-529) give discussions of Tobit models 
relevant for consumption functions. 
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contributes to their understanding, for example, of the benefits of investment in health, 
education or nutrition. This might be termed “network learning effects”. 
 
In order to focus on these differences the samples are split into households which do and 
which do not receive remittances. Tobit models are used to regress each consumption 
category against the total per adult equivalent non-business income (excluding 
remittances), and all other variables. Where differences in consumption patterns can be 
observed between the two groups, there is some indication that the receipt of 
remittances alters household behaviour. 
 
 
Results showing total MPC out of different sources of income, the uses of different 
sources of income and the differences between remittance receiving and non receiving 
households are discussed in the following section. 
 
6.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.3.1 Evidence for mental accounting 
This section discusses the results shown in Table 6.2 of the appendix to this chapter, and 
presents evidence in favour of mental accounting.  
 
The OLS coefficients on each income source represent marginal propensities to consume. 
Male headed households (MHH) exhibit a MPC out of salary income of 0.421, a MPC out 
of farm income of 0.492 and a MPC out of remittance income of 0.065. Female headed 
households (FHH) have a MPC out of salary income of 0.667, a MPC out of farm income of 
0.836 and a MPC out of remittance income of 0.223. All coefficients on liquid income are 
positive and statistically significant, and two salient points emerge. Firstly, MPCs are 
consistently larger for FHH than for MHH. This is unlikely to be due to lower income levels 
amongst FHH than their MHH counterparts. Average consumption is MK2081 for MHH 
and MK2013 for FHH. 
 
Secondly, formal tests strongly reject the null hypotheses that MPCs for remittance 
income and salary income are equal, and that MPCs for remittance income and farm 
income are equal, for both MHH and FHH. The null hypothesis that coefficients on salary 
income and farm income are equal cannot be rejected for either set of households. 
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Despite this, there are strong initial indications that remittance income is used differently 
from income from other sources. 
 
These results are in line with other studies on developing countries. For example, Adams 
(2005) finds marginal propensities to consume of between 0.54 and 0.59 for Guatemala. 
The same author finds MPC out of total income of 0.149 for rural Pakistan (Adams, 2002).  
 
Both MHH and FHH exhibit a small but positive and statistically significant MPC out of 
fixed assets (0.070 and 0.071 respectively) whilst only MHH have a positive and significant 
MPC (of 0.109) out of liquid assets. The loan dummy is positive, as one would expect; all 
other things being equal, accessing credit increases consumption. The business income 
dummy is positive and significant for both sets of household, but is around double the 
size for MHH compared with FHH. This is indicative of the fact that males who run 
businesses tend to run larger businesses than their female counterparts. Farming income 
reduces overall consumption for both MHH and FHH. This is potentially due to the fact 
that those with farming income have less need to purchase food produced outside of the 
household, reducing total reported consumption, but is also indicative of the fact stated 
in Chapter 1 that agriculture employs around 90 per cent of people but produces only 
around one third of GDP. 
 
The dummy indicating that the household lives in the north of the country is positive and 
significant for MHH, but not FHH. MHH in the north consume more per adult equivalent 
than their central and southern counterparts. Finally, consumption is highest during the 
hungry season. This is unsurprising as, during this period food prices tend to rise as stocks 
fall, requiring greater expenditure. 
 
6.3.2 How are remittances used? 
As before all models are estimated separately for male and female headed households, 
with results being strongly supportive of the mental accounting hypothesis. Tobit results 
are presented in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 in the appendix to this chapter and Table 6.8 
presents MPC out of each source of income, as explained in Chapter 4. Signs and 
significances for MPCs and Tobit coefficients match. Since the aim is to understand how 
remittances are used, rather than the exact MPC, the discussion which follows focuses on 
the Tobit results, but draws on MPCs where relevant. It should be noted that the MPCs 
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are consistently lower than the Tobit coefficients since MPCs are given by the Tobit 
coefficients weighted by the estimated probability of observed consumption being 
positive. Where most households exhibit positive consumption for a category, the 
difference between the Tobit coefficients and the MPC is minimal. 
 
Male headed households exhibit positive and significant MPC out of salary income for 
food and general household items. 
 
For MHH, the only positive and significant MPC out of remittances is for education. This is 
evidence that remittance income goes, at least in part, into a “pot” to fund education. In 
addition, there is a positive relationship between the dummy indicating remittance 
receipt and education consumption. Other things being equal MHH which receive 
remittances also spend more on education. Receiving remittances has no discernable 
impact on any other consumption category. 
 
There is a small but statistically significant negative relationship between remittances and 
food consumption. It could be that remittances are, in part, motivated by altruism and 
insurance. Households that are unable to afford sufficient food receive gifts and 
remittances. The negative coefficient reflects the fact that remittances do not fully cover 
the lost income, forcing receiving households to reduce their food consumption as part of 
a coping strategy. Chapter 7 discusses in more detail remittances as an insurance 
mechanism. 
 
There is a large negative (-0.117) MPC food out of farming income. This should not be a 
surprise; households with farming income are also likely to consume home grown food, 
reducing reported spending on food. These results are supported by the negative 
relationship between acres owned and food expenditure, and the positive relationship 
between acres owned and farm expenditure. In addition, farming income is used to fund 
farm expenditure (MPC=0.040) and clothing (MPC=0.052). 
 
Fixed assets are used to fund education and farming, and liquid assets fund education and 
household items. 
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The loan dummy is positive and significant for education, health and farm consumption, 
with the value on education being around four times as great as the next highest 
coefficient. Those that accessed credit spent nearly MK200 more on education than those 
who did not, other things being equal. Loans are important in the funding of education, 
health and farm consumption. It is possible that emergency health expenditure is funded 
through short term loans, whilst loans and repayment to fund farm expenditure will 
follow the agricultural cycle. 
 
Business income is generally associated with increased consumption, and having salary 
income is either positive or insignificant for all consumption categories except food. This 
could be a reflection of the fact that, in rural Malawi, even stable, regular salaried work 
can be partly paid in kind with food. 
 
Acres owned is positively associated with health, farm and clothing consumption, with 
those owning more land being able to afford more of these products. Land ownership and 
food consumption are negatively associated. As previously discussed, this is likely to be 
due to the fact that households which own more land are able to produce more of their 
own food, minimising the need to purchase it. The insignificant coefficient with respect to 
education is perhaps surprising. Land rich households may be more able to afford to 
educate their children, but appear to prefer to increase their consumption of health and 
clothing instead. It is possible that these households tend to make use of their children 
more as farm labour, or that the (older) children themselves see less value in education, 
as they have a stable future working on the family farm. 
 
The more children a household has, the less they spend on education in per adult 
equivalent terms. This result could be explained by the fact that a household has limited 
resources to spend on education, which increase proportionally less with each additional 
child. Households would therefore choose which children to educate. Often, the 
household would pay for the education of the older children, and, once these are 
educated it becomes their responsibility to fund the education of their younger siblings – 
often in the form of remittances. 
 
There is a positive association between the hungry season, and amount spent on food for 
reasons previously stated. In addition, there is a potentially surprising positive 
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relationship between the hungry season and education. Although rural schools can be 
lenient when parents are unable to pay school fees on time, a part of these fees tend to 
be due during the months of the hungry season, explaining this link. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the constant, representing autonomous consumption, 
is positive and significant for food, but either negative or insignificant for every other 
category of consumption, suggesting that food is the major necessity in the rural 
Malawian economy. 
 
Turning to FHH in Table 6.4, the results show that salary income is used to fund 
household items (MPC=0.174). In addition, a small part of remittance income is used to 
fund fuel consumption (MPC=0.014). As with MHH, remittances are used to fund 
education with a positive and significant MPC. 
 
Although both MHH and FHH use remittances to fund education, both the Tobit 
coefficients presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 and the marginal effects reported in Table 6.8 
show that this coefficient is significantly larger for FHH than for MHH. Using the same 
data set but looking intra-household bargaining in only urban Malawi, Davies 
(forthcoming) notes that education expenditure is positively correlated with greater 
female “bargaining power” within the household. Female education, female income share 
and female household headship are all positively correlated with household education 
expenditure in urban Malawi. This result is however, in contrast to Maitra and Ray (2003) 
who find that South African males tend to favour education expenditure more, and Duflo 
and Udry (2003) who find that education expenditure is decreasing in female income in 
the Ivory Coast. 
 
At the margin, increased remittances income is actually negatively associated with 
farming spending. This potentially captures some degree of moral hazard whereby 
increased remittances decrease the need to work on the family farm. Although it is not 
possible to investigate this hypothesis further, several authors have found that 
remittances can have a negative impact on labour market participation (Lucas, 1987; 
Azam and Gubert, 2004). 
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An increased value of fixed assets is associated with a small increase in food consumption 
and consumption of household items. 
 
Like their male counterparts, FHH access credit to fund education and farm expenditure, 
and acres owned is negatively associated with food expenditure but positively associated 
with farm expenditure. 
 
For both male and female headed households, the hungry season dummy is positive and 
significant for food, reflecting increased expenditure during this period following price 
rises. 
 
For both groups of household, consumption quartiles dummies are designed to remove 
the impact of total wealth from the MPCs due to both differing preferences, and 
economic behaviour summarised by Engel’s law. They indicate that for all categories of 
good, the lowest quartile consumes the least in per adult equivalent terms rising to the 
highest quartile which consumes the most.  
 
Northern males spend more on education than their central and southern counterparts. 
This could be interpreted from a historical or cultural perspective; the first schools in 
Malawi were set up in the north of the country by missionaries, and the “learning culture” 
still exists today (McCracken, 2002). However, the same is not true for FHH for which 
those in the south consume more education than those in the centre and south. 
6.3.3 Are remittances behaviour changing? 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 contrast MPC out of total income for remittance receiving and 
non receiving male headed households, and Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 do the same for 
female headed households. The aim is to understand whether remittance receiving 
households differ from their non receiving counterparts in their consumption habits. 
Although, in the context of cross-sectional data, it may be heroic to suggest that it is only 
remittances which are driving any differences, it is useful to ask whether there are any 
differences between receivers and non receivers as the previous results suggest that 
there may be. Since previous results show that remittances are important to finance 
education, and that loans also play a role in this, the discussion in this section focuses on 
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the differences between remittance receivers and non receivers with respect to total 
income, loans and education. 
 
Amongst MHH, remittance receivers exhibit positive and significant MPC out of total 
income for clothing and education, whilst non receivers exhibit positive and significant 
MPC food and household items. It is difficult to assume that remittance receipts are alone 
responsible for these difference. 
 
Other key differences can be found with respect to loans. For non receivers, these 
increase consumption of education, health and farming, but for receivers, loans are 
significant only for education. 
 
It is interesting to note that with respect to total income, and loans, the results are similar 
for education. Previous results showed that credit is important in funding education, and 
this appears to be the case for both remittance receivers and non receivers. The two 
groups do not differ substantially however in the MPC education out of total income. 
 
This result does not hold for FHH however. Although both receivers and non receivers 
exhibit positive and significant MPC education out of total income, remittance receivers 
have a MPC education of around seven times that of their non receiving counterparts. 
This is tentative evidence that remittances increase education expenditure and is in line 
with results by previous authors, notably Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003). 
 
For remittance receiving FHH, borrowing money is important for funding farming, but not 
education, whilst for non-receiving households, credit is important in order to fund 
education (as well as farming). This may suggest some degree of substitutability between 
remittances and credit for FHH. Those which receive remittances are able to fund 
education, but those which do not are forced to borrow. Indeed, Udry (1990) suggests 
that the distinction between credit and remittances might not always be clear. 
 
Overall there is some evidence that receiving and non receiving households differ in their 
behaviour, however, this evidence should be taken as indicative only, as other, 
unobserved factors may explain the results. The discussion has focused on education, 
remittances and credit in order to show that these remain to be key interlinked variables.  
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The results offer support for the use of mental accounting models in Malawi. Households 
do not, in general, lump all income together, but choose to allocate income differently. 
This is the case even after analysing male and female headed households separately to 
minimise the influence of intra-household bargaining. There are some differences 
between male and female headed households, however, they concur in one notable 
respect: both choose to allocate remittances towards education. 
 
This chapter has extended the theoretical work of Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Levin 
(1998) in order to show that households in a developing country choose to consume 
differently out of equally liquid forms of income. The findings support the implicit 
assumption in many studies of remittances that households regard this flow of income as 
distinct from others and thus choose to use it differently. Furthermore it offers evidence 
that the reason for this lies, at least in part, in mental accounting. The results are 
consistent with Adams (2002) who finds that households are more likely to save out of 
remittance income than other sources, but offers an alternative explanation. In addition 
to simply analysing the consumption/savings trade-off, this work extends Adams (2002) 
work by looking at how remittances are spent and how their receipt may alter behaviour.  
 
Remitters may require receiving households to use this income in order to fund education, 
increasing the total share of education in total household consumption. Furthermore, low 
MPC out of remittances indicate that these are more likely to be saved than some other 
forms of income. 
 
This chapter has used cross-sectional data in order to study household behaviour. In 
order to control for unobserved (but constant) characteristics driving results, ideally 
longitudinal data would be used. Chapter 7 uses Malawian panel data to study the impact 
of shocks on consumption and the moderating impact of remittances. However, the data 
used in this chapter contain more detailed information on income and consumption. In 
addition, efforts have been made to control for the main likely sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity (income levels and control of consumption choices by different household 
members through intra-household bargaining) by analysing only rural households, by 
controlling for total consumption quartiles where necessary, and by studying male and 
female headed households separately.  
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Policy formulation by governments, NGOs and credit or savings institutions need to take 
account of mental accounting models since these influence consumption and savings 
habits. Although micro in nature, the existence of mental accounting has important 
implications at the macro level. If households consume income from different sources 
differently, this has implications for transfer payments under welfare policies. For 
example, earned income may not be viewed or spent in the same way as unemployment 
benefit which may not be spent in the same way as child benefit. Encouraging 
consumption of certain types of good deemed “useful” might be achieved through 
policies designed to alter the composition of household income. 
 
Remittances should be encouraged in Malawi since they encourage savings and 
consumption of education. Current efforts to help reduce the costs of remittances are a 
step in the right direction.  
 
Banks are more likely to be successful in attracting household funds if they encourage the 
saving of particular forms of income, notably remittances. On the lending side, micro-
finance organisations must not only improve access to credit, but must ensure that 
mental accounting models encourage the “constructive” use of credit (which is shown to 
have an important role in funding education and farming for both male and female 
headed households); targeted publicity may help to support this aim. Lending institutions 
requiring valuable collateral may be unsuccessful as low marginal propensities to 
consume out of these indicate mental accounting systems do not currently appear to 
permit households to consume out of these assets. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 6.2: Robust OLS models. Dependent Variable: Total Consumption PAE 
  Male Headed Female Headed 
Salary 0.421*** 0.667*** 
  (4.048) (6.593) 
Remittances 0.065*** 0.223*** 
  (3.260) (4.208) 
Farm 0.492** 0.836** 
  (2.386) (2.339) 
Fixed assets 0.070*** 0.071*** 
  (3.778) (6.946) 
Liquid assets 0.109*** 0.042 
  (2.912) (1.303) 
Loan dummy 254.663*** 569.696*** 
  (2.778) (4.040) 
Business dummy 1016.794*** 465.307*** 
  (7.524) (3.552) 
Farm dummy -422.607*** -319.428* 
  (-3.912) (-1.804) 
Salary work dummy 391.338 -463.980* 
  (1.352) (-1.809) 
Remittance dummy -30.009 34.280 
  (-0.382) (0.225) 
Acres owned 51.983 29.649 
  (1.228) (0.747) 
Age  4.783 -5.182 
  (0.401) (-0.358) 
Age square -0.069 -0.005 
  (-0.587) (-0.040) 
Agriculture dummy -69.385 -80.803 
  (-0.852) (-0.834) 
Married dummy -112.494 -37.409 
  (-0.823) (-0.324) 
Number children -30.478 -42.736 
  (-0.728) (-0.806) 
Household size 46.477 1.160 
  (1.456) (0.030) 
Education 14.628 24.951 
  (0.701) (0.705) 
Hungry season 221.016*** 223.303** 
  (2.720) (2.033) 
North dummy
†
 785.452*** 149.824 
  (3.786) (0.903) 
South dummy
†
 -88.650 -93.969 
  (-0.830) (-0.668) 
Constant 994.360*** 1422.472*** 
  (3.526) (3.732) 
N 4037 1435 
r2 0.224 0.347 
F 21.589 12.345 
Coefficient Equality Test (t-values) 
Null Hypothesis     
Salary=Remittances 11.08*** (R
‡
) 15.48*** (R
‡
) 
Salary=Farm 0.09 (NR
‡
) 0.20 (NR
‡
) 
Remittances=Farm 4.15** (R
‡
) 2.80* (R
‡
) 
Notes: t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%. All standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. All Kwacha values annualised, spatially deflated and in per adult equivalent 
terms.  
†
 Omitted variable: Central (capital) region. 
‡
 (R) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis, (NR) 
indicates non-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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7 REMITTANCES AS INSURANCE FOR HOUSEHOLD AND 
COMMUNITY SHOCKS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 found evidence that one of the motivations for remitting is (co-)insurance or 
income pooling. This chapter looks at two household shocks (sickness and death) and two 
community shocks (floods and droughts), which will impact on a household’s wellbeing. 
Household level shocks can be insured through gifts or transfers at the local level but it is 
difficult to insure community or covariant shocks at the local level. Instead, these will 
require remittances from further afield. The results show that remittances do indeed help 
to moderate the impact of shocks, but that the geographical source of remittances is 
important when remittances are viewed as insurance. 
 
This chapter does not explicitly test for the motivations for remitting, nor for how 
remittances are used by recipients, but rather, focuses on one of the impacts of the 
remittances. Nonetheless, in a review of the motivations literature, Rapoport and 
Docquier (2006) show that two of the main motivations are compatible with a shock 
being insured: altruism and co-insurance/income pooling. As discussed in chapters 2 and 
5, studies of motivations to remit have mixed results, but several papers find evidence of 
altruism (for example, Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Naufal, 2008) or co-insurance 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; De la Brière et al., 2002). 
 
In the first step, remittances are viewed as an ex post coping strategy – that is one of 
several coping strategies in which a household might engage following a shock. This stage 
models likelihood of receiving remittances from local and distant areas as a function of 
shocks suffered. The results show that households are more likely to receive remittances 
from local areas if someone in the household is sick (local remittances help to insure a 
health shock). Households that suffer from a drought are more likely to receive 
remittances from more distant areas (other districts, cities, abroad). 
 
The second step assesses the impact of a shock on change in consumption, and shows 
that drought has a major negative impact on consumption growth but that distant 
remittances insure affected households. Local remittances, which make up most 
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remittance flows, are unable to insure these community shocks. Only around 10 per cent 
of households receive remittances from outside their home district however. Remittances 
help to insure consumption against health shocks, but only food consumption is insured.  
 
Ex post coping strategies imply that a shock occurs, and the response is not necessarily 
anticipated by the receiving household. The consumption smoothing literature suggests 
that remittances are more of an ex ante coping strategy with households deliberately 
pooling income and sharing risks in order to smooth consumption. That is, rather than 
smoothing consumption over time, as in the permanent income hypothesis, these 
theoretical models postulate a cross-sectional equivalent in which households smooth 
consumption amongst themselves following shocks. Without knowing more about the 
motivations for remitting however, it is not possible to discriminate between these two 
theoretical models with the data used. For example, it might be expected that, following 
a shock, households receive two types of remittances: those unanticipated and motivated 
by altruism, and those which are received because implicit contracts require senders to 
remit when the receiving household suffers from a negative shock. The first could be 
considered part of an ex post coping strategy, and the second, an ex ante coping strategy 
designed to help smooth consumption. Unfortunately the data do not permit to 
discriminate between these different flows, and the aim of this chapter is to contribute to 
the understanding of one of the impacts of remittances whichever motivation is driving 
them. Since either co-insurance and/or altruism will be necessary to moderate the impact 
of shocks however, the results do suggest that remittances are, in part, driven by these 
motivations. 
 
Although, in the data, it is difficult to separate ex post and consumption smoothing 
behavior, a modelling strategy which considers both of these allows results to be 
compared and, where results are similar, helps to re-enforce the overall conclusions of 
the study. 
 
Finally, the study is extended to analyse the longer run impact of shocks. Results indicate 
that having a sick member impacts negatively on current consumption levels, but has no 
persistent impact. Flooding has no short run impact but a positive persistent impact – 
probably because more household benefit from increased rainfall than suffer from it. 
Drought has a negative impact on consumption levels in the short run, but no persistent 
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impact. The lack of persistent impacts is consistent with the hypothesis that in the long 
run, households are able to insulate themselves from the shocks using various coping 
strategies, including transfers. 
7.2 METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the studies of a wide range of previous 
work discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, in the 7.3.1 the analysis follows Harrower and 
Hoddinott (2005), Fafchamps and Lund (2002) and Park (2006) in viewing remittances as 
an ex post coping strategy households use following a shock. As such, probits are used to 
model the likelihood of receiving remittances following a shock. 
 
The second part studies the impact of shocks on change in consumption using the simple 
insight by Cochrane (1991) that, after controlling for various other factors, household 
shocks should be orthogonal to change in consumption if they are fully insured. Change in 
consumption is thus modelled as a function of household shocks, community shocks and 
various control variables. Previous studies are extended to look at remittances as one 
possible mode of insurance. 
 
In addition, whether remittances are viewed as an ex post coping strategy or as a means 
of moderating the impact of a shock on consumption growth, the geographical source is 
important with community shocks requiring distant remittances, whilst household shocks 
can be insured closer to home.  
 
Finally, there are a large number of econometric issues which must be resolved in order 
to have confidence in the results. These include the endogeneity of household 
characteristics, the fact that health shocks might be predictable, and the fact that health 
shocks might increase medical consumption. These and other econometric issues are 
given their own section below. More details of the econometric methods used are given 
in Chapter 4. 
7.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
7.3.1 Shocks and likelihood of receiving remittances 
This section views remittances as a coping mechanism used by households following a 
shock. The perspective is therefore similar in nature to that of Harrower and Hoddinott 
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(2005), Fafchamps and Lund (2002) and Park (2006). The impact of shocks on the 
likelihood of household h receiving remittances, R, at time t is estimated using pooled  
and random effects probit models. 
 
)'()|1( βhththt xxRP Φ==        (7.1) 
 
)'(),|1( hhthhtht cxcxRP +Φ== β       (7.2) 
 
where 
htx  includes all shock variables and captures observable household characteristics, 
and ch includes all household specific time constant unobservables. 
 
The selected variables are included for one of several reasons. Firstly, those that are 
postulated by theory to have an income on consumption or remittances are included. 
Thus, the main aim of the chapter is to test the impact of shocks on remittance receipts 
and change in consumption. Four shocks are therefore included – sickness, death, flood 
and drought. Secondly, variables that are traditionally included in any household level 
study are also included. This includes the age, sex, marital status and education of the 
head as well as household size. The third category can be seen as study specific, and are 
included for either cultural reasons (regional dummies) or econometric reasons. Thus, 
initial income and wealth are included since it seems reasonable to believe that initial 
income level may impact both receipt of remittances – depending upon remittance 
motivation, theory suggests that poorer households would receive more (under altruism) 
or that wealthier households receive more (they make better insurers and are better 
households to have in one’s network following a shock). Wealth is entered as livestock 
and non-livestock indexes. These are entered separately, as previous studies (Fafchamps 
et al., 1998) have shown that different assets are used differently in insuring shocks. 
 
The three final variables to be included are whether or not a household has a member in 
salaried employment, whether or not the head was born outside of Malawi, and an 
indicator of credit access. These are included because all are likely to impact on 
remittance behaviour. They should therefore be included in all probit regressions 
estimating receipt of remittances, as well as in consumption models, in order to ensure 
that the impact of these variables does not enter the remittance variables. Udry (1990) 
shows that remittances and credit are strongly interlinked, and evidence from Chapter 6 
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supports this; having been born outside Malawi is an indicator of access to networks, and 
should therefore be included in studies of remittances; salaried employment is similarly 
linked to networks with households with a member in salaried employment likely to be 
more sought after insurers, and more likely to be able safeguard themselves against 
shocks – particularly those of an agricultural nature. 
 
Summary statistics for all variables included are given below. 
 
Table 7.1: Summary statistics for variables included in models 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in consumption 1270 -0.23 1.74 -8.43 5.85
Sick member 1270 0.59 0 1
Death 1270 0.04 0 1
Flood 1270 0.10 0 1
Drought 1270 0.02 0 1
Female Head 1270 0.23 0 1
Age 1270 45.73 15.57 18 97
Education (years) 1270 4.43 3.44 0 15
Initial income 1270 6.65 1.43 2.08 10.54
Household size 1270 5.98 2.49 1 16
Married 1270 0.83 0 1
Member in salaried employment 1270 0.12 0 1
Born abroad 1270 0.05 0 1
Member accessed credit in 12 months prior to round 1 1270 0.15 0 1
Received Remittances 1270 0.38 0 1
Livestock asset index 1270 0.13 1.36 -1.21 6.06
Non-livestock asset index 1270 -0.24 1.65 -2.25 11.50
Northern region 1270 0.13 0 1
Central region 1270 0.41 0 1
Southern region 1270 0.46 0 1  
 
The analysis differs in one key respect from previous authors; this study considers 
separately the likelihood of receiving remittances from local areas (defined as the home 
village and district) and from more distant areas (outside the home district). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, this analysis focuses on four shocks faced by households: death 
of household members, health shocks, floods and droughts. Floods and droughts capture 
the covariant, district level shocks. Larger scale shocks as well as regional preference and 
cultural differences (discussed in Chapter 1) are captured by three regional dummies 
representing the north, centre and south of Malawi. The main cultural, tribal and religious 
differences are captured by these dummies, as are the main economic differences 
including price differentials which tend to vary at this level and industrial make-up 
(Conroy et al., 2006). Round dummies are also included to capture national shocks and 
seasonal differences. The results are presented in Table 7.5 of the appendix to this 
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chapter and offer considerable support for the hypothesis that when remittances are 
considered as a form of insurance, geographical source matters. 
 
Households which have suffered from recent sickness are more likely to receive 
remittances than other households. The models indicate that having suffered from a 
health shock increases the chances of receiving remittances. Regressions in which 
remittances from local and distant areas are pooled indicate that no other analysed 
shocks impact on the probability of receiving remittances. However, splitting remittances 
by source is revealing. Suffering from bereavement does not appear to change the 
probability of receiving remittances in any of the models. This might be for two reasons: 
firstly, all deaths are pooled. It is likely that some deaths impose additional burden on a 
household, attracting altruistic or insurance payments in the form of gifts and remittances. 
Other deaths may actually relieve pressure on household finances. These two effects may 
be cancelling each other out. Secondly, gifts following bereavement may involve 
contributing to funeral costs and are not received by households. 
 
Weather shocks are especially revealing. Estimations show negative and significant 
impacts of floods and droughts on the likelihood of receiving local remittances. This result 
is not surprising given that most households in the local area would also have suffered 
from these shocks. However, all model specifications show that the probability of 
receiving remittances from outside a household’s home district increases following 
droughts. Suffering from a drought increases the probability of receiving remittances 
from outside the home district whilst the same shock reduces the probit of receiving local 
remittances. 
 
These results help to confirm the central hypothesis of this work: that geographical 
source is an important consideration when remittances are viewed as having a role as 
insurance. Covariant or community shocks require risk pooling with individuals living 
further away from home where weather patterns are uncorrelated with those of the 
home district. Idiosyncratic shocks such as sickness can be insured either close to home or 
further away. 
 
It is interesting to note though, that the coefficients on sickness are significant at the five 
per cent level for local remittances but marginally insignificant for distant remittances. 
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This suggests that sickness shocks tend to be insured closer to home. There are two 
reasons why this might be the case. Firstly, sickness is likely to require immediate funds to 
pay for medical treatment, food, or other assistance. Local remittances will therefore be 
more effective in an environment in which transferring funds can carry large transaction 
costs in terms of time and money. Secondly, Posner (1980) notes that it is reasonable to 
assume that in the case of health shocks the problem of information asymmetry between 
the remittance sender and receiver is reduced closer to home. Coate and Ravallion (1993) 
note that the lack of privacy in rural areas of developing countries helps to overcome 
problems associated with information asymmetry, whilst Fafchamps (1992) discusses 
punishment of cheaters. He notes that although each household might insure themselves 
with several other households, each of these will be, in turn, connected to other 
households. Within a village context, any deception (with regards to the degree of 
sickness, the impact or the ability to insure oneself through [hidden] wealth), if 
discovered, will be punished by those who are best informed, that is, the closest people in 
the insurance network. This can be a signal to others to avoid informal insurance 
contracts with the cheating household, exacerbating the economic and social punishment.  
 
Since a household has more privacy from a remittance partner living further away, the 
chances of being caught cheating is lower. In addition, the punishment for being caught 
cheating is potentially lower as the household is likely to lose only that partner, and not 
the whole village. 
 
It is interesting to note that there is no significant correlation between receiving local and 
distant remittances, either with values, or indicator variables. This orthogonality suggests 
that receipt of these two forms of remittances are independently determined, however, 
making such an assumption in a model is liable to introduce a simultaneity bias. This 
relationship was therefore tested by introducing lagged local remittances into models 
estimating distant remittances, and lagged distant remittances into models estimating 
receipt of local remittances.  In all cases, the lagged variables were insignificant, and no 
other results of interest changed. 
 
A number of interesting results can be observed from the control variables. Households 
with female heads are more likely to receive distant remittances, however, the female 
head dummy is insignificant across all models with respect to receiving local remittances. 
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Thus females are more likely to receive remittances from distant areas, but not local 
areas. Due to the nature of the survey, a household would have been registered with a de 
facto female head if the husband worked away from home and sent back remittances, 
and it seems likely that this is the explanation in this case. In Chapter 5, the gender 
dummy was significant in only one case; males were less likely than females to receive 
remittances from their parents. Gender was not a significant determinant of remittance 
receipts for other relationships. 
 
Age has a positive effect on receiving both local and distant remittances33. This could 
reflect a use of children as “pension providers” for their parents suggesting inter-
generational bargaining. Alternatively, in the absence of an overall health variable, age 
might capture the deteriorating health of the household head and his/her increasing 
reliance on altruistic remittance. 
 
Households whose heads were born abroad are less likely to receive remittances than 
other households. This might seem counter-intuitive at first glance, but it could be that 
those who move abroad tend to cut ties with their families and friends in their home 
countries, but do not have significant family or social networks inside their adopted 
country to compensate. 
 
The log of per capita income is positive for distant remittances but negative for local 
remittances. Thus, richer households are less likely to receive from their neighbours but 
more likely to receive from family/friends outside of their home network. In addition, 
education is positive and significant for distant remittances, but not for local remittances. 
These results might be for one of several reasons. If wealthier households are more likely 
to be educated and to educate their children/siblings, it seems likely that these 
children/siblings can profit more easily from higher wages in cities or abroad. Equally, 
wealthier households will be more able to afford migration costs of family members, or 
indeed, friends. These households will be more likely to receive remittances from distant 
areas. A negative sign on income for local remittances is likely to simply be an indication 
of the fact that these households are less likely to receive “altruistic” remittances. It is 
                                                
33
 A square was initially included but this was consistently insignificant so was dropped from this analysis in 
the interests of parsimony. 
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interesting to note however, that the asset indexes included (livestock and other), are 
rarely significant. 
 
Having accessed credit is positive for local remittances but not for distant ones. The link 
between credit and remittances is potentially ambiguous. Receiving remittances might 
reduce the need to access credit (if they are substitutes), but might also reduce 
household income risk, increasing the demand for credit. In addition, receiving 
remittances might encourage lenders to lend. Finally, remitters might remit to those who 
are unable to access credit when required. Richter (2008) studies the impact of receiving 
remittances on household credit demand and finds that remittances have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of applying for a loan. Udry (1990) finds that the distinction 
between credit and remittances is not clear with repayments of a resource (money/gift) 
being dependent on the relative fortunes of the giver/lender and receiver/borrower. 
Given these relationships, it is difficult to interpret this variable as causal in any sense. If 
loans tend to be made locally, and the distinction between remittances and credit is 
unclear as Udry (1990) suggests, then respondents may have reported any gift as part 
loan and part gift, resulting in the positive relationship shown. 
 
Households with a member in salaried employment are more likely than others to have 
received local remittances but not more distant remittances. It could be that those with 
such employment make better insurers, encouraging others to remit insurance 
“premiums” to them in the form of remittances, generating this positive coefficient. 
7.3.2 Do remittances insure consumption? 
7.3.2.1 Estimation method and econometric issues 
This section views remittances as consumption insurance and estimations are based on 
the models outlined and the empirical insights described in Chapter 2. Interaction 
variables are included as shown in (2.23) to assess the moderating impact of remittances 
following shocks. In addition, separate regressions are estimated for remittance receiving 
and other households. 
 
This study follows the majority of authors in analysing food and non-food consumption 
(excluding durables) separately. Asset Indexes for livestock and other assets are entered 
separately due to the importance previous authors have attached to livestock in 
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smoothing consumption (Fafchamps et al., 1998). The impact of shocks is tested for 
directly, rather than through income. This allows the study to avoid attenuation bias 
whereby measurement error in income leads to downward biasing of coefficients (Deaton, 
1997, 3rd ed.: pp.99-100) and to assess directly the impact of different shocks. As is 
standard, change in logged per capita consumption is used for each household as the 
dependent variable. 
 
Several important econometric issues need to be addressed, with a large proportion of 
these especially relevant for health shocks. For example, it is useful to verify that results 
are robust to analysing food and non-food consumption separately and excluding health 
expenditure since a health shock may result in increased food or health consumption. 
Secondly, if health shocks are predictable, then households which anticipate them may 
decrease consumption in time t-1 and save in order to increase consumption in time t 
resulting in a positive impact of health shocks on consumption change. Results are 
therefore verified by excluding all households for which health shocks can be correctly 
predicted using household characteristics. Thirdly, health shocks may actually be a 
function of consumption change for poorer households. It is therefore useful to verify 
that results are robust to excluding the poorest 25 per cent of households. Forth, self-
reported health shocks may contain non-random errors related, especially, to education 
or unobserved characteristics. It is therefore important to control for education and other 
household characteristics, and to verify results using fixed effects models.  
 
Other potential issues, not necessarily related to health shocks include the endogeneity of 
household characteristics. This is solved by using initial household characteristics as in 
Dercon et al. (2005), and verifying that results are robust to fixed effects. There is a risk 
that error terms for households living in the same area are clustered due to suffering 
from the same community shocks, or preferences. Finally, White (1980) corrected 
standard errors are presented to correct for potential heteroskedasticity. These problems 
and solutions or robustness tests undertaken are summarised in Table 7.2 below. 
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Table 7.2: Potential econometric issues and correction or robustness test undertaken 
Potential Econometric Issue Correction or Robustness Test 
Unobserved heterogeneity • Use White corrected standard errors 
Clustering of errors in small geographical areas • Report standard errors that correct for clustering.  
• Include Round and Regional Dummies as well as district 
level shocks 
Endogeneity of household characteristics • Use initial household characteristics  
• Verify results robust to fixed effects 
Self-reported health shocks contain non-random 
error 
• Verify results robust to fixed effects 
•  Control for education and other household characteristics 
Health shocks are predictable • Run a probit to predict health shocks, then re-run basic 
regressions excluding correctly predicted health shocks 
Health shocks increase health (and food?) 
consumption 
• Verify results estimating food and non-food separately 
and exclude health consumption from dependent variable 
Health shocks may be simultaneously 
determined with change in consumption for 
those with low consumption levels 
• Estimate excluding households in bottom 25% of per 
capital consumption levels which have suffered negative 
consumption growth. 
 
7.3.2.2 Econometric results 
Table 7.6 reports results based on (2.20) and (2.23), and repeated here for convenience: 
 
h
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h
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h
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h
vt XSSc ,,,,ln εϕδβα ++++=∆       (7.3) 
 
           (7.4) 
 
where hvtS ,  indicates a shock suffered by household h in village v at time t, X captures all 
household characteristics, 1I  represents interaction terms for household shocks, 
h
tvS , ,  
and whether or not a household received remittances and 2I  interactions for community 
shocks, tvS ,  and whether or not remittances are received. All estimates report standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and clustering (Deaton, 1997, 3rd ed.: 
pp.74-78) and use initial household characteristics to eliminate potential endogeneity. 
Column 1 in Table 7.6 in the appendix to this chapter presents a simple estimate of (7.2) 
and can be viewed as the base regression. Under full insurance a shock would not have a 
significant impact on consumption change so that a zero coefficient would be expected 
on the shock. 
 
This estimate shows that drought has a strong negative impact on consumption growth. 
Droughts are covariant in nature and are therefore difficult to insure. The coefficient on 
health shocks is positive and significant. This is counter-intuitive at first glance, however 
this result is not entirely illogical. Irac and Minoiu (2007) note that a positive and 
1 1 2 2, , 1 , , 2 , ,
ln [ ( )] [ ]h h h ht v t v I I t v t v I I t v t vc S I S S I S Xα β α β δ α δ ϕ ε∆ = + + + + + + + +
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significant coefficient on a shock variable might be the result of over-insurance, or of 
preference change. Column 1 does not test for the source of insurance and it is possible 
that health shocks are met with increased health and food consumption, and this increase 
may be financed (insured) through lower savings or remittances. 
 
Death and floods do not significantly impact on consumption growth. This can be 
interpreted as evidence that although these shocks impact on total income excluding 
remittances, remittances then increase to cover the impact. Alternatively put, they are 
adequately insured and do not therefore impact on consumption. Other explanations are 
possible in this case however. Death may not have any impact on average because the 
variable is unable to distinguish between the death of different members, some of whom 
may increase burden on a household whilst living (e.g. the very old, or HIV positive), and 
others whose death increases the burden (healthy prime age working adults). The nature 
of the flood variable makes it difficult to capture differences between households at the 
centre of the shock whose crops have been entirely destroyed, and those who live around 
the periphery. This latter group may actually benefit from the increased rainfall thanks to 
better quality land, or living on the edge of the area affected. These two groups should 
exhibit opposing signs, but the data do not, unfortunately allow the study to distinguish 
between them. 
 
A number of other interesting results can also be seen in column 1. The log of initial 
income is negative and significant throughout Table 7.5. This can be interpreted in the 
same way as initial income in macroeconomic growth models. The higher starting income 
is, the lower is consumption growth – there is thus some evidence of a closing gap 
between lower and upper income groups.  
 
The issue of consumption convergence deserves greater discussion. The below graphs 
show that consumption convergence can also be seen in the descriptive data. Figure 7.1 
shows that there was a large decrease in average consumption from the first to second 
rounds for those that were in the top quartile in the first round. Although this might be 
partly explained by people moving between quartiles, the same pattern can be seen 
when re-categorising each household depending upon their consumption in each round. 
After the initial fall, the consumption level increases for the highest quartile over the 
following rounds. 
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Figure 7.2 reproduces the graph for the lower three quartiles for clarity. This shows a 
clear increase in consumption levels for the lower two quartiles. The third quartile suffers 
from an initial fall followed by an increase thereafter. 
 
Figure 7.1: Mean Consumption Over Rounds (1) Figure 7.2: Mean Consumption Over Rounds(2) 
  
 
The pattern exhibited by the top two consumption quartiles suggests that there are data 
issues which may need to be addresses. In particular, the issue of high consumption 
outliers may be of importance. However, excluding even the top 20 per cent does not 
alter this pattern indicating that these patterns are robust to outliers. Put simply, there 
are a large number of households which reported very high consumption levels in Round 
1, which did not report the same high levels in following rounds. One question that arises 
is whether the richer households dropped out of the survey, but this does not appear to 
be the case with these households reporting similar levels of response in following rounds 
to the average. Two possibilities remain: the first is that these high first round levels of 
consumption for this group (or, indeed, the lower consumption levels for future rounds) 
are due to data collection errors. However, there is no indication that this might be the 
case. The second is that the high consumption levels for this group are genuine – possibly 
related to some economic factors. There is no obvious change however that might have 
resulted in this apparent decline in consumption. The growth in consumption levels of the 
lower quartiles is believed to be genuine gains. Education has a positive impact on 
consumption growth indicating that the better educated are able to continually increase 
their per capita consumption levels. Age and age squared are both insignificant. 
Household size is negative – other things being equal larger households at the start of the 
survey exhibit lower per capita consumption growth (perhaps because they tend to keep 
getting larger). 
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Having been born abroad increases consumption growth suggesting that, on average, 
those that migrate are able to take advantage of their new environment to increase 
consumption levels. The previous section noted that migrants were less likely to receive 
remittances. Their increased consumption growth compared with other households 
suggests that they do not need to rely on remittances to maintain their standard of living. 
 
A household’s livestock index is negatively related to consumption growth – households 
with more livestock have lower consumption growth. This is somewhat surprising since it 
suggests that asset rich households grow at a lower rate than other households. This is in 
line with the negative coefficient on income, but counter-intuitive. Assets should be a 
springboard to increased consumption, but this does not seem to be the case. It could be 
that households with more assets are those which choose to save or invest more, thereby 
reducing consumption growth. Without more information, it is not possible to assess this 
further. 
 
Finally, a dummy indicating whether or not a household receives remittances is 
insignificant. Since receiving remittances does not contribute to consumption growth, it 
likely that some other loss offsets this, offering evidence that remittances rarely over-
compensate the loss resulting from a shock. The low r2 values are disappointing but are 
around the average values found by other authors. 
 
Next, the hypothesis that remittances act as insurance for shocks is investigated. Chapter 
5 found some evidence that one of the motivations for remitting is indeed co-insurance. 
In addition, the probit models above show that a household is more likely to receive 
remittances if they have suffered from certain shocks. It seems likely therefore, that one 
should be able to find evidence that remittances help to moderate the impact of shocks 
on consumption growth. 
 
Column 2 in Table 7.6 augments the original model to include interactions between each 
shock, and between whether or not a household receives remittances from local areas 
(RemLocal) or distant areas (RemDistant), as described in (7.3). The results strongly 
support the findings in the previous section in which remittances are viewed as an ex-post 
coping strategy. That is, for those who receive them, distant remittances can help to 
insure covariant shocks. Droughts have a strong negative impact on consumption growth, 
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however households that receive distant remittances appear to be fully insured. The 
possibility cannot be ruled out that the coefficient on Drought and the interaction term 
Drought*RemDistant sum to zero in columns (2) or (3) (with p-values of 0.8894 and 
0.8652 respectively).  
 
Households that suffer from drought and receive local remittances actually appear to 
have lower consumption growth than households that do not. It is perhaps only the 
hardest-hit households that the local community remit to following such a negative shock. 
 
These results are confirmed by estimating the model separately for households that do 
and do not receive remittances from local and distant areas. Droughts have a strongly 
negative and significant impact on consumption growth for households that do not 
receive remittances from outside of their home district whilst this variable is insignificant 
for households which do. Regardless of whether or not a household receives local 
remittances, drought has a negative impact on consumption growth, with the impact 
again, being stronger for those that reported receiving local remittances. 
 
As in model (1), having suffered from a flood does not have an impact on consumption 
growth. As before this might be either because such shocks are fully insured or because it 
is not possible to observe the extent to which any given household was impacted on by 
the flooding with some potentially benefiting whilst other lost. 
 
As in model (1) and all probit models in the previous section, death is insignificant. 
Reasons for this were expanded on in the previous section when remittances are viewed 
as an ex post coping strategy. When the sample is split into those that do and do not 
receive distant remittances, this variable turns significantly negative: a death has a 
negative impact on household consumption growth. One can only speculate as to what 
the reasons might be. One explanation for this might be that distant remittances are sent, 
partly, to help support a long-term sick household member who subsequently dies. The 
resulting loss of remittances impacts on household consumption. In this case, a long-term 
sickness would have little impact on change in household consumption whilst the death 
would, helping to explain why this is captured by death and not health shocks. 
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As in regression (1), health shocks increase consumption growth, but, somewhat 
surprisingly, local remittances appear to actually act to reduce this consumption growth. 
It could be that it is those that suffer from the worst health shocks that tend to receive 
local remittances, and also see a big decline, or lower growth, in consumption. Local 
remittances would then follow for those with the worst sicknesses, but would not fully 
insure the consumption increase necessary. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the 
impacts of different types of health shocks. This study is able to investigate further the 
results however, and in light of this surprising outcome and the econometric problems 
associated with health shocks, it is to this that this thesis now turns. The impact of the 
predictability of health shocks is investigated, followed by the hypothesis that increased 
health and food consumption are responsible for the unexpected results associated with 
health shocks. 
7.3.2.3 Predictability of health shocks 
This chapter now turns to one of the econometric issues discussed above; that of the 
predictability of health shocks. If health shocks can be predicted in advance, then 
previous consumption habits may have changed. For example, households which are able 
to predict a health shock may have saved more in time t-1 and spent it in time t. This 
would cause health shocks to have a positive impact on consumption change. 
 
In order to verify the results, this analysis follows the methodology of De Weerdt and 
Dercon (2006) who test the robustness of their initial results by excluding all households 
for which health shocks were predicted correctly by an initial probit regression. The 
original basic regressions are re-estimated excluding all correctly predicted health shocks 
from the sample. Although this may result in some selection bias, the aim here is to test 
whether this group of households, which are able to correctly predict health shocks, are 
driving the results. Such an analysis necessarily excludes the influence of these 
households. Results from both the probit, predicting health shocks, and the re-run pooled 
OLS are presented in Table 7.7 in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
The results are highly supportive of the argument that the predictable nature of health 
shocks does not alter the key conclusions of the basic regressions. That is, drought has a 
large negative impact on consumption growth, or, put another way, that it is a largely 
uninsured shock, whilst having a sick member increases consumption growth. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on flood shocks remains positive and is now (marginally) 
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significant. This is likely to reflect characteristics of the households that remain in the 
regression. In particular, this group may own land in areas that is likely to be less affected 
by flood damage, but in a better position to benefit from increased rainfall. It is not 
known why this might be the case. Given the similarity of these results to the initial 
regressions, the study continues the analysis with the initial sample, maximising the 
number of observations included. 
 
It is interesting to note a number of the results from the probit models predicting health 
shocks. Floods have a positive impact on the likelihood of a household suffering from a 
health shock, whilst droughts have a negative impact. Floods bring with them a large 
number of insects which help to spread disease, while droughts do not offer a friendly 
environment for insects. It is somewhat surprising that per capita consumption level does 
not appear to impact on the probability of suffering from a health shock. It is likely that 
behaviour, sanitary facilities and weather conditions are responsible for health shocks at 
all levels of consumption. The impact of sanitary facilities is picked up by a negative 
impact on probability of health shocks of non-livestock assets. Finally, household size has 
a positive impact on the likelihood of a member suffering from a health shock. This is 
intuitive; more members increase the likelihood that any one of them will fall ill. 
7.3.2.4 Food versus non-food consumption 
Given that the predictability of health shocks does not appear to have been responsible 
for the unexpected positive impact of health shocks on consumption growth, it is now 
useful to turn to the hypothesis that increased food and health consumption following a 
health shock are driving the positive coefficient on this variable. Separate regressions are 
run for food consumption, non-food consumption and non-food consumption excluding 
health. This makes the assumption of separable utility between food and non-food 
consumption. Nonetheless, other authors find evidence that this is likely to be the case 
(Dubois and Lignon, 2005), and this risk is the price paid for increased information. In 
addition, this test is of particular importance since it is possible that essential 
consumption such as food is more likely to be insured against shocks than non-essential 
consumption. Results are reported in Table 7.8 of the appendix to this chapter. 
 
Columns 1 and 3 show that the impact of a health shock on food and non-food 
consumption remains positive and significant. It is noteworthy however that a health 
shock appears to impact to a greater extent on food consumption growth than on non-
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food with the difference being statistically significant at the 10 per cent level (t≈1.87) for 
the regression excluding interaction variables. It is possible that health shocks are over-
insured, especially with regards to food consumption and it could be that food 
consumption is over-insured but not through remittances. It would be a separate study to 
understand the source of the insurance. For example, are savings used to insure food 
consumption? Are (potentially productive) assets sold? Do household members sell sex? 
Excluding health expenditure from non-food consumption does not alter this conclusion.  
 
Interaction variables are again consistently negative for health shocks but are significant 
only in the case of non-food consumption, including medical expenses. It therefore 
appears that medical expenditure is a major factor behind the negative and significant 
coefficient on the Health shock*Local remittances interaction term. If health shocks 
requiring the largest amount of medical treatment (and therefore expenditure) are the 
ones that attract local remittances, and, as seems likely, impact most on household 
income, but these remittances cover only a small proportion of the lost income, then 
these shocks will have a negative impact on medical consumption. Thus, households will 
suffer a sever enough income shock to attract local remittances, but will actually be 
forced to decrease medical expenditure since the increase in remittances is less than the 
loss of income. In order to purchase other (non-food) essentials (e.g. paraffin, blankets), 
medicine is actually foregone. 
 
As before, drought has a strong negative impact on change in food consumption and 
unsurprisingly impacts on food consumption growth more strongly than non-food 
consumption. The interaction variable between Drought and Distant Remittances is 
positive for food consumption, indicating that for those that receive distant remittances, 
food consumption is insured against this shock. Non-food consumption however, is not 
insured by distant remittances with this variable actually turning significantly negative. 
 
Both flood and death are again largely insignificant. There are two exceptions: in column 
3, flood has a positive impact (significant at the 10 per cent level) on non-food 
consumption when interactions are not included. This is likely to be driven by households 
on the periphery of a flood who benefit from the increased rainfall. Their increase 
agricultural income will pay for other, non-food items. 
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Death*RemDistant is negative and significant for food consumption. That is, households 
that have suffered from a death and receive distant remittances have lower income 
growth than other households. This is consistent with the result in Table 7.6, which gave a 
similar result for total consumption, and is discussed above. 
7.3.2.5 Fixed effects 
Although all regressions have controlled for household characteristics, there remains the 
possibility that there exist unobserved characteristics that are positively correlated with 
both consumption growth and reported health shocks. This is likely to be the case if self-
reported health shocks are reported with error. Under the assumption that an individual’s 
measurement error is constant over the short period of the survey (around three years), 
it is possible to control for this effect using fixed effects. Results are therefore verified 
using fixed effects panel models. Results are reported in Table 7.9 of the appendix to this 
chapter.  
 
The major conclusion is that previous results are robust to fixed effects; indeed the value 
of the coefficient on health shock has increased and is still highly significant. These results 
should be interpreted with some caution due to the lack of variability over the short time 
period. Nonetheless, the key conclusions remain unchanged: drought impacts negatively 
on per capital consumption growth; distant remittances can help to moderate the 
impacts of drought; having suffered from a health shock is positively associated with 
consumption growth and receiving local remittances is actually associated with reduced 
consumption growth.  
 
In addition, as before, there is a negative association between death and consumption 
growth for households that receive distant remittances, but not for other households. 
 
One key change can be found with regards to flooding. Previously insignificant, the 
Flood*RemDistant interaction term is now positive so that households that both suffered 
from a flood and received remittances from outside of the home district actually 
increased their consumption growth. 
7.3.2.6 Excluding the extreme poor 
Table 7.10 in the appendix to this chapter presents results for results for regressions 
which exclude all households in the bottom 25 per cent of per capita consumption which 
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also suffered from negative consumption growth. This group could be classified as the 
“extreme poor” and is the group for which changes in consumption level are potentially 
endogenous. That is, the group for which a consumption decrease might cause the health 
shock. In the absence of suitable instruments, the aim here is to show that the key results 
are robust to excluding all potentially endogenous observations.  
 
The values of the coefficients on health shocks are lower than in previous estimates but 
remain positive and significant. The fact that they are lower is due to the fact that the 
poorest households are forced to increase their consumption by more, in proportional 
terms, in order to cope with a health shock. The main conclusions remain unchanged.  
 
In order to understand in greater depth the impact of a health shock on consumption, this 
study needs to take another approach. In particular, it attempts to understand whether it 
matter who in the household suffers from the shock. 
7.3.3 A Focus on health shocks 
7.3.3.1 Overview 
This section aims to “drill down” into the impact of health shocks on consumption. In 
particular, it aims to understand whether different members’ health shocks are treated 
alike, and whether male and female headed households differ significantly in their 
behaviour. This section focuses on health due to the results previously obtained, and the 
prevalence of these shocks. 
 
Over 50 per cent of all households suffered from health shocks over the two weeks prior 
to being interviewed. Table 7.3 below shows that adults are more likely to have been sick 
than children with 29 per cent of households having had a sick adult female, and 22 per 
cent a sick adult male. Ten and 12 per cent of households reported a sick girl and/or boy 
respectively.  
Table 7.3: Percentage of households suffering health shocks 
Health shock Obs Mean Min Max 
Any member 2355 54.0% 0 1 
Adult female 2355 29.3% 0 1 
Adult male 2355 21.8% 0 1 
Girl* 2355 10.4% 0 1 
Boy* 2355 11.7% 0 1 
*Children are defined as being under 15 years 
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Table 7.4 below shows correlations between health shocks and remittance receipts from 
the local community and distant areas. The major and most robust conclusion is that 
health shocks on children are positively associated with remittances from the local 
community, but not from further afield. There is also some suggestion that female health 
shocks are positively associated with remittance receipts, especially from the local 
community. There are no significant correlations for adult male health shocks. Although 
not conclusive, this might suggest that remittance senders behave more altruistically 
towards children who suffer from health shocks than towards adults who do so. 
 
Table 7.4: Correlations between health shocks and remittance receipts 
  Health shock 
  Male Female Boy* Girl* 
Local remittances (dummy) -0.0331 0.0584* 0.0840* 0.0674* 
Distant remittances (dummy) -0.0276 0.0369* -0.0008 -0.0041 
Local remittances (value) 0.0104 0.0331 0.0703* 0.0421* 
Distant remittances (value) -0.0157 -0.0133 -0.0028 -0.0093 
*Children are defined as being under 15 years 
7.3.3.2 Empirical results 
The same models are used as used in previous sections with several key changes. Firstly, 
the data permit to ascertain not only whether the household as a whole suffered from a 
health shock, but also to decompose this into four categories: adult male, adult female, 
girl and boy. This makes it possible to assess the impact of a health shock for different 
household members. In addition, the sample is decomposed into male and female 
headed households to allow for separate treatment of the responses to health shocks. 
Results from the initial OLS regressions are reported in Table 7.11 and offer some 
interesting insight into the behaviour of households when different members suffer from 
health shocks.  
 
Sick children and adult males impact positively on food consumption and non-food 
consumption. Excluding health from non-food consumption causes the coefficient on sick 
adult males to turn insignificant. This suggests that when children and adult males are sick, 
they benefit from increased food and health consumption. In addition, children benefit 
from increased non-food consumption apart from health. The coefficient on health 
shocks for adult females is negative and insignificant; adult females who suffer from 
health shocks do not benefit from increased consumption in any category. 
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The study next assesses whether this behaviour is constant between male and female 
headed households. Results are reported in Table 7.12. In male headed households, 
children and adult males who suffer from health shocks appear to benefit from increased 
food and health consumption, and children benefit from increased other non-food 
consumption. In male headed households all coefficients on sick adult females are 
insignificant. Females who suffer health shocks appear not to benefit from increased 
consumption. 
 
In female headed households however, these results are reversed. Adult females who 
suffer health shocks benefit from increased food consumption, but not non-food 
consumption, whilst there is no impact on consumption growth of health shocks amongst 
adult males. It could be that a male who suffers from a health shock in a female headed 
household gains little because the whole household suffers. This is likely to be the case 
where an adult son is earning a wage which contributes to the family pot. 
 
In addition, in female headed households, girls benefit more than boys from increased 
health and other non-food consumption following a health shock. This suggests that 
female heads tend to favour girls over boys. 
7.4 AN EXTENSION: DO SHOCKS HAVE A PERSISTENT IMPACT ON CONSUMPTION? 
It is possible to answer one final, related question using the same data and similar 
methodology to that outlined in Chapter 2 and above: to what extent do shocks have a 
persistent impact on consumption? Similar tests to Dercon et al. (2005) are performed 
and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is one of only a few such tests and the 
first using Malawian data. 
 
The econometric model is based on Dercon et al. (2005). Since it is likely that ability to 
cope with a shock is correlated with likelihood of suffering from the shock, resulting is an 
endogeneity problem, health shocks are instrumented using lagged per capita income 
and the number of household members aged over 55 years. The model is specified as: 
 
h
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h
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h
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h
vt XSSSSc ,,12,1,12,1,ln εϕδδββα ++++++= −−     (7.5) 
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where 
h
vtc ,  is the current consumption level at time t for household h in village v. 
h
vtS ,  and 
h
vtS ,1− indicate household level shocks at time t and t-1 respectively and vtS ,  and vtS ,1−  are 
community shocks. Control characteristics including round and regional dummies, X, are 
included, ε is the error term. All estimations correct for unobserved heterogeneity using 
White (1980). Other control variables used include the age34, sex, education and marital 
status of the household head and whether s/he was born abroad. In addition, household 
size, income, access to credit and employment status as well as assets are controlled for. 
Results are presented in Table 7.13 in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
The over and under identification tests pass all relevant tests. That is, the instruments are 
positively correlated with the instrumented variable, sick member but are not correlated 
with the error term.  
 
Recent health shocks have a negative impact on current consumption levels. This is in line 
with Dercon et al. (2005). However, the lagged health shock dummy is insignificant. This 
suggests that households in rural Malawi must bear the short run costs of health shocks, 
but in time, are compensated for persistent effects through risk-pooling mechanisms or 
self-coping strategies. It is likely though that one of the coping strategies is short term 
consumption reduction. 
 
Recent droughts have a negative impact on current consumption. Like health shocks 
however, the lagged shock is not significant suggesting that households are able to 
insulate themselves from the persistent impact of droughts. 
 
Recent floods do not have a significant impact on consumption levels. However past 
flooding does appear to have a persistent and positive impact on current consumption 
level. This might appear counterintuitive but is in line with Irac and Minoiu (2007) and 
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) who find that weather shocks impact positively on 
consumption. In addition, the variable reports flooding at district level. It is likely that 
some households suffered from this but that other households, at the periphery of the 
flooding zone actually benefited from the increased rainfall. Their harvest and therefore 
                                                
34
 Age squared is also included in this regression since it is significant indicating a quadratic relationship in 
consumption levels over the lifecycle, as expected. 
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consumption would increase in periods following this shock, causing the lagged flooding 
indicator to exhibit a positive impact on consumption levels.  
 
Certain control variables deserve brief discussion. The results confirm the fact that female 
headed households tend to have lower per capita consumption levels than the average. 
Increased education is associated with higher per capita consumption, as is increased 
non-livestock asset ownership. Accessing outside finance in the form of credit or 
remittances unsurprisingly increases consumption. Coefficients on age and age squared 
are respectively positive and negative, helping to confirm the lifecycle consumption 
model (without perfect consumption smoothing). Finally, larger household size is 
associated with lower per capita consumption. 
7.5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER EXTENSIONS 
This chapter has looked at remittances as insurance for two types of household and two 
covariant shocks. Evidence is presented that households are more likely to receive 
remittances from distant areas if they have suffered from a drought, but more likely to 
receive them from local areas following a health shock. Household shocks might be better 
insured close to home whilst remittances from more distant areas are essential in order 
to moderate the impacts of drought shocks suffered by the whole community. 
Unfortunately only around 10 per cent of all households in the sample benefited from 
such transfers. 
 
Amongst the shocks, drought has a consistently negative impact on consumption change 
but it is not possible to rule out the possibility that, for those that receive them, distant 
remittances entirely counter the negative impact. Despite various robustness tests, the 
results show that a health shock tends to actually increase a household’s consumption 
growth. Drilling down deeper into health shocks the study reveals a number of interesting 
results. 
 
Children and adult males appear to benefit from increased food and health expenditure 
when they are sick. The same is not true for adult females however. When male and 
female headed households are analysed separately, females benefit from increase food 
consumption when they are sick only in female headed households, whilst males benefit 
only in male headed households. Girls tend to be favoured over boys in female headed 
households. 
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The results suggest that remittances can act as insurance for shocks. This suggests that 
remittances are likely to be motivated, at least in part, by altruism or deliberate (co-
)insurance or income pooling since both motivations would achieve the result found 
(Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). 
 
The results have important policy implications. They suggest that informal insurance 
systems already exist in rural Africa, and that governments introducing any social welfare 
programmes need to be careful not to displace these. In addition, it seems unlikely that 
states are better able to detect “need” than local African communities. The fact that few 
households are able to insulate themselves against covariant shocks indicate that 
government and donor resources could be well used in this area. Weather shocks are 
largely exogenous to household behaviour minimising any moral hazard impacts35. Finally, 
although household shocks can be devastating to uninsured households, community 
shocks can devastate entire communities, setting back “development” several years as 
productive resources are sold, amongst other negative impacts (e.g. increased crime, 
prostitution). The results in this study therefore indicate that scarce resources should be 
directed towards insuring exogenous, community shocks. 
 
Studying the persistent impact of shocks, there is evidence that households suffer in the 
short run from sickness and drought, but in the long run, their coping mechanisms appear 
to ensure that these shocks to do not have a persistent impact. 
 
The results in each of the three sections are relatively consistent. For example, droughts 
impact negatively on consumption change and on current consumption levels. 
Remittances from distant places are shown to moderate the negative impact of droughts 
on consumption change, and those that suffered from droughts are more likely to receive 
distant remittances. However, some differences deserve discussion.  
 
Households that suffer from a health shock are more likely to receive local remittances. 
However, health shocks have a negative impact on current consumption levels, but not 
on long run consumption. This suggests that households are unable to insure current 
                                                
35
 Certain moral hazard issues remain – for example, if households know that they are ‘insured’ in the event 
of drought, they may make less efforts to irrigate land. 
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consumption, but that they have coping mechanisms in the shorter run. That a household 
suffering from a health shock is more likely to receive remittances suggests that these are 
one coping mechanism, but that this takes time to work. However, although there 
appears to be a negative impact on current consumption levels, there is actually a positive 
impact on consumption growth. That is, households that suffer from a sickness have 
lower consumption levels, but higher consumption growth following a health shock. The 
results suggest that the increased consumption growth is a result of males and children 
increasing their food and medical consumption when they are sick. 
 
Nonetheless, the necessary conclusion that consumption levels are lower following 
sickness but higher than they would have been without sickness makes these two results 
difficult to reconcile. It would suggest that households that get sick are the ones with 
decreasing consumption levels, who then receive remittances following sickness which 
help to increase consumption levels. Indeed, excluding those households in the lowest 25 
per cent of income levels that suffered a decline in consumption levels reduced the 
impact of health shocks on consumption change by around half. It could be that the 
lowest 25 per cent should be extended to 50 per cent, or some other number. The 
bottom 25 per cent however matches well with the Malawian National Statistical Office 
“food poverty” line, making this the obvious choice.  
 
This study offers several natural extensions. Firstly, this analysis does not study other 
coping mechanisms used by households. Understanding the extent to which different 
options are used for different shocks would be interesting. Secondly, in light of the 
findings in Chapter 5, it would be interesting to understand not only the importance of 
the geographical source of remittances, but also how this interacts with the relationship 
between the sender and receiver; who insures which shocks and where do they live? This 
degree of disaggregation is likely to require a larger data set. Thirdly, it would be useful to 
show that the main conclusions drawn within the context of the study of the impact of 
shocks on consumption growth are robust to any potential endogeneity if suitable 
instruments can be found for health shocks. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 7.5: Probit models estimating probability of receiving remittances from different sources 
  
Pooled probit: Likelihood of receiving 
remittances 
Random Effects probit: Likelihood of 
receiving remittances 
  Total Distant Local Total Distant Local 
Sick member 0.174*** 0.131 0.161**  0.187*** 0.141 0.171**  
  (3.023) (1.554) (2.461)    (2.799) (1.465) (2.465)    
Death 0.132 0.066 0.129    0.151 0.080 0.142    
  (0.893) (0.263) (0.930)    (0.943) (0.363) (0.867)    
Flood -0.147 0.103 -0.310*** -0.181 0.142 -0.340**  
  (-1.213) (0.631) (-2.663)    (-1.414) (0.801) (-2.446)    
Drought -0.083 0.506** -0.527*   -0.066 0.525* -0.523*   
  (-0.380) (2.023) (-1.759)    (-0.279) (1.840) (-1.884)    
Log per capita income -0.014 0.071*** -0.045*   -0.015 0.072** -0.046**  
  (-0.630) (3.212) (-1.887)    (-0.722) (2.322) (-2.096)    
Female head 0.256*** 0.523*** 0.041    0.267** 0.606*** 0.040    
  (3.069) (3.927) (0.421)    (2.490) (3.828) (0.362)    
Age 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.004*   0.008*** 0.013*** 0.004*   
  (3.080) (3.348) (1.810)    (3.502) (3.683) (1.813)    
Education (years) 0.024* 0.056*** 0.003    0.027** 0.066*** 0.004    
  (1.917) (2.867) (0.303)    (2.208) (3.520) (0.338)    
Household size -0.012 0.012 -0.016    -0.014 0.011 -0.017    
  (-0.726) (0.541) (-1.045)    (-0.881) (0.495) (-1.083)    
Married -0.062 -0.083 -0.079    -0.062 -0.071 -0.082    
  (-0.571) (-0.413) (-0.750)    (-0.506) (-0.408) (-0.659)    
Member in salaried 
employment 0.163 -0.125 0.282**  0.169 -0.140 0.291*** 
  (1.252) (-0.678) (2.502)    (1.507) (-0.788) (2.591)    
Born abroad -0.412*** -0.457** -0.288**  -0.438*** -0.528* -0.298*   
  (-3.188) (-2.155) (-2.208)    (-2.619) (-1.878) (-1.777)    
Accessed credit in 12 
months prior to round 1 0.253*** 0.037 0.329*** 0.265*** 0.065 0.341*** 
  (2.767) (0.385) (3.489)    (2.576) (0.421) (3.311)    
Livestock asset index 0.006 0.058 -0.024    0.004 0.069* -0.027    
  (0.201) (1.559) (-0.773)    (0.158) (1.730) (-0.933)    
Non-livestock asset index -0.019 -0.019 -0.024    -0.021 -0.025 -0.025    
  (-0.810) (-0.779) (-1.011)    (-0.811) (-0.677) (-0.934)    
North† -0.097 0.038 -0.202    -0.111 0.045 -0.214*   
  (-0.764) (0.265) (-1.493)    (-0.965) (0.264) (-1.801)    
Centre† 0.053 0.064 0.045    0.052 0.087 0.043    
  (0.785) (0.576) (0.592)    (0.637) (0.697) (0.525)    
Round 3‡ -0.015 0.606 -0.160    -0.008 0.757* -0.161    
  (-0.074) (1.375) (-0.955)    (-0.042) (1.875) (-0.884)    
Round 4‡ 0.261*** 0.245** 0.229*** 0.276*** 0.284** 0.237*** 
  (3.319) (2.528) (3.249)    (3.071) (1.999) (2.588)    
Constant ‡ -1.090*** -3.544*** -0.628*   -1.163*** -4.068*** -0.665**  
  (-2.900) (-5.651) (-1.759)    (-3.815) (-7.098) (-2.162)    
N 1803 1803 1803 1803 1803 1803 
Pseudo r2 0.031 0.076 0.031         
Clusters 39 39 39    
Chi 2 146.828 166.758 109.241    62.244 63.613 57.223    
% correct predictions 66.78% 89.46% 74.38%      
rho    0.094 0.219 0.067    
Likelihood-ratio test of 
rho=0       6.21*** 15.22***   2.68* 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Rho indicates the proportion of total variance due to within estimates. † excluded regional dummy is South; 
‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. 
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Table 7.7: Predicting health shocks and excluding predictable shocks 
  
Probit for a household having a sick 
member 
Robust OLS: Dependent variable: Change 
in log per capita consumption 
  Probit 1 Probit 2 
Correct positive 
predictions from 
Probit 1 excluded 
Correct positive 
predictions from 
Probit 2 excluded 
Sick member     0.521*** 0.595*** 
      (4.460) (4.817)    
Death     0.110 -0.095    
      (0.311) (-0.293)    
Flood 0.324*** 0.361*** 0.371* 0.459*   
  (2.935) (3.765)    (1.753) (1.999)    
Drought -0.429*** -0.479*** -0.789*** -0.807*** 
  (-2.631) (-2.744)    (-3.757) (-3.861)    
Log per capita income 0.025                        
  (0.985)                        
Female head -0.040 -0.041    -0.032 -0.009    
  (-0.398) (-0.602)    (-0.298) (-0.079)    
Age  0.026***                    0.003 0.010    
  (3.281)                    (0.184) (0.530)    
Age square -0.000***                    -0.000 -0.000    
  (-3.048)                    (-0.001) (-0.480)    
Education (years) -0.004 -0.009    0.029* 0.025    
  (-0.312) (-0.842)    (1.730) (1.457)    
Initial income     -0.101** -0.098*** 
      (-2.594) (-2.927)    
Household size 0.029 0.028*   -0.070*** -0.070*** 
  (1.488) (1.900)    (-4.259) (-4.184)    
Married -0.083 -0.087    0.044 0.065    
  (-0.636) (-1.154)    (0.310) (0.425)    
Member in salaried 
employment -0.004 0.014    0.090 0.059    
  (-0.044) (0.167)    (0.690) (0.456)    
Born abroad -0.218* -0.146    0.475*** 0.419*** 
  (-1.719) (-1.001)    (3.940) (3.546)    
Member accessed credit 
in 12 months before 
round 1 0.118 0.160*   -0.009 0.080    
  (1.293) (1.925)    (-0.085) (0.785)    
Receive remittances 0.103* 0.104*   0.038 0.064    
  (1.722) (1.849)    (0.370) (0.651)    
Livestock index -0.007 -0.006    -0.038 -0.050*   
  (-0.259) (-0.230)    (-1.371) (-1.902)    
Non-Livestock asset 
index -0.045* -0.019    -0.002 -0.006    
  (-1.733) (-0.875)    (-0.080) (-0.256)    
North† -0.160 -0.115    0.228** 0.186*   
  (-1.278) (-0.971)    (2.205) (1.716)    
Centre† 0.016 0.051    0.148 0.150    
  (0.222) (0.812)    (1.291) (1.370)    
Round 3‡ 0.400*** 0.282**  0.228 0.228    
  (2.605) (2.005)    (0.711) (0.723)    
Round 4‡ 0.172** 0.174**  0.124 0.171    
  (1.990) (2.302)    (1.044) (1.462)    
Constant‡ -1.334*** -0.430*** -0.238 -0.425    
  (-4.423) (-2.752)    (-0.348) (-0.572)    
N 1877 2239 1030 1058 
(Pseudo) r2 0.024 0.018    0.059 0.063    
Clusters 39 39 39 39 
F     15.340 18.080   
Chi 2 239.184 167.193        
% correct predictions (0.5 
cut-off) 58.71% 56.19%     
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
† excluded regional dummy is South; ‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. 
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Table 7.9: Fixed Effects regression. Dependent variable: Change in log of per capita consumption 
      
Receive Distant 
Remittances 
Receive Local 
Remittances 
  1 2 Yes No Yes No 
Sick member  0.984*** 1.146*** 0.114 1.016*** 1.128*** 1.190*** 
  (6.411) (6.833) (0.186) (5.937) (2.762) (6.419)    
Sick*RemLocal   -0.550**       
    (-2.348)       
Sick*RemDistant   -0.070       
    (-0.180)       
Death  -0.292 0.207 -2.059*** -0.253 -0.718 -0.252    
  (-0.970) (0.460) (-12.733) (-0.685) (-0.817) (-0.755)    
Death*RemLocal   -0.935       
    (-0.965)       
Death*RemDistant   -1.065       
    (-1.627)       
Flood  0.389 0.190 -1.231 0.047 0.949* 0.594**  
  (1.389) (0.718) (-1.168) (0.160) (1.760) (2.149)    
Flood*RemLocal   -0.164       
    (-0.237)       
Flood*RemDistant   1.531**       
    (2.432)       
Drought  -0.884*** -0.975*** -1.583*** -1.223*** -1.972*** -0.620*   
  (-3.926) (-3.005) (-2.967) (-3.803) (-3.41e+15) (-1.781)    
Drought*RemLocal   -1.602***       
    (-2.829)       
Drought*RemDistant   1.044**       
    (2.377)       
Receive remittances 0.046 0.325*   -0.165  0.331    
  (0.324) (1.880)   (-0.966)  (1.160)    
Constant -0.851*** -0.935*** 0.130 -0.787*** -0.972*** 
-
1.003*** 
  (-7.469) (-8.074) (0.301) (-6.781) (-3.751) (-8.590)    
N 1434 1434 170 1264 443 991 
r2 0.070 0.088 0.210 0.075 0.095 0.104    
Clusters 39 39 39 39 39 39 
F 17.027 54.277 67.823 15.866 3.452 13.696    
rho 0.247 0.254 0.568 0.291 0.462 0.348    
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Rho indicates the proportion of total variance due to within estimates. 
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Table 7.10: Excluding the extreme poor. Dependent variable: Change in log of per capita consumption. 
  
Total 
consumption 
Food 
consumption 
Non-food 
consumption 
Non-food excl. 
health 
Sick member 0.303*** 0.346*** 0.263** 0.227*   
  (3.226) (3.235) (2.332) (1.795)    
Death -0.060 0.020 -0.294 -0.341    
  (-0.183) (0.066) (-0.706) (-0.876)    
Flood 0.064 -0.043 0.292 0.195    
  (0.465) (-0.286) (1.536) (0.957)    
Drought -0.604*** -0.718** -0.723*** -0.500*   
  (-2.878) (-2.555) (-4.657) (-1.888)    
Female head 0.168 0.080 0.302** 0.157    
  (1.347) (0.446) (2.261) (0.921)    
Age  -0.004 -0.027 0.013 0.005    
  (-0.207) (-1.527) (0.607) (0.174)    
Age square 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000    
  (0.612) (1.573) (-0.137) (0.199)    
Education (years) 0.017 0.003 0.038* 0.027    
  (0.982) (0.195) (1.788) (1.411)    
Initial income -0.376*** -0.326*** -0.374*** -0.322*** 
  (-8.255) (-7.356) (-7.298) (-5.597)    
Household size 0.011 0.011 0.007 -0.007    
  (0.575) (0.459) (0.299) (-0.288)    
Married 0.108 -0.018 0.273** 0.281    
  (0.801) (-0.090) (2.106) (1.549)    
Member in salaried 
employment -0.181 -0.358*** -0.129 -0.154    
  (-1.534) (-2.745) (-0.929) (-0.936)    
Born abroad 0.306* 0.025 0.414 0.139    
  (1.741) (0.158) (1.680) (0.913)    
Member accessed credit 
in 12 months before 
round 1 -0.116 -0.077 -0.092 -0.109    
  (-0.991) (-0.475) (-0.672) (-0.791)    
Receive remittances -0.027 -0.064 -0.075 -0.088    
  (-0.264) (-0.529) (-0.774) (-0.844)    
Livestock index -0.027 -0.027 -0.040 -0.038    
  (-0.941) (-0.837) (-1.237) (-1.175)    
Non-Livestock asset index 0.011 0.022 0.015 0.018    
  (0.344) (0.707) (0.491) (0.597)    
North† 0.226* 0.167 0.247** 0.425*** 
  (1.955) (1.326) (2.304) (4.196)    
Centre† 0.199 0.023 0.190 0.196*   
  (1.579) (0.175) (1.607) (1.732)    
Round 3‡ 0.166 0.254 0.504 0.437    
  (0.407) (0.763) (0.913) (0.795)    
Round 4‡ -0.119 -0.013 0.044 0.251*   
  (-0.738) (-0.070) (0.351) (1.790)    
Constant‡ 2.116** 2.590*** 0.852 0.804    
  (2.630) (4.131) (0.876) (0.746)    
N 927 880 841 790 
r2 0.133 0.095 0.110 0.081    
Clusters 39 39 39 39 
F 43.526 11.866 51.822 16.379    
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
† excluded regional dummy is South; ‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. 
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Table 7.11: Impact of sickness of different household members. Dependent variable: Change in log of per 
capita consumption 
  
Food 
consumption 
Non-food 
consumption 
Non-food excl. 
health 
Sick adult female -0.009 -0.172 -0.197    
  (-0.068) (-1.205) (-1.206)    
Sick adult male 0.366*** 0.266** 0.171    
  (3.270) (2.386) (1.450)    
Sick girl 0.443*** 0.492*** 0.614*** 
  (3.589) (3.383) (4.196)    
Sick boy 0.489*** 0.298** 0.305**  
  (3.859) (2.612) (2.222)    
Flood 0.005 0.383* 0.202    
  (0.030) (1.915) (0.942)    
Drought -1.034*** -0.680*** -0.433**  
  (-2.792) (-4.758) (-2.156)    
Female head -0.023 0.164 0.121    
  (-0.180) (1.409) (0.878)    
Age  0.005 -0.001 0.001    
  (0.315) (-0.086) (0.055)    
Age square -0.000 0.000 0.000    
  (-0.433) (0.806) (0.506)    
Education (years) 0.024** 0.038** 0.021    
  (2.286) (2.178) (1.310)    
Initial income -0.122*** -0.201*** -0.187*** 
  (-3.119) (-6.247) (-4.576)    
Household size -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.064*** 
  (-3.724) (-2.985) (-4.092)    
Married -0.099 0.001 0.080    
  (-0.802) (0.011) (0.482)    
Member in salaried 
employment -0.194* -0.117 -0.030    
  (-1.802) (-0.849) (-0.207)    
Born abroad 0.291** 0.328* 0.018    
  (2.071) (1.864) (0.124)    
Member accessed credit 
in 12 months before 
round 1 -0.131 -0.007 -0.075    
  (-1.207) (-0.070) (-0.605)    
Receive remittances 0.022 -0.020 0.017    
  (0.176) (-0.247) (0.192)    
Livestock index -0.035 -0.041 -0.044    
  (-1.556) (-1.462) (-1.556)    
Non-Livestock asset index 0.053 0.057* 0.063**  
  (1.587) (1.964) (2.079)    
North† 0.259*** 0.130 0.296**  
  (3.118) (1.164) (2.508)    
Centre† 0.090 0.032 0.097    
  (1.022) (0.302) (0.951)    
Round 3‡ 0.396 0.570 0.674*   
  (1.309) (1.453) (1.703)    
Round 4‡ 0.051 0.251** 0.454*** 
  (0.429) (2.324) (3.663)    
Constant‡ 0.265 0.056 -0.231    
  (0.455) (0.083) (-0.311)    
N 1162 1121 1036 
r2 0.063 0.076 0.076    
Clusters 39 39 39 
F 10.597 20.820 25.788   
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
† excluded regional dummy is South; ‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. 
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Table 7.12: Health shocks in male and female headed households. Dependent variable: Change in log of 
per capita consumption 
  Food consumption Non-food consumption Non-food excl. health 
  
Female 
head 
Male 
head 
Female 
head 
Male 
head 
Female 
head 
Male 
head 
Sick adult female 0.624** -0.252 0.213 -0.325* 0.123 -0.317    
  (2.304) (-1.570) (0.941) (-1.874) (0.433) (-1.644)    
Sick adult male 0.392 0.371*** 0.347 0.276** 0.046 0.203    
  (1.125) (2.871) (1.206) (2.321) (0.169) (1.433)    
Sick girl 0.330 0.469*** 0.603** 0.503*** 0.708* 0.639*** 
  (0.971) (3.363) (2.283) (2.964) (1.961) (3.440)    
Sick boy 0.364 0.537*** 0.212 0.308** 0.008 0.339**  
  (1.055) (4.121) (0.825) (2.671) (0.026) (2.380)    
Flood -0.225 0.093 0.453 0.390* -0.152 0.315    
  (-0.726) (0.612) (1.223) (1.771) (-0.353) (1.475)    
Drought -0.439 -1.272*** -0.878 -0.592*** -0.506 -0.351    
  (-0.516) (-3.321) (-1.198) (-2.744) (-0.446) (-1.417)    
Age  -0.012 0.008 0.014 -0.006 0.016 -0.005    
  (-0.448) (0.406) (0.794) (-0.354) (0.623) (-0.278)    
Age square -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000    
  (-0.019) (-0.415) (-0.423) (0.950) (-0.298) (0.753)    
Education (years) 0.035 0.024* 0.054** 0.042** 0.018 0.027    
  (1.214) (1.885) (2.350) (2.025) (0.624) (1.364)    
Initial income -0.184** -0.103** -0.330*** -0.160*** -0.242*** -0.160*** 
  (-2.296) (-2.335) (-4.431) (-4.061) (-3.426) (-3.410)    
Household size -0.129*** -0.043* -0.072** -0.034 -0.080** -0.042**  
  (-3.208) (-1.757) (-2.288) (-1.637) (-2.136) (-2.123)    
Married -0.207 0.184 0.004 0.189 0.175 0.092    
  (-1.220) (0.785) (0.025) (0.958) (0.913) (0.406)    
Member in salaried 
employment -0.383 -0.152 -0.069 -0.115 0.424 -0.106    
  (-1.132) (-1.269) (-0.183) (-0.718) (1.542) (-0.664)    
Born abroad 0.548 0.207 0.073 0.261 -0.238 0.017    
  (1.456) (1.350) (0.215) (1.204) (-0.595) (0.100)    
Member accessed credit 
in 12 months before 
round 1 -0.296 -0.113 -0.353 0.101 -0.601** 0.049    
  (-1.363) (-0.909) (-1.510) (0.872) (-2.382) (0.373)    
Receive remittances 0.273 -0.075 0.357 -0.158 0.369 -0.105    
  (1.069) (-0.559) (1.586) (-1.586) (1.593) (-0.904)    
Livestock index -0.061 -0.033 -0.226** -0.010 -0.196** -0.015    
  (-1.130) (-1.214) (-2.713) (-0.338) (-2.150) (-0.592)    
Non-Livestock asset index 0.144*** 0.043 0.187** 0.031 0.082 0.058    
  (3.141) (1.048) (2.726) (0.866) (0.844) (1.590)    
North -0.061 0.286** 0.628** -0.018 0.542* 0.238*   
  (-0.537) (2.536) (2.272) (-0.125) (1.889) (1.791)    
Centre 0.140 0.076 0.095 -0.007 0.181 0.073    
  (0.889) (0.717) (0.564) (-0.064) (0.889) (0.738)    
Round 3 -0.409 0.657* 0.112 0.709 0.851 0.662    
  (-1.078) (1.698) (0.190) (1.507) (1.668) (1.254)    
Round 4 0.104 0.036 0.100 0.319** 0.159 0.490*** 
  (0.471) (0.271) (0.505) (2.250) (0.691) (3.222)    
Constant 2.129** -0.554 1.058 -0.492 -0.170 -0.403    
  (2.424) (-0.749) (1.146) (-0.620) (-0.177) (-0.435)    
N 268 894 257 865 233 803 
r2 0.113 0.073 0.162 0.073 0.152 0.076    
Clusters 32 39 32 39 32 39 
F 20.107 10.526 13.507 9.799 8.057 11.719   
Notes: t-values in parenthesis, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
† excluded regional dummy is South; ‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. 
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Table 7.13: The Persistence of Shocks. Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Consumption 
1st stage IV
Sick Member Dummy -0.628*  
(-1.710)   
Lag Sick Member 0.100*** 0.006   
(0.027) (0.112)   
Death Dummy 0.081 0.144   
(0.075) (1.568)   
Lag Death -0.143** -0.026   
(0.067) (-0.233)   
Flood Dummy 0.043 0.063   
(0.045) (0.868)   
Lag Flood 0.148 0.251** 
(0.051)*** (2.404)   
Drought -0.134 -0.244*  
(0.088) (-1.801)   
Lag Drought 0.098 -0.086   
(0.085) (-1.037)   
Log Per Capita Income 0.032*** 0.726***
(0.010) (27.593)   
Female Head Dummy -0.017 -0.167** 
(0.042) (-2.402)   
Age 0.006 0.016** 
(0.005) (2.188)   
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000** 
(0.000) (-2.448)   
Education (Years) -0.001 0.019***
(0.005) (2.631)   
Household Size 0.017** -0.040***
(0.007) (-3.491)   
Head Married Dummy -0.019 -0.039   
(0.049) (-0.543)   
Member in Salaried Employment 0.008 -0.088   
(0.044) (-1.149)   
Born Abroad -0.066 0.052   
(0.060) (0.643)   
Member Accessed Credit in 12 Months 
before Round 1 0.051 0.194*  
(0.040) (1.925)   
Receive Remittances 0.069** 0.139***
(0.029) (3.380)   
Livestock Index -0.002 -0.017   
(0.011) (-0.949)   
Non-Livestock Asset Index -0.016* 0.041** 
(0.010) (2.401)   
Lagged per capita income -0.051***
(0.008)
Members over 55 years 0.043
-0.18
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Round Dummies Yes Yes
Constant 0.043 0.644** 
(0.180) (2.291)   
N 1212 1212
r2 0.112 0.644   
F 5.72 300.256   
Hanson J P-value (overidentification test) 0.4946
Kleibergen-Paap P-value 
(underidentification test) 0.0000  
Notes: t-values in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Sick Member instrumented using lag of per capita income and number of household members over the age 
of 55 years. † excluded regional dummy is South; ‡ rounds 1 and 2 excluded. First stage dependent variable 
is ‘Sick member’. 
 215
 
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
By studying remittances in rural Malawi, this thesis has aimed to contribute to the 
understanding of transfers in a developing context from several perspectives. Based on 
relevant literature, it has used three different data sets to “follow” remittances from the 
sender by answering the question, “what motivates people to send remittances?”, to the 
receiver by contributing to understanding how s/he views remittance receipts, and how 
they are spent, and finally to one of their impacts, by assessing whether remittances are 
able to moderate the impact of negative household and community shocks. 
 
Chapter 1 summarises the remittances literature in an international context before 
focusing on the microeconomic impacts on which this thesis is centred. The same chapter 
goes on to discuss the Malawian context, examining the major themes relevant to the 
country without which any study of Malawi would be incomplete. It finally shows why 
Malawi is a useful context for the analysis of remittances on a microeconomic level. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review which moves the thesis from the general topics of 
remittances and the context to the more specific areas on which the empirical chapters 
focus. It begins by giving a summary of the theory of remittances before going on to 
discuss in detail the literature on motivations for remitting; mental accounting and its 
relevance for remittances; and the impact of household and community shocks on 
household consumption. 
 
Chapter 3 gives descriptive statistics for the three data sets used in the empirical chapters. 
All are Malawian and all contain information which are specifically relevant for the 
chapter they are used for. Chapter 4 looks at the empirical methodologies used, and gives 
reasons for the methods used. 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 are the three empirical chapters, which each focus on a different area of 
remittances. Chapter 5 uses data on inter-family transfers to help understand the 
motivations for remitting. Chapter 6 draws heavily on economic psychology theory to 
understand how remittance receivers view and use this money, with a focus on 
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remittance uses. Chapter 7 contributes to the understanding of one of the potential 
impacts of remittances; whether they are able to moderate the impact of negative shocks 
(death, sickness, flooding, drought). This chapter summarises and concludes. 
8.1.1 Non-empirical findings 
Chapter 1 places this thesis into its context both with regards to remittances, and the 
country studied, Malawi. It shows that international remittance flows have been growing 
in importance over the previous 20 years, and are now greater in value than both 
Overseas Development Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment. International remittance 
flows are however, just one part of the story, with internal transfers being of considerable 
importance for rural households in developing countries. In Malawi, over 20 per cent of 
households receive remittances, and these come from the home village, more distant 
rural areas, cities within Malawi and sub-Saharan Africa, and from further afield including 
Europe and North America. In Malawi, official foreign remittances make up around one 
per cent of GDP, although if Malawi is a typical sub-Saharan African country, this might be 
around two per cent if non official flows are included. Although this is small compared to 
some other countries in the region, the importance of internal transfers in addition to 
international flows mean that remittances are an important source of income for many 
rural households. In addition to the different geographical sources, remittances might be 
received from neighbours and friends as well as from (close and distant) relatives. 
 
Studying the impact of remittances is a challenging task due to data limitations, and the 
impact of social and cultural factors and context which differ widely between, and even 
within, countries. In particular, the motivations for remitting may differ, which will imply 
different uses of remittances, and different impacts at both household and the macro 
levels. Remittances may be used to fund current consumption, or invested in land 
potentially creating negative macroeconomic consequences, or may deter labour market 
participation. Equally, remittances tend to reduce poverty (but perhaps increase 
inequality), and can help to fund investment in productive private enterprise and social 
amenities. The overall impact of remittances is not therefore, immediately apparent, but 
varies depending upon the context. 
 
The importance of remittances to rural Malawian households make this country an ideal 
setting for this thesis. In addition, the risk and impact of HIV/AIDS, and the risky 
agricultural economy mean that many households frequently have to rely on transfers in 
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order to smooth their consumption through shocks. This allows this thesis to test for the 
moderating impact of remittances following (health and climactic) shocks, and permits a 
wide range of possible motivations for remitting to be tested (altruism, which reacts to 
wealth; altruism or insurance following a health shock; services provided such as looking 
after AIDS orphans; inheritance under different mixtures of matrilineal and patrilineal 
systems used by different tribes in Malawi). 
 
Chapter 2 begins by summarising the main models of remittances. These highlight the 
difficulties in separating motivations for remitting, particularly with regards to altruism 
and insurance models, with many of the signs of coefficients expected to be the same 
under each motivation. Nonetheless, the models do help to draw out certain testable 
conclusions upon which the discriminating hypotheses for remittance motivations are 
based. For example, under altruism the sender will send more as his/her own income 
rises, and as the receiver’s income declines. Under the insurance model, transfers are 
increasing as the probability of the sender suffering from a shock increases. 
 
Chapter 2 goes on to discuss empirical findings from papers which aim to understand the 
motivations for remitting. The fact that no paper has, to date, been able to single out one 
motivation is indicative of the fact that different remitters have different motivations in 
each context studied. In addition, one remitter can have more than one motivation since 
the existence of one reason for remitting does not preclude another; for example, a 
threat of disinheritance may help to enforce an insurance payout from the child if the 
parent is sick. In this case, it is not clear whether the remittance is motivated by 
inheritance or insurance. 
 
Nonetheless, the methodologies help to inform the empirical study in this thesis and the 
results are of interest. As in Chapter 5, many authors find that altruism plays an important 
role in motivating remittances. However, securing inheritance rights, insuring oneself 
against negative shocks, paying indemnities, implicit payment for services or previous 
loans and investment are also shown to be key motivators by various empirical studies. 
 
After reviewing the literature on motivations to remit, Chapter 2 discusses the 
psychological and consumption theory related to uses of income from different sources, 
noting both the theoretical background and the key empirical findings. In particular, the 
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theory and the evidence suggest that “a dollar is not a dollar”, or rather, “a kwacha is not 
a kwacha”. That is, income from one source is not used in the same way as income from a 
different source or, put another way, even equally liquid income is not fungible.  
 
Remittances are an ideal candidate for studying this theory in a developing context. There 
are several reasons to suspect that remittances might be used differently to income from 
other sources. For example, they may come with conditions attached (“use this money to 
educate my little brother”), or may be a form of income pooling in order to reduce risk, 
and potentially alter consumption behaviour. In addition, remittances may be seen as 
“manna from heaven” and wasted, or as the product of someone else’s hard work and 
come with a duty to use them “wisely”. These ideas are tested, in a developing context, 
for the first time, in Chapter 6. 
 
Finally Chapter 2 shows the models used to estimate the impact of shocks on 
consumption before noting the empirical results found by other authors in a developing 
context. Health and weather are the main shocks analysed, and, unsurprisingly, results 
are mixed with some studies finding that some shocks are fully insured and other finding 
that consumption is sensitive to the shocks. Although the method of insurance is rarely 
discussed, several studies have noted that remittances could play a role. 
  
Chapter 3 explores the three different data sets used in each of the three empirical 
chapters. Since each data set contains unique information which can be used to inform 
the overall study, the discussion of each set focuses on a different, relevant aspect of 
remittances and the rural Malawian household. 
 
The FTP provides an insight into intra-family (but inter-household) remittance transfers, 
and notes the importance of the different relationships (parents, children, siblings) for the 
central households. The IHS98 helps to illustrate the difference between male and female 
headed households. For example, female headed households tend to be smaller, but have 
slightly higher income in adult equivalent terms. The CPS shows the differences between 
remittance receivers and non receivers, and remittance senders and non senders. In 
particular, senders and receivers exhibit similar characteristics to each other and are 
different from the wider population. For example sender and receiver households tend to 
be better educated, and are better connected through networks. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the empirical methodologies used. These include Ordinary Least 
Squares, Tobit models, probit models, and panel data analysis. Special attention is paid to 
discussing adjustments or corrections made for the purposes of the analyses in this thesis. 
8.1.2 Empirical findings 
Chapter 5 uses standard methodology to study motivations to remit from the perspective 
of intra-family transfers. Unlike most studies, the data make it possible to analyse 
motivations from both perspectives in the relationship. In addition, this study compares 
and contrasts motivations to remit between senders and receivers of different 
relationships, and is the first study to be able to do so. 
 
The study uses econometric techniques widely employed in the relevant literature to 
model remittances sent or received as a function of sender and receiver characteristics. 
Expected signs of coefficients on each of the relevant variables under different 
motivations are clearly presented for each relationship 
 
The results show that there is a negative relationship between net remittances received 
from parents, and the respondent’s wealth. In addition, remittances to parents are 
increasing in respondent’s wealth. These results are indicative of altruism on behalf of 
both the respondents and their parents towards each other. 
 
Respondents and their parents tend to remit more to each other the worse the other’s 
health is. In addition, parents are more likely to remit to respondents who have recently 
suffered from a health shock. These results are likely to capture some degree of altruism, 
and some degree of (co-)insurance amongst the respondents and their parents. 
 
Co-insurance, as well as other more social motivations for giving, including Platteau’s 
(1997) “balanced reciprocity” as mutual insurance is captured by the fact that 
respondents are more likely to receive remittances if they also give them, and are more 
likely to give if they also receive. 
 
Results indicate (unsurprisingly) that motivations for remittance relationships between 
respondents and their children differ from those of respondents and their parents. In 
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particular, children appear not to respond to the respondents’ remittances, and do not 
“insure” respondents’ health shocks. Rather, children appear to desire to insure 
themselves with the respondents (their parents). Children remit more to the respondents, 
the better the insurer the respondent would make. Thus, respondents with better 
education and those in better health receive more from their children than others. In 
addition, children in better health (and thus less likely to require insurance) are less likely 
to send remittances. Thus the insurance is rather one-way (rather than mutual, or co-
insurance), with children seeking to pay insurance premiums to the respondents, but not 
insuring the respondent in their turn. 
 
There is also evidence that children remit for other reasons. For example, net receipts 
from children are decreasing in respondents’ income indicating some degree of altruism. 
In addition, any one child is less likely to remit the more children there are. Agarwal and 
Horowitz (2002) suggest that this is also consistent with altruism. However, the results in 
this thesis suggest that the more children there are actually remitting, the more likely any 
one of these is to remit. This is potentially indicative of competition for inheritance 
amongst the children. 
 
A relevant extension separates the analysis by studying child-respondent remittances 
separately depending upon whether they are son to father; son to mother; daughter to 
father; or daughter to mother, and by allowing the coefficient on wealth of the 
respondent to differ by inheritance system (patrilineal, matrilineal, mixed) of the tribal 
origins of the household. The results suggest that sons remit more to the main controller 
of household wealth (the female/mother in matrilineal tribes, and the male/father in 
patrilineal tribes) as the respondent is poorer. This is consistent with altruism or 
indicative of fulfilling a social responsibility. However, sons remit more to the parent who 
does not control wealth the wealthier that parent is. This potentially indicates that the 
father’s wealth in a matrilineal system, and the mother’s wealth in a patrilineal system is 
available to any child, even those who would not traditionally benefit from inheritance. 
Remittances to this parent would then be seen as a means of attempting to access this 
inheritance.  
 
Finally, respondents and their siblings behave overwhelmingly altruistically towards each 
other. They remit more to each other the worse the other’s health is, and siblings are 
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more likely to remit if the respondent has suffered from a health shock. In addition, there 
is a great deal of reciprocity between respondents and their siblings. 
 
Chapter 6 follows remittance from the motivations for sending to how the receiver uses 
the remittances. It is based on economic psychology theory which suggests that income 
from different sources (even if they are equally liquid) can be viewed and used differently 
by the receiver. 
 
This chapter begins by extending existing theory sketched in Chapter 2, and uses Tobit 
models to estimate consumption functions. The empirical section first estimates marginal 
propensities to consume out of different sources of (equally liquid) income each entered 
separately. Under traditional theory, these should be equal whilst under the behavioural 
mental accounting model, these are likely to differ as income from each source is placed 
in separate “mental accounts”, and used for different purposes. In order to minimise the 
impact of intra-household bargaining which is an unobserved influence on consumption 
behaviour, male and female headed households are analysed separately throughout 
Chapter 6. 
 
The results are supportive of mental accounting with remittance income exhibiting 
significantly lower marginal propensities to consume than salary and farm income for 
both male and female headed households. Interestingly, the null hypothesis that farming 
and salary income have the same coefficients cannot be rejected suggesting that 
remittance income is indeed unique. 
 
After presenting evidence for mental accounting and showing that remittance income 
differs from other sources of income, Chapter 6 goes on to study remittance uses, by 
estimating consumption functions for each of seven categories of good. Male and female 
headed households are shown to differ in their use of income, but concur on one 
important point: remittances are used to fund education. 
 
This result in not a surprise for rural Malawi where parents often fund the education of 
the eldest children who, in turn, fund the education of their younger siblings, perhaps 
through remittances. Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) also find a positive association 
between remittance receipts and education. 
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Finally, the chapter asks whether there exist any consumption differences between 
remittance receivers and non receivers. Although, with regards to education, there is little 
difference between the two groups for male headed households, for female headed 
households, receivers exhibit a MPC education around seven times that of their non 
receiving counterparts. In addition, credit is an important means of funding education for 
non receiving female headed households, but receivers do not appear to require to 
borrow to fund education, but rather, are able to use the remittances.  
 
In Chapter 7, the final empirical chapter, one of the potential impacts of remittances is 
studied using short panel data. Using established theory, the impacts of four shocks 
(sickness, death, flooding, drought) firstly on likelihood of receiving remittances, and then 
on consumption change are estimated. This chapter contains two major extensions to 
existing work. Firstly, remittances are separated by geographical source (local, defined as 
the recipient’s village or district, and distant, defined as outside of the home district, 
Malawian cities, or abroad). Secondly, the chapter contributes to understanding whether 
remittances are able to moderate the impact of these shocks, and whether the 
geographical source of the remittances matter. 
 
The results reveal that households which have suffered from a recent sickness are more 
likely to receive remittances than other households. The evidence suggests that health 
shocks are insured close to home, rather than further afield. 
 
Climatic shocks however exhibit the opposite pattern. Having suffered from a recent flood 
or drought decreases the likelihood of receiving remittances from local sources, but 
increases the likelihood of receiving remittances from more distant sources. These results 
are unsurprising, but a first in the literature. Since climatic shocks impact most 
households in the regions which suffered, households are unable to send remittances to 
neighbours. Instead, in order to “insure” these shocks, remittances are required from 
areas which did not suffer from the shock. 
 
Secondly, Chapter 7 asks whether remittances insure consumption. The models first 
estimate the impact of shocks on change in log consumption, as is standard in the 
literature. After addressing several important econometric issues, the results indicate that 
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drought has a strong negative impact on consumption growth. Death and flooding do not 
have a significant impact, and potential reasons for this are discussed. Somewhat 
surprisingly, health shocks however have a positive impact on consumption growth.  
 
Given this result, the chapter ensures that the results are robust to a number of changes 
in specification, before “drilling down” into health shocks. It is ensured that results to not 
change substantially when using fixed effects, when excluding the extreme poor, when 
excluding observations for which health shocks may be predictable, and the chapter 
follows several other studies in examining food and non food consumption separately. 
Results do not differ when these changes are made. 
 
The data provide information on which household member actually suffered from the 
sickness, allowing the study to separate the impact of sickness by household member. 
The results indicate that in male headed households, sick children and sick adult males 
benefit from increased food and health consumption, whilst sick females do not. In 
female headed households however, the reverse it true and children and adult females 
who have suffered from a health shock benefit from increased consumption during 
sickness. These findings go some way to explaining why health shocks increase 
consumption growth, but do not explain exactly how this is financed. 
 
An extension asks whether shocks can have a persistent impact on consumption. Based 
on Dercon et al. (2005) the study estimates per capita consumption at time t as a function 
of shocks suffered at time t and t-1 plus control variables. Since current consumption 
might also impact on current health, this last variable is instrumented. Recent sickness 
and drought are shown to have a negative impact on current consumption level, but 
coefficients on lagged sickness and drought are insignificant suggesting that households 
are able to insulate themselves from the longer run impact of these shocks.  
 
Neither present nor lagged death are significant. Contemporary flooding is insignificant 
but the lag is positive and significant. This is likely to be due to the fact that whilst some 
households (at the centre) suffer from flooding, many others (at the periphery) benefit 
over time from the increased rainfall. 
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8.1.3 Limitations of the study 
Although this study has made every effort to make results as reliable as possible, a 
number of weaknesses remain, both with the generalisability of the results and with the 
data themselves. 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the similarities between Malawi and her neighbours – Zambia, 
Tanzania and Mozambique. Although these neighbours have many things in common, 
including certain remittance characteristics, the extent to which the results are 
generalisable both to these countries and others in the region can be debated. For 
example, Zambia has a similar population to Malawi, but has a land area of around 
740,742 square kilometres, compared with Malawi’s 94,080 square kilometres. This alone, 
is likely to make the transporting of remittances an even greater issue in Zambia than in 
Malawi – perhaps making certain results here too weak for the Zambian context. The land 
area of Tanzania is slightly larger than that of Zambia, but with a population of 40 million 
and a greater mix of tribal and religious affiliations than Malawi.  
 
The proximity of southern Mozambique to South Africa – the regional economic power – 
means that results found in this study are likely to be more applicable to the north of 
Mozambique than the south, with the south having greater access to both the labour and 
goods market in South Africa.  
 
In addition, historical factors are likely to strongly influence national behaviour – large 
parts of Mozambique were under Portuguese control for around five centuries, whilst 
Zambia and Malawi were the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
respectively, and came under heavy British influence for only around 100 years prior to 
independence. Tanzania was a German colony (German East Africa) which was 
transferred to the British after World War I, and has had nearly a millennium of Arab 
influence in coastal areas. 
 
These basic differences, even amongst Malawi’s neighbours are multiplied when we 
consider other countries in the region; the colonial history of the Congo under the 
Belgians is considerably more brutal than those of other regional countries, for example, 
and this large country contains many areas which are more difficult to access that remote 
areas in other countries in the region. South Africa has experience apartheid, and is also 
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the industrial economic superpower of the region whilst Botswana’s economy is based on 
diamond mining, and has grown to become Africa’s richest economy. Both Angola and 
Mozambique have suffered from long periods of civil war – Angola’s at least partly fuelled 
by oil. Zimbabwe – once the ‘bread-basket of Africa’ has also suffered from white 
minority rule from 1965 to 1980, before, from the late 1990s, suffering under Mugabe’s 
poor social, political and economic management of the country. 
 
These differences have an impact on the relative importance of different survival 
mechanism, and the ease with which they can be used. Although countries in the region, 
and particularly Malawi’s neighbours, have many things in common, the differences mean 
that results presented in this study should be taken as indicative of behaviour elsewhere 
in the region. 
 
Although efforts have been made to ensure that the results are as reliable as possible, 
there remain several issues. In both chapters 5 and 6, which use cross-sectional data, it 
would have been ideal to use suitable panel data sets. This would help to minimise the 
risk that unobserved heterogeneity of individuals or households drives the results. This 
would be of particular interest for mental accounting, since it would be ideal to know that 
an individual changes his/her behaviour when his/her income composition changes, 
rather than simply that individuals with different income compositions have different 
consumption habits. 
 
In Chapter 5, ideally, one would want to know about remittances from non-relatives and 
from relatives other than those the respondent was questioned about. This would make it 
possible to understand better the degree of substitutability of remittances from different 
sources. In addition, suitable instruments would be found for variables indicating receipt 
of remittances from different sources in order to limit the risk of simultaneity.  
 
Since both geographical (in Chapter 7) and relationship source are shown to matter, it 
would be ideal to combine these findings to assess in more detail which drives remittance 
behaviour and how these interact.  
 
In addition, the difficulties of household versus individual receipts would ideally be 
assessed using panel data. In one sense, it would be ideal to conduct analysis (of mental 
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accounting and motivations to remit) on an individual level since in both cases theories 
relate to individual motivation or behaviour. However, one cannot rule out intra-
household bargaining. Therefore, the household level would be more suitable. 
Unfortunately, combining these two facts in quantitative empirical analysis is difficult, 
and, with the data used, almost impossible without some loss of information. Ideally, the 
results would therefore be combine with more qualitative analysis in order to gain a 
wider understanding of the results and the interaction between individual and household 
behaviour. 
8.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the increase in the importance of remittances, and the ever growing interest 
shown by academics and policy makers, remittances remain an under-studied topic 
relevant to their significance in a development context. Data and econometric issues 
make analysing remittances a difficult task, and the wide range of cultural and economic 
contexts ensures that the impacts of remittances can differ widely. 
 
Despite these difficulties, this thesis has studied remittances from three relevant 
perspectives within the cultural setting of a rural sub-Saharan African economy. 
Remittances have been followed from the sender, to their uses, and finally to one of the 
impacts using three different, relevant data sets. 
 
This thesis has contributed to the overall understanding of remittances. Specifically, it has 
extended the study of remittance motivations by looking at inter family transfers and 
understanding that the relationship between the sender and receiver matters. It has 
extended the study of mental accounting to a developing context and to remittances. This 
offers an explanation for other authors’ findings that remittances can impact on 
consumption choice including education. Finally, since remittances can act to moderate 
the impact of shocks, this study recognises that, in an agricultural context, the 
geographical source of remittances matters. Community or covariate shocks require 
remittances from further afield than idiosyncratic, household shocks. 
 
Although the data present some limitations, there is scope for further study of 
remittances from each of the angles presented. In Chapter 5, motivations for remitting 
could be examined from the household perspective by limiting the study to two-parent 
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households and including characteristics of both the husband and wife. A second 
extension might be to limit the study only to those households which reported having a 
potential remittance relationship with individuals living outside the respondents’ villages. 
Both of these studies might produce interesting results, particularly in order to compare 
with the results presented in this thesis, but would also potentially suffer from selection 
bias. An interesting extension to Chapter 6 would be to examine remittances separately 
depending upon which member of the household received them. In particular, it might be 
useful to classify remittances separately depending upon whether they were received by 
the main male or main female of the household. This degree of disaggregation is likely to 
require a larger data set. Finally, several extensions to Chapter 7 might be insightful and 
provide additional, complementary, information. For example, it would be interesting to 
study other coping mechanisms which the household reported. With regards to 
remittances, as well as the geographical source, Chapter 5 suggests that the relationship 
of the sender to the receiver might matter. It would be interesting to know who insures 
the shocks, with results in Chapter 5 suggesting that parents and siblings are of great help 
to working age adults in this respect.  
 
Although this thesis has offered several new perspectives from which to consider 
remittances, and generated new results, these potential extensions show that there are 
several avenues of research which remain to be pursued in each area. It is hoped that 
future research will provide answers to these, and other, related issues. 
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